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Abstract
I study endogenous learning dynamics for people expecting systematic reversals
from random sequences — the “gambler’s fallacy.” Biased agents face an optimal-
stopping problem, such as managers conducting sequential interviews. They are un-
certain about the underlying distribution (e.g. talent distribution in the labor pool)
and learn its parameters from their predecesors. Agents stop when early draws are
deemed “good enough,” so predecessors’ experience contain negative streaks but not
positive streaks. Since biased agents understate the likelihood of consecutive below-
average draws, society converges to over-pessimistic beliefs about the distribution’s
mean. When early agents decrease their acceptance thresholds due to pessimism, later
agents will become more surprised by the lack of positive reversals in their predecessors’
histories, leading to more pessimistic inferences and lower acceptance thresholds — a
positive-feedback cycle. Agents who are additionally uncertain about the distribution’s
variance believe in fictitious variation (exaggerated variance) to an extent depending
on the severity of data censoring.
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1 Introduction
The gambler’s fallacy is widespread. Many people believe that a fair coin has a higher
chance of landing on tails after landing on heads three times in a row, think a son is “due”
to a woman who has given birth to consecutive daughters, and, in general, expect too much
reversal from sequential realizations of independent random events. Studies have documented
this bias in settings where it is strictly costly, such as state lotteries with pari-mutuel payouts
(Terrell, 1994; Suetens, Galbo-Jørgensen, and Tyran, 2016) and incentivized lab experiments
(Benjamin, Moore, and Rabin, 2017). The same bias also affects experienced decision-makers
in high-stakes environments, including immigration judges (Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue,
2016). Section 1.3 surveys more of this empirical literature.
This paper highlights novel implications of the gambler’s fallacy in optimal-stopping
problems when a society of biased agents learns about the underlying distributions. As a
running example, consider a junior HR manager who sequentially interviews candidates for
a single job opening. In deciding whether to hire a candidate or to keep searching, the junior
manager must form a belief about the distribution of potential future applicants should she
keep the position open. She consults with senior managers and adopts their belief about
the labor pool based on their recruiting experience for similar positions in the past. The
junior manager then implements a stopping strategy for her own recruiting problem, updates
her belief at the end of the hiring season, and shares this new belief with future managers.
Suppose all managers commit the gambler’s fallacy — that is, they exaggerate how unlikely
it is to get consecutive above-average or consecutive below-average applicants (relative to
the labor pool mean). This error stems from the same psychology that leads people to
exaggerate how unlikely it is to get consecutive heads or consecutive tails when tossing a fair
coin. How does this bias influence the managers’ beliefs and behavior over time?
In this example and other natural optimal-stopping problems, agents tend to stop when
early draws are deemed “good enough,” leading to an asymmetric truncation of experience.
When a manager discovers a sufficiently strong candidate early in the hiring cycle, she stops
her recruitment efforts and does not observe what additional candidates would have been
found for the same job opening with a longer search. This endogenous censoring effect on
histories interacts with the gambler’s fallacy bias and leads to pessimistic inference about
the labor pool. Managers continue searching only when their early candidates are below-
average. They misinterpret subsequent above-average candidates as the expected positive
reversal after bad initial outcomes, not as strong signals about the labor pool. On the other
hand, they are surprised by subsequent below-average candidates since they understate the
likelihood of bad streaks, misreading consecutive bad draws as very strong negative signals
about the pool. That is, after bad early draws, managers under-infer from subsequent good
draws but over-infer from subsequent bad draws. On average, they communicate an over-
pessimistic impression of the labor pool to today’s junior manager. This pessimism informs
1
the junior manager’s stopping strategy and affects the kind of censored history she observes
and the new belief she communicates to future managers.
This paper examines the endogenous learning dynamics of a society of agents believing
in the gambler’s fallacy. All agents face a common stage game: an optimal-stopping problem
with draws in different periods independently generated from fixed yet unknown distribu-
tions.1 They take turns playing the stage game, with each agent’s payoff determined by the
game’s outcome. Agents are Bayesians except for the statistical bias. That is, they start with
a prior belief supported on a class of feasible models about the joint distribution of draws.
Feasible models are symmetric, log-concave distributions indexed by different unconditional
means (the fundamentals). I study the gambler’s fallacy as a misspecified prior: all feasible
models specify that better earlier draws tend to lead to worse later draws, and vice versa.
The feasible models exclude the true distribution where draws are independent, so agents
undertake misspecified Bayesian learning.
I consider two social-learning environments. In the first environment, agents play the
stage game one at a time. Before playing her own game, each agent adopts the final belief of
her immediate predecessor as her prior belief and formulates a stopping strategy. At the end
of her game, she updates her belief about the fundamentals by applying the Bayes’ rule to
her stage-game history, then passes on her posterior belief to her successor. I show that the
stochastic processes of the agents’ beliefs and behavior almost surely converge to a unique
steady state in which agents are over-pessimistic about the fundamentals and stop too early
relative to the objectively optimal strategy.
In the second environment, agents arrive in large generations with everyone in the same
generation playing simultaneously after observing all predecessors’ histories. Society con-
verges to the same steady state as the previous environment. This large-generations model
illustrates a positive-feedback cycle between distorted beliefs and distorted stopping strate-
gies. More severely censored datasets lead to more pessimistic beliefs, while more pessimistic
beliefs lead to earlier stopping and, as a consequence, heavier history censoring. Mapping
back to the recruiting example, suppose a firm appoints HR managers in cohorts. Upon
arrival, each junior manager learns the recruiting experience of all previous managers. If
managers in the first cohort start with the correct stopping strategy, then average hiring
outcome monotonically deteriorates across all future cohorts. After today’s cohort observes
predecessors’ histories and makes an over-pessimistic inference, this belief leads them to
act less “choosy” and only keep searching if their early candidates prove to be truly un-
satisfactory. On average, early applicants rejected by today’s managers are worse than the
1Mueller, Spinnewijn, and Topa (2018) find evidence consistent with people exhibiting the gambler’s
fallacy in an optimal-stopping problem. They show job seekers’ beliefs about the probability of finding a
job in the near future increase significantly over the course of the unemployment spell, after controlling for
individual fixed effects. These beliefs contrast with theories that predict decreasing job-finding rates (e.g.,
human capital depreciation) and with the authors’ structural estimation that suggests constant rates. One
application of my work is studying how a society of such biased job seekers make inferences about job-finding
rates from others’ job-search experience.
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early applicants rejected by previous cohorts. Since biased learners expect greater positive
reversal following worse early outcomes, they expect an improved distribution of later can-
didates compared to what happened in previous generations. When this improvement fails
to materialize, biased managers become disappointed and view it as a negative signal about
the average labor-pool quality. The pessimistic inference of today’s cohort thus becomes
amplified in the next generation, leading to a further lowering of acceptance thresholds and
a further decrease in the average quality of the hired candidate.
The endogenous-data setting leads to novel comparative statics predictions about how
the economic environment affects learning outcomes under the gambler’s fallacy. For in-
stance, suppose a new government policy subsidizes longer search in the optimal-stopping
problem, so that agents incur a lower continuation cost when they decide to keep searching.
This policy does not change long-run learning outcomes if data is exogenous or if agents are
correctly specified. When biased agents learn from endogenously censored histories, how-
ever, lower continuation costs in the stage game moderate steady-state pessimism about the
fundamentals. This result is another expression of the positive feedback between actions
and beliefs. Under the new policy, agents use higher acceptance thresholds and generate less
censored histories, which lead to less pessimistic beliefs for their successors. An increase in
acceptance thresholds today (due to the subsidy) gets compounded with further increases
in the future (due to more optimistic beliefs). In the long run, the government subsidy
— a policy intervention implementable without knowing the true distribution — partially
corrects society’s beliefs.
Finally, I specialize to the Gaussian case, expand the set of feasible models, and consider
agents who are uncertain about both the means and variances of the distributions. In this
joint estimation, agents misinfer means by the same amount as in the baseline model, and
exaggerate variances. In the recruiting example, biased managers wrongly believe that ap-
plicants for different vacancies come from different labor pools that vary in average quality,
when in reality applicants for all vacancies originate from the same pool with a fixed qual-
ity distribution. This belief in vacancy-specific fixed effects helps biased managers better
explain histories containing consecutive below-average candidates, reasoning that it must
have been especially difficult to find good applicants for these specific job openings. The
degree of belief in this fictitious variation both depends on severity of history censoring and
influences the managers’ stopping strategy. I derive two results that illustrate how this be-
lief in fictitious variation interacts with endogenous learning. First, when the stage-game
payoff function is convex in draws (such as when previously rejected candidates can be
recalled with some probability in the sequential interviewing game), the positive-feedback
cycle of the baseline environment strengthens. More severely censored histories not only
make agents more pessimistic about the fundamentals by the usual censoring effect, but also
decrease their belief in fictitious variation. Both forces encourage earlier stopping due to
the convexity of the optimal-stopping problem, so subsequent agents will face even heavier
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data censoring. Second, a society where agents are uncertain about the variances can end
up with a different long-run belief about the means than another society where agents know
the correct variances. This is despite the fact that agents in both societies would make the
same (mis)inference about the means given the same data.
I study a number of extensions in the Online Appendix, showing robustness of the results
to a range of alternative specifications. The paper focuses on (misspecified) Bayesian agents,
but the over-pessimism result and the positive-feedback loop continue to obtain under a non-
Bayesian method-of-moments inference procedure (Online Appendix OA 5). For simplicity
I consider a two-period optimal-stopping problem as the stage game, but the combination
of the gambler’s fallacy and history truncation after good outcomes still produces over-
pessimistic inferences in stage games of arbitrary length (Online Appendix OA 2). I assume
all agents have the gambler’s fallacy. The presence of a subpopulation of unbiased agents or
agents suffering from additional behavioral biases may mitigate the extent of over-pessimism
(Online Appendix OA 8.2), but does not eliminate it.
1.1 Contributions
This work contributes to two strands of literature: the behavioral economics literature on
inference mistakes for biased learners, and the theoretical literature on the dynamics of
misspecified endogenous learning.
As a contribution to behavioral economics, I highlight a novel channel of misinference for
behavioral agents — the interaction between psychological bias and data censoring. In many
natural environments, agents learn from censored data. The economics literature has recently
focused on the learning implications of selection neglect in these settings, where agents act as
if their dataset is not censored.2 This work points out that other well-documented behavioral
biases can also interact with data censoring to produce new implications. Mislearning stems
precisely from this interaction, not from either censored data or the gambler’s fallacy alone.
Agents who do not suffer from the statistical bias learn the fundamentals correctly even from
censored histories. On the other hand, if we removed censoring by having agents observe ex-
post what would have been drawn in each period of the optimal-stopping problem, then even
biased agents would learn the fundamentals correctly. The intuition is that the gambler’s
fallacy is a “symmetric” bias. The “asymmetric” outcome of over-pessimism only occurs
when the bias interacts with an (endogenous) asymmetric censoring mechanism that tends
to produce data containing negative streaks but not positive streaks. Environments that
feature different censoring patterns (e.g., strategies that produce positive streaks) or other
behavioral biases would produce different predictions, but again through the same basic
mechanism— interaction between censoring and bias.
As a theoretical contribution, I prove convergence of beliefs and behavior in a non-self-
2See, for example, Enke (2019) and Jehiel (2018).
4
confirming misspecified setting with a continuum of states of the world. Economists study
many kinds of misspecifications with the property that even the “best-fitting” feasible belief
does not match data exactly — that is to say, no feasible self-confirming belief exists. The
gambler’s fallacy belongs to this family, since all feasible models imply a negative correla-
tion absent in the data. This paper analyzes the stochastic processes of belief and behavior
under this statistical bias, proving their global almost-sure convergence to a unique steady
state. In related work, Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018) study learning dynamics un-
der overconfidence about own ability. Despite being biased, agents in their setting always
have some feasible belief that exactly rationalizes data, so their learning steady-state is a
self-confirming equilibrium.3 Another difference is that I establish my convergence result in
a setting with multiple dimensions of uncertainty (the distributional parameters for different
periods of the stage game), whereas Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018) consider conver-
gence of misspecified learning with one-dimensional uncertainty. Fudenberg, Romanyuk, and
Strack (2017) study a continuous-time model of active learning under misspecification, but
their learning problem only involves two feasible models. In this work, agents’ prior belief
about each distributional parameter is supported on a continuum of possible values.
As another contribution to the theoretical literature on misspecified learning dynamics,
this project studies a new source of endogeneity: the censoring effect in a dynamic stage
game. The dynamic stage game is both essential for studying learning under the gambler’s
fallacy — a behavioral bias concerning the serial correlation of data — and crucial for the
censoring effect. In my setting, the type of data that an agent generates depends on her
beliefs. To understand the distinction from the existing literature, consider the classic paper
in this area, Nyarko (1991), who studies a monopolist setting a price on each date and
observing the resulting sales. No matter what action the monopolist takes, she observes
the same type of data: quantity sold. Similarly, the agent in Fudenberg, Romanyuk, and
Strack (2017) always observes payoffs and the agent in Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018)
always observes output levels, after any action. Endogenous learning in these other papers
takes the form of agents attributing different meanings to the same data, when interpreted
through the lenses of different actions. On the other hand, we may think of stage-game
histories censored with different thresholds as different types of data that, by themselves,
lead to different beliefs about the fundamentals for biased learners. Actions play no role in
inference except to generate these different types of data, as the likelihood of a (feasible)
history does not depend on the censoring threshold that produced it.
1.2 Other Related Theoretical Work
Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010) are the first to study the inferential mistakes
3Their follow-up work Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2019) also focuses on mislearning with one-
dimensional uncertainty in a self-confirming setting.
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implied by the gambler’s fallacy. Except for an example in Rabin (2002), discussed below,
all such investigations focus on passive inference, whereby learners observe an exogenous
information process. By contrast, this paper examines an endogenous learning setting where
actions affect observables. This setting allows me to study how actions and beliefs co-evolve
and whether the feedback cycle between them attenuates or exaggerates distortions over the
course of learning. Another distinction is that the present paper focuses on the dynamics of
mislearning under censoring and works with the stochastic processes of beliefs and behavior.
Section 7 of Rabin (2002) discusses an example of endogenous learning with a finite-urn
model of the gambler’s fallacy. The nature of Rabin (2002)’s endogenous data, however, is
unrelated to the censoring effect central to the current paper.4 In Online Appendix OA 6,
I modify Rabin’s example to induce the censoring effect. His finite-urn model then delivers
a misinference result analogous to the results in this paper, which are derived in a different
setting with continuously-valued draws. This exercise shows the robustness of my results
within different modeling frameworks of the same statistical bias.
Steady state in this work corresponds to Esponda and Pouzo (2016)’s Berk-Nash equilib-
rium. Rather than focusing only on equilibrium analysis, however, I study non-equilibrium
learning dynamics and prove global convergence of behavior.5 This paper also contains more
specific results: I emphasize the interaction between censoring and bias as the driver of mis-
learning, discuss how changing the stage game affects long-run beliefs, and relate my results
to previous findings on inference under the gambler’s fallacy (e.g., fictitious variation in an
endogenous-data setting).
Although my learning framework involves a sequence of short-lived agents, the social-
learning aspect of the framework is not central to the results. In fact, the environment
where a sequence of short-lived agents acts one at a time is equivalent to an environment
where a single long-lived agent plays the stage game repeatedly, myopically maximizing her
expected payoff in each iteration of the stage game. In the growing literature on social
learning with misspecified Bayesians (e.g., Eyster and Rabin (2010); Gaurino and Jehiel
(2013); Bohren (2016); Bohren and Hauser (2018); Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2019)), agents
observe their predecessors’ actions but make errors when inverting these actions to deduce
said predecessors’ information. This kind of action inversion does not take place here: later
agents inherit all the information that their predecessors have seen, either by adopting their
beliefs or by observing their histories, so predecessors’ actions are uninformative.
The econometrics literature has also studied data-generating processes with censoring —
4In Rabin (2002)’s example, biased agents (correctly) believe that the part of the data which is always
observable is independent of the part of the data which is sometimes missing. However, what I term
the “censoring effect” is about misinference resulting from agents wrongly believing in negative correlation
between the early draws that are always observed and the later draws that may be censored, depending on
the realizations of the early draws.
5Esponda, Pouzo, and Yamamoto (2019)’s work-in-progress considers misspecified learning environments
with finite action sets and studies the convergence of empirical action frequencies. Their techniques and
notion of convergence do not seem to apply to a setting with a continuum of actions.
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for example, the Tobit model and models of competing risks.6 This literature has primarily
focused on the issue of model identification from censored data (Cox, 1962; Tsiatis, 1975;
Heckman and Honoré, 1989). In my setting, there is no identification problem for correctly
specified agents. Instead, I study how agents make wrong parameter estimates from censored
data when they infer using a family of misspecified models. Another contrast is that the
econometrics literature has focused on exogenous data-censoring mechanisms, but censoring
is endogenous in this paper and depends on the beliefs of previous agents. This endogeneity
is central to the results, as discussed before.
1.3 Empirical Evidence on the Gambler’s Fallacy
Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) review classical psychology studies on the gambler’s fallacy.
The earliest lab evidence involves two types of tasks. In “production tasks,” subjects are
asked to write down sequences using a given alphabet, with the goal of generating sequences
that resemble the realizations of an i.i.d. random process. Subjects tend to produce sequences
with too many alternations between symbols, as they attempt to locally balance out symbol
frequencies. In “judgment tasks” where people are asked to identify which sequence of
binary symbols appears most like consecutive tosses of a fair coin, subjects routinely judge
sequences with an alternation rate of 60% as “more random” than those with an alternation
rate of 50%. While most of these studies are unincentivized, Benjamin, Moore, and Rabin
(2017) have found the gambler’s fallacy with strict monetary incentives, where a bet on a
fair coin continuing its streak pays strictly more than the bet on the streak reversing. Barron
and Leider (2010) have shown that experiencing a streak of binary outcomes one at a time
exacerbates the gambler’s fallacy, compared with simply being told the past sequence of
outcomes all at once.
Other studies have identified the gambler’s fallacy using field data on lotteries and casino
games. Unlike in experiments, agents in field settings are typically not explicitly told the
underlying probabilities of the randomization devices. In state lotteries, players tend to
avoid betting on numbers that have very recently won. This under-betting behavior is
strictly costly for the players when lotteries have a pari-mutuel payout structure (as in the
studies of Terrell (1994) and Suetens, Galbo-Jørgensen, and Tyran (2016)), since it leads to a
larger-than-average payout per winner in the event that the same number is drawn again the
following week. Using security video footage, Croson and Sundali (2005) show that roulette
gamblers in casinos bet more on a color after a long streak of the opposite color. Narayanan
and Manchanda (2012) use individual-level data tracked using casino loyalty cards to find
that a larger recent win has a negative effect on the next bet that the gambler places, while
a larger recent loss increases the size of the next bet. Finally, using field data from asylum
judges, loan officers, and baseball umpires, Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016) show that
6References can be found in Amemiya (1985) and Crowder (2001).
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even very experienced decision-makers show a tendency to alternate between two decisions
across a sequence of randomly ordered decision problems. This can be explained by the
gambler’s fallacy, as the fallacy leads to the belief that the objectively “correct” decision
is negatively auto-correlated across a sequence of decision problems. The authors rule out
several other explanations, including contrast effect and quotas.
As Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010) have argued, someone who dogmati-
cally believes in the gambler’s fallacy will attribute the lack of reversals in the data to the
fundamental probabilities of the randomizing device. One implication is that the gambler’s
fallacy generates the hot-hand fallacy: in settings where it is plausible that the fundamental
probabilities fluctuate, biased agents may come to believe in such fluctuations even if they do
not exist. For instance, a sports fan who under-estimates the likelihood of making four free
throws in a row with a 70% accuracy rate reasons that anyone on a four-hits streak must be
in a “hot” state with a temporarily elevated accuracy rate far above 70%. This misinference
leads the fan to over-estimate the probability that the said player will also make the next free
throw. The same kind of overinference can be seen in the field data. Cumulative win/loss (as
opposed to very recent win/loss) on a casino trip is positively correlated with the size of fu-
ture bets (Narayanan and Manchanda, 2012). A player who believes in the gambler’s fallacy
rationalizes his persistent good luck on a particular day by thinking he must be in a “hot”
state. Similarly, a number that has been drawn more often in the past six weeks, excluding
the most recent past week, gets more bets in the Denmark lottery (Suetens, Galbo-Jørgensen,
and Tyran, 2016). This kind of overinference from small samples persists even in a market
setting where participants have had several rounds of experience and feedback (Camerer,
1987). In line with these studies about misinferences under a primitive gambler’s fallacy
bias, I consider agents who believe in reversals conditional on the underlying fundamentals
and mislearn some parameters of the world as a result. But, the misinference mechanism in
this paper is further complicated by the presence of endogenous data censoring.
2 Model and Overview of Results
This section presents the basic elements of the model, previews the main results, and provides
intuition for how the censoring effect drives the conclusions. I describe the (single-player)
stage game, an optimal-stopping problems satisfying some conditions. Agents are uncertain
about the distribution of draws in the stage game. They entertain a prior belief over a family
of feasible models of how draws are generated. All feasible models specify the same negative
correlation between draws, though they are objectively independent — an error that reflects
the gambler’s fallacy. Sections 3 and 4 embed these model elements into social-learning
environments and derive learning dynamics. Section 5 contains a number of extensions that
verify robustness of the main results.
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2.1 Basic Elements of the Model
2.1.1 Optimal-Stopping Problem as a Dynamic Stage Game
The stage game is a two-period optimal-stopping problem. In the first period, the agent
draws x1 ∈ R and decides whether to stop. If she stops, her payoff is u1(x1) and the stage
game ends. Otherwise, she continues to the second period and draws x2 ∈ R. The stage
game then ends with the payoff u2(x1, x2).
The payoff functions u1 : R → R and u2 : R2 → R satisfy some regularity conditions to
be introduced in Assumption 1. The following example satisfies Assumption 1 and will be
used to illustrate my results throughout this paper.
Example 1 (search with q probability of recall). Many industries have an annual hiring
cycle. Consider a firm in such an industry and an HR manager who must fill a job opening
during this year’s cycle. In the early phase of the hiring cycle, she finds a candidate who
would bring net benefit x1 to the organization if hired. She must decide between hiring
this candidate immediately or waiting. Waiting means she continues searching in the late
phase of the cycle, finding another candidate with benefit x2. Waiting carries the risk that
the early candidate accepts an offer from a different firm in the interim, which happens
with probability 0 < 1 − q ≤ 1. This situation has the payoff functions u1(x1) = x1
and u2(x1, x2) = q · max(x1, x2) + (1 − q)x2. In the late phase, there is q probability the
manager gets payoff equal to the higher of the two candidates’ qualities, and complementary
probability that only the second candidate is available.
The following regularity conditions define the class of optimal-stopping problems I study.
Assumption 1 (regularity conditions). The payoff functions satisfy:
(a) For x′1 > x
′′
1 and x
′
2 > x
′′
2 , u1(x
′
1) > u1(x
′′
1) and u2(x
′
1, x
′
2) > u2(x
′
1, x
′′
2).
(b) For x′1 > x
′′
1 and any x¯2, u1(x
′
1)− u1(x′′1) > |u2(x′1, x¯2)− u2(x′′1 , x¯2)|.
(c) There exist xg1, xb2, xb1, x
g
2 ∈ R so that u1(xg1) > u2(xg1, xb2) and u1(xb1) < u2(xb1, xg2).
(d) u1, u2 are continuous and x2 7→ u2(x¯1, x2 + k¯) is absolutely integrable with respect to
the objective distribution of X2 for all x¯1, k¯ ∈ R.
Assumption 1(a) says u1, u2 are strictly increasing in the draws of their respective periods.
Assumption 1(b) says a higher realization of the early draw increases first-period payoff more
than it changes second-period payoff. Under Assumption 1(a), Assumption 1(b) is satisfied
whenever u2 is not a function of x1, as in optimal-stopping problems where stopping in period
k gives payoff only depending on the k-th draw. Assumption 1(c) says there exist situations
where the agent wants to stop and other situations where the agent wants to continue. The
technical Assumption 1(d) ensures continuation payoffs are well-defined. These conditions
are satisfied by my recurring example.
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Claim 1. Example 1 satisfies Assumption 1 whenever the objective distribution of X2 has a
finite first moment.
Proofs of results in Sections 2 to 4 can be found in Appendix A.
I now define strategies and histories of the stage game.
Definition 1. A strategy is a function S : R→{Stop, Continue} that maps the realization
of the first-period draw X1 = x1 into a stopping decision.
Without loss I only consider pure strategies, because there always exists a payoff-maximizing
pure strategy under any belief about the distribution of draws.
Definition 2. The history of the stage game is an element h ∈ H := R × (R ∪ {∅}). If
an agent decides to stop after X1 = x1, her history is (x1,∅). If the agent continues after
X1 = x1 and draws X2 = x2 in the second period, her history is (x1, x2).
The symbol ∅ is a censoring indicator, emphasizing that the hypothetical second-period
draw is unobserved when the agent does not continue into the second period. In Example 1,
if the HR manager hires the first candidate, she stops her recruitment efforts early and the
counterfactual second candidate that she would have found had she kept the position open
remains unknown.
2.1.2 Feasible Models and the Objective Model
I work with a general class of distributions for the main results. Both the true data-generating
process and the agents’ domain of learning can be described in terms of a pair of densities
on R satisfying the following:
Assumption 2 (log-concavity and symmetry). f1(· | 0) and f2(· | 0) are strictly positive
densities on R with finite second moments, and they are strictly log-concave, symmetric, and
mean-zero.
A leading example of strictly log-concave and symmetric distributions is the Gaussian
distribution. Another example is the logistic distribution. The mean-zero condition is only
a normalization, since we can shift any log-concave distribution symmetric around its mean
to be centered around 0.
For τ1, τ2 ∈ R, let f1(· | τ1) and f2(· | τ2) represent shifted versions of f1(· | 0) and f2(· | 0)
centered around τ1 and τ2, respectively. More precisely, f1(x1 | τ1) := f1(x1 − τ1 | 0) and
f2(x2 | τ2) := f2(x2 − τ2 | 0) for x1, x2 ∈ R.
Objectively, draws X1, X2 in the stage game are independently distributed with X1 ∼
f1(· | µ•1) and X2 ∼ f2(· | µ•2). The parameters µ•1, µ•2 ∈ R are the true fundamentals. In
Example 1, µ•1 and µ•2 stand for the true qualities of the two applicant pools in the early and
late phases of the hiring season.
Agents are uncertain about the distribution of (X1, X2). The next definition describes
the set of distributions that a gambler’s fallacy agent deems plausible.
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Definition 3. The set of feasible models {Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) : (µ1, µ2) ∈ M} is a family of joint
distributions of (X1, X2) indexed by feasible fundamentals (µ1, µ2) ∈M ⊆ R2, for some bias
parameter γ > 0. Here Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) refers to the joint distribution
X1 ∼ f1(· | µ1)
(X2 | X1 = x1) ∼ f2(· | µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)),
where X2 | (X1 = x1) is the conditional distribution of X2 given X1 = x1.
I write EΨ and PΨ throughout for expectation and probability with respect to model Ψ.
When E and P are used without subscripts, they refer to expectation and probability under
the true model, Ψ• = Ψ(µ•1, µ•2; 0).
I model the gambler’s fallacy as an additive shift in the agent’s belief about X2’s dis-
tribution following different X1 realizations, so that (X2 | X1 = x1) increases in first-order
stochastic dominance order as x1 decreases. Conditional on the fundamentals, if the real-
ization of X1 is higher than expected, then the agent believes bad luck is due in the near
future and the second draw is likely below average.7 Conversely, an exceptionally bad early
draw likely portends above-average luck in the next period. This interpretation is clearer
in the following equivalent formulation of Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ): X1 = µ1 + 1, X2 = µ2 + 2 where
1 ∼ f1(· | 0) and (2 | 1) ∼ f2(· | −γ1). The mean-zero terms 1, 2 represent the idiosyn-
cratic factors, or “luck,” that determine how X1 and X2’s realizations deviate from their
unconditional means µ1 and µ2. The negative correlation between 1 and 2 conditional on
µ1, µ2 represents a belief in reversal of luck. Larger γ > 0 implies greater magnitudes in
these expected reversals and thus more bias.
It is useful to keep the Gaussian case in mind, which I will use to derive closed-form
versions of some general results. I will also specialize to the Gaussian case for some of the
extensions in Section 5.
Example 2 (the Gaussian case). Objectively, X1 ∼ N (µ•1, σ2) and X2 ∼ N (µ•2, σ2) are
independent Gaussian random variables each with variance σ2 > 0. But the agent believes
X1, X2 are a pair of correlated Gaussian random variables with X1 ∼ N (µ1, σ2) and (X2 |
X1 = x1) ∼ N (µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1), σ2) for some (µ1, µ2) ∈M.
The set of feasible models is indexed by the set of feasible fundamentals, M. We may
think of the agents as learning about the unconditional means of X1 and X2, withM as the
domain of their inference.
7I study gambler’s fallacy for continuous random variables, where the magnitude of X1 affects the agent’s
prediction about X2. Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016)’s analysis of baseball umpire data provides support
for the continuous version of the statistical bias. They find that an umpire is more likely to call the current
pitch a ball after having called the previous pitch a strike, controlling for the actual location of the pitch.
Crucially, the effect size is larger after more obvious strikes, where “obviousness” is based on the distance of
the pitch to the center of the regulated strike zone. This distance can be thought of as a continuous measure
of the “quality” of each pitch.
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Remark 1. I will consider several specifications ofM throughout this paper.
(a) M = R2. The agent thinks all values (µ1, µ2) ∈ R2 are possible.
(b) M = ♦, where ♦ is a bounded parallelogram in R2 whose left and right edges are
parallel to the y-axis, whose top and bottom edges have slope −γ. The agent is
uncertain about both µ1 and µ2, but her uncertainty has bounded support.8
(c) M = {µ•1} × [µ2, µ¯2]. The agent has a correct, dogmatic belief about µ1, but has
uncertainty about µ2 supported on a bounded interval.
(d) M = {(µ, µ) : µ ∈ R}. The agent is convinced that the first-period and second-period
fundamentals are the same, but is uncertain what this common parameter is.
While the agent can freely update her belief about the fundamentals on M, she holds
a dogmatic belief about γ > 0.9 This implies the set of feasible models excludes the true
model, Ψ• = Ψ(µ•1, µ•2; 0), so Bayesian updating within the class of feasible models amounts
to misspecified learning. I use misspecification as a tool to represent and study the gambler’s
fallacy. This approach is motivated by field evidence on the bias’ persistence: for example,
Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016) show that even very experienced decision-makers exhibit
a non-negligible amount of the gambler’s fallacy in high-stakes settings.
In the social-learning environment I study in Section 3, short-lived agents each observes
one iteration of the stage game, so no one has a large enough dataset to identify the misspec-
ification problem. In Online Appendix OA 7, I discuss why even agents with large datasets
may never question their feasible models: the misspecification is “attentionally stable” in
the sense of Gagnon-Bartsch, Rabin, and Schwartzstein (2018).
Before stating my main results, I first establish a proposition about the optimal stage-
game strategy. This will motivate a slight strengthening of Assumption 1 that I need for
some results. For c ∈ R, write Sc for the cutoff strategy such that Sc(x1) = Stop if and only
if x1 > c. That is, Sc accepts all early draws above a cutoff threshold c.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1 and for γ > 0,
• Under each feasible model Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ), there exists a cutoff threshold C(µ1, µ2; γ) ∈ R
such that it is strictly optimal to continue whenever x1 < C(µ1, µ2; γ) and strictly
optimal to stop whenever x1 > C(µ1, µ2; γ).
• For every µ1 ∈ R, µ2 7→ C(µ1, µ2; γ) is strictly increasing.
8Any prior belief over fundamentals (µ1, µ2) supported on a bounded set in R2 can be arbitrarily well-
approximated by a prior belief over a large enough ♦.
9Section 5.3 studies the extension where agents are uncertain about γ, but the support of their prior
belief about γ lies to the left of 0 and is bounded away from it.
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• For every µ1 ∈ R, µ2 7→ C(µ1, µ2; γ) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant
1/γ.
The content of this proposition is threefold.
First, it shows that the best strategy for the class of optimal-stopping problems I study
takes a cutoff form. This is because a higher x1 both increases the payoff to stopping and,
under the gambler’s fallacy, predicts worse draws in the next period. Both forces push in the
direction of stopping. The optimality of cutoff strategies leads to an endogenous, asymmetric
censoring of histories, formalizing the idea that agents stop after “good enough” draws.
Second, holding fixed µ1, the cutoff threshold increases with µ2. This is because the agent
can afford to be choosier in the first period when prospects in the second period improve.
The third statement about Lipschitz continuity, on the other hand, gives a bound on
how quickly µ2 7→ C(µ1, µ2; γ) increases. Suppose that one agent believes draws are gen-
erated according to Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ), while another agent believes they are generated according
to Ψ(µ1, µ2 + 1; γ). If the first agent is indifferent between stopping and continuing after
X1 = c, then the second agent prefers stopping afterX1 = c+ 1γ . This is because the predicted
conditional mean of X2 falls by (1/γ) · γ = 1 when X1 increases by 1/γ under any feasible
model, which cancels out the relative optimism of the second agent about the unconditional
distribution of X2.
The Lipschitz constant 1/γ is guaranteed for every optimal-stopping problem satisfying
Assumption 1 and every γ > 0. But, 1/γ may not be the best Lipschitz constant. My results
use the slightly stronger condition that µ2 7→ C(µ•1, µ2; γ) has a Lipschitz constant strictly
smaller than 1/γ. Instead of making an assumption on C directly, I strengthen Assumption
1(b) on the stage-game primitives to imply the desired infinitesimally stronger Lipschitz
continuity.
Assumption 3 (`-Lipschitz continuity).
Either: (a) There exists 0 < ` < 1
γ
so that for every x1, x2 ∈ R and d > 0,
u1(x1 + `d)− u1(x1) ≥ u2(x1 + `d, x2 + (1− γ`)d)− u2(x1, x2)
Or: (b) u2 is Lipschitz continuous and only a function of x2, and furthermore there exists
 > 0 so that u′1(x1) >  for all x1 ∈ R.
Assumption 3(a) is satisfied by my recurring example.
Claim 2. Example 1 satisfies Assumption 3(a) with ` = 11+γ for every probability of recall
0 ≤ q < 1 and every bias γ > 0.
2.2 Main Results
I now state my two main results, which concern learning dynamics under the gambler’s
fallacy in two different social-learning environments. Precise details of these environments
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will follow in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.
In the first environment, short-lived agents arrive one per round, t = 1, 2, 3, .... Agent in
round t = 1 starts with a full-support prior density m0 : ♦ → R>0, where ♦ is a bounded
parallelogram in R2 as in Remark 1(b). In round t, agent t adopts the final belief m˜t−1 of her
immediate predecessor as her prior belief, then chooses a cutoff threshold C˜t to maximize
her expected payoff based on this belief.10 She observes what happens in her stage game and
uses Bayes’ rule to update her belief from m˜t−1 to m˜t, which then becomes the prior belief
of agent t+ 1.
In this environment, the sequences of cutoffs (C˜t) and posterior belief densities (m˜t) are
stochastic processes whose randomness derives from the randomness of draws. Draws are
objectively independent, both between the two periods in the same round of the stage game
and across different rounds. Write (µ˜1,t, µ˜2,t) for the random element in ♦ given by the
density m˜t.
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold, and the second derivative of ln (f2(x | µ•2))
is uniformly bounded for x ∈ R. There exists a unique steady state µ∞2 , c∞ ∈ R not depen-
dent on m0, so that provided (µ•1, µ∞2 ) ∈ ♦, almost surely limt→∞ C˜t = c∞ and (µ˜1,t, µ˜2,t)t≥1
converges in L1 to (µ•1, µ∞2 ). The steady state satisfies µ∞2 < µ•2 and c∞ < c•, where c• is the
objectively optimal cutoff threshold.
In other words, almost surely behavior and belief converge in the society, and this steady
state is independent of the prior over fundamentals (provided its support is large enough).
In the steady state, agents hold overly pessimistic beliefs about the fundamentals and stop
too early, relative to the objectively optimal strategy. (The additional regularity assumption
that the second derivative of ln (f2(x | µ•2)) is uniformly bounded is satisfied by the Gaussian
and logistic distributions.)
In the second environment, short-lived agents arrive in generations, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., with
a continuum of agents per generation. Agents’ prior belief about the fundamentals is given
by a full-support density m0 on R2, as in Remark 1(a). Each agent observes the stage-game
histories of all predecessors from all past generations to make inferences about the funda-
mentals. Due to the large generations, cutoffs and beliefs are deterministic in generations
t ≥ 1, which I denote as c[t] and µ[t] = (µ1,[t], µ2,[t]) respectively. The society is initialized at
an arbitrary cutoff strategy Sc[0] in the 0th generation, the initial condition.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Starting from any initial condition and any
m0, cutoffs (c[t])t≥1 and beliefs (µ2,[t])t≥1 form monotonic sequences across generations. When
Assumption 3 also holds, there exists a unique steady state µ∞2 , c∞ ∈ R so that c[t] → c∞
and (µ1,[t], µ2,[t])→ (µ•1, µ∞2 ) monotonically, regardless of the initial condition and m0. This
steady state is the same as the one in Theorem 1.
10I focus on learning across different iterations of the stage game and assume agents do not update beliefs
within the stage game.
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The monotonicity of beliefs and cutoffs across generations reflects the positive feedback
between changes in beliefs and changes in behavior. Suppose generation t is more pessimistic
than generation t−1 about the second-period fundamental, µ2,[t] < µ2,[t−1]. The monotonicity
result implies that beliefs move in the same direction again in generation t + 1, that is
µ2,[t+1] < µ2,[t]. The information of generation t+ 1 differs from that of generation t only in
that agents in generation t + 1 observe all stage-game histories of generation t. This means
generation t’s stopping behavior differs from that of generation t − 1 in such a way as to
generate histories that amplify, not dampen, the initial change in beliefs from generation
t− 1 to generation t.
2.3 Intuition for the Main Results
In the learning environments of this paper, each agent censors her stage game history through
her stopping strategy, where the strategy choice depends on her beliefs. To build intuition
for how this censoring effect relates to the two main theorems, I first consider a biased agent
with feasible fundamentalsM = R2, facing a large sample of histories all censored according
to some cutoff threshold c. I characterize her inference about fundamentals when the sample
size grows and analyze how her inference depends on the cutoff threshold c.
Suppose c ∈ R ∪ {∞} and Ψ is a model. Then H(Ψ; c) refers to the distribution of
histories when draws are generated by Ψ and histories censored according to Sc.
Definition 4. For c ∈ R and Ψ a model, H(Ψ; c) ∈ ∆(H) is the distribution of histories
given by
H(Ψ; c)[E1 × E2] := PΨ [(E1 ∩ (c,∞))× E2] for E1, E2 ∈ B(R)
H(Ψ; c)[E1 × {∅}] := PΨ[(E1 ∩ (−∞, c])× R] for E1 ∈ B(R),
where B(R) is the collection of Borel subsets of R.
I abbreviate H(Ψ•; c) as simply H•(c), the true distribution of histories under the cutoff
threshold c. The next definition gives a measure of the difference between the distribution
of histories under the feasible model with fundamentals (µ1, µ2) and the true distribution of
histories, both with the same censoring threshold c.
Definition 5. For µ1, µ2 ∈ R, c ∈ R∪{∞} the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence from H•(c)
to H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); c), denoted by DKL(H•(c) || H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); c) ), is∫ ∞
c
f1(x1 | µ•1) · ln
(
f1(x1 | µ•1)
f1(x1 | µ1)
)
dx1
+
∫ c
−∞
{∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) · f2(x2 | µ•2) · ln
[
f1(x1 | µ•1) · f2(x2 | µ•2)
f1(x1 | µ1) · f2(x2 | µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1))
]
dx2
}
dx1.
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The minimizers of KL divergence with respect to cutoff c,
(µ∗1, µ∗2) ∈ arg min
µ1,µ2∈R
DKL(H•(c) || H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); c) ),
are called the pseudo-true fundamentals with respect to c.
To interpret, the likelihood of the history h = (x1, x2) with x1 ≤ c is f1(x1 | µ•1)·f2(x2 | µ•2)
under the true model Ψ•, f1(x1 | µ1) · f2(x2 | µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)) under the feasible model
Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ). The likelihood of the history h = (x1,∅) with x1 > c is f1(x1 | µ•1) under
the true model, f1(x1 | µ1) under the feasible model. The likelihoods of all other histories
are 0 under both models. So the KL divergence expression in Definition 5 is the expected
log-likelihood ratio of the history under the true model versus under the feasible model
with fundamentals (µ1, µ2), where expectation over histories is taken under the true model.
In general, this optimization objective depends on the cutoff threshold c and I denote the
pseudo-true fundamentals as µ∗1(c), µ∗2(c) to emphasize this dependence. The pseudo-true
fundamentals correspond to the biased agent’s inference about the fundamentals in large
samples.
The next proposition characterizes the pseudo-true fundamentals and contains the key
intuition behind the two main theorems.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 2, for any c ∈ R∪{∞}, the KL divergence minimization
problem in Definition 5 admit a unique solution (µ∗1(c), µ∗2(c)) ∈ R2. Furthermore:
• µ∗1(c) = µ•1 for any c ∈ R ∪ {∞}
• µ∗2(c) < µ•2 for any c ∈ R and µ∗2(∞) = µ•2
• µ∗2(c) is strictly increasing in c.
In the Gaussian case, the pseudo-true fundamental µ∗2(c) admits a closed-form expression
that readily verifies Proposition 2.
Example 2 (continued). In the Gaussian case, for c ∈ R ∪ {∞},
µ∗2(c) = µ•2 − γ (µ•1 − E [X1 | X1 ≤ c]) .
The censoring effect is crucial for misinference: as Proposition 2 shows, the pseudo-true
fundamentals are unbiased in the absence of censoring (i.e., when c =∞). Here is why the
directional data censoring I study leads to over-pessimism. In every feasible model of draws
Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ), the realization of X2 depends on two factors: the second-period fundamental
µ2, and a reversal effect based on the realization of X1. The biased agent cannot end up with
a correct or over-optimistic belief about µ2, else she would be systematically disappointed
by realizations of X2 in her dataset. This is because X2 is only uncensored when X1 is low
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enough, a contingency where the agent expects positive reversal on average. Over-pessimism
can therefore be thought of as “two wrongs making a right,” as the biased agent’s pessimism
about the unconditional mean of X2 counteracts her false expectation of positive reversals
in the dataset of censored histories.
This mechanism explains the long-run pessimism in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. In
fact, in the large-generations setting of Theorem 2, every generation t ≥ 1 holds strictly
pessimistic beliefs, so over-pessimism is also a short-run phenomenon provided there are
enough predecessors per generation. The idea that asymmetric data censoring after favorable
draws combined with the gambler’s fallacy leads to pessimistic inference is robust. In the
Gaussian case, it continues to hold when agents are uncertain about variances (Section
5.2), when the feasible fundamentals reflect agents’ knowledge that µ1 = µ2 as in Remark
1(d) (Section 5.4), when the stage game has more than two periods (Online Appendix OA
2), under an alternative method-of-moments inference procedure (Online Appendix OA 5),
when a fraction of agents suffer from selection neglect (Online Appendix OA 8.2), when
higher draws bring worse payoffs (Online Appendix OA 8.1), and with high probability after
observing a finite dataset containing just 100 censored histories (Online Appendix OA 9.1).
The severity of the biased agent’s pessimism increases with the severity of censoring. The
intuition is that the agent wants to infer a lower µ∗2 to better match X2’s in histories that
start with bad X1’s, but doing so carries the cost of a worse model fit for histories that start
with intermediate X1’s. More severe censoring — generated by a strategy that accepts not
only very good X1’s but also intermediate ones— alleviates this cost, as histories that start
with intermediate X1’s no longer contain their associated X2’s. The optimal inference µ∗2
thus decreases.
The comparative static dµ
∗
2
dc
> 0 is central to Theorem 2’s positive-feedback loop. In
the large-generations model, Generation 1 observes a large dataset of histories drawn from
H•(c[0]) and chooses a cutoff c[1]. Generation 2 then observes histories from all predecessor
generations, that is histories drawn from both H•(c[0]) and H•(c[1]). If c[1] < c[0], then
Generation 2’s dataset features (on average) more severe censoring than Generation 1’s
dataset. Thus, Generation 2 comes to a more pessimistic inference about the second-period
fundamental. By Proposition 1, this leads to a further lowering of the cutoff threshold,
c[2] < c[1], and the pattern continues.
3 Convergence, Over-Pessimism, and Early Stopping
This section studies a social-learning environment where biased agents act one at a time
and pass down beliefs to their successors. I define the steady state of the stage game,
prove its existence and uniqueness, and show it features over-pessimistic beliefs and early
stopping. Then, I turn to the stochastic process of beliefs and behavior in the social-learning
environment, showing that this process almost surely converges to the steady state.
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3.1 Steady State: Existence, Uniqueness, and Other Properties
A steady state is a triplet consisting of fundamentals (µ∞1 , µ∞2 ) ∈ R2 and a cutoff threshold
c∞ ∈ R that endogenously determine each other. The cutoff strategy with acceptance
threshold c∞ maximizes expected payoff under the feasible model Ψ(µ∞1 , µ∞2 ; γ), while the
fundamentals are the pseudo-true fundamentals under data censoring with threshold c∞.
More precisely,
Definition 6. A steady state consists of µ∞1 , µ∞2 , c∞ ∈ R such that:
1. c∞ = C(µ∞1 , µ∞2 ; γ).
2. µ∞1 = µ∗1(c∞) and µ∞2 = µ∗2(c∞).
Steady states correspond to Esponda and Pouzo (2016)’s pure Berk-Nash equilibria for an
agent whose prior is supported on the feasible models with feasible fundamentalsM = R2,
under the restriction that equilibrium belief puts full confidence in a single fundamental
pair. The set of steady states depends on γ, since the severity of the bias changes both the
optimal cutoff thresholds under different fundamentals and inference about fundamentals
from stage-game histories.
The “steady state” defined here almost surely characterizes the long-run learning outcome
in the society where biased agents act one by one. This convergence does not follow from
Esponda and Pouzo (2016), for their results only imply local convergence from prior beliefs
sufficiently close to the equilibrium beliefs, and only in a “perturbed game” environment
where learners receive idiosyncratic payoff shocks to different actions. I will show global
convergence of the stochastic processes of beliefs and behavior without payoff shocks.
Like almost all examples of Berk-Nash equilibrium in Esponda and Pouzo (2016), my
steady state generates data with positive KL divergence relative to the implied data distri-
bution under the steady-state beliefs. That is, H•(c∞) 6= H(Ψ(µ∞1 , µ∞2 ; γ); c∞), so the steady
state is not a self-confirming equilibrium.11 This is because for every censoring threshold c
(and in particular for c = c∞), the KL divergences of the true history distribution to the
history distributions under different feasible models is bounded away from 0.
To prove the existence and uniqueness of steady state, I define the following belief itera-
tion map on the second-period fundamental.
Definition 7. For γ > 0, the iteration map I : R→ R is given by
I(µ2; γ) := µ∗2(C(µ•1, µ2, γ))
11For example, under the history distribution H•(c∞), E[h2|c∞ − 1 ≤ h1 ≤ c∞] = E[h2|c∞ − 2 ≤ h1 ≤
c∞−1] since draws are objectively independent. However, under the history distribution driven by the steady-
state feasible model Ψ(µ∞1 , µ∞2 ; γ), we must have E[h2|c∞ − 1 ≤ h1 ≤ c∞] < E[h2|c∞ − 2 ≤ h1 ≤ c∞ − 1]
since γ > 0. This feature contrasts with Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018)’s model that results in a
self-confirming learning outcome.
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Given that µ∗1(c) = µ•1 for all c from Proposition 2, it is straightforward to see that
steady-state beliefs about µ2 are in bijection with fixed points of I. This shows steady-state
belief about µ2 exhibits over-pessimism.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 2, every steady state satisfies µ∞2 < µ•2, µ∞1 = µ•1.
Furthermore, steady state is unique under the additional Assumption 3.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, I is a contraction mapping with contraction
constant 0 < `γ < 1. Therefore, a unique steady state exists.
The contraction mapping property of I comes from two lemmas. First, we can use the
strict log-concavity assumption to show that µ∗2(c) is Lipschitz continuous with constant γ.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 2, µ∗2(c) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant γ.
Next , the indifference threshold is Lipschitz continuous with a Lipschitz constant strictly
less than 1/γ once we adopt Assumption 3.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, µ2 7→ C(µ•1, µ2; γ) is Lipschitz continuous with
a Lipschitz constant ` < 1/γ.
Even under Assumptions 1 and 2 alone, the basic regularity conditions we maintain
throughout, it turns out I is “almost” a contraction mapping for any γ > 0, in the sense
that |I(µ′2)−I(µ′′2)| < |µ′2−µ′′2 | for every µ′2, µ′′2 ∈ R. But, there is no guarantee of a uniform
contraction constant strictly less than 1. The slight strengthening in Assumption 3 ensures
such a uniform contraction constant exists.
I now show the steady-state stopping threshold always features stopping too early. For
every µ•1, µ•2 ∈ R, the objectively optimal stopping strategy takes the form of a cutoff c• ∈
R ∪ {±∞}, where c• = −∞ means always stopping and c• = ∞ means never stopping.12 I
show that c• > c∞ for every steady-state cutoff c∞. (This result only requires Assumptions
1 and 2 and does not require uniqueness of steady states.)
Early stopping does not directly follow from over-pessimism. In fact, outside of the
steady state, there is an intuition that a biased agent may stop later than a rational agent,
not earlier. For a concrete illustration, consider Example 1 with q = 0, so there is no
probability of recall. Suppose the true fundamentals are µ•1  µ•2. If a biased agent has
the correct beliefs about the fundamentals, she perceives a greater continuation value after
X1 = µ•2 than a rational agent with the same correct beliefs, since the former holds a
false expectation of positive reversals after a bad (relative to µ•1) early draw. Even though
c• = µ•2 and the rational agent chooses to stop, the biased agent chooses to continue and has
12This follows from Lemma A.2 in the Appendix, which shows even when γ = 0, the difference between
stopping payoff at x1 and expected continuation payoff after x1 is strictly increasing and continuous in x1.
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an indifference threshold strictly above c•. By continuity, the biased agent’s cutoff threshold
remains strictly above c• even under slightly pessimistic beliefs about µ2.
Nevertheless, the next proposition shows that in the steady state, it is unambiguous
that the biased agent stops too early relative to the objectively optimal threshold. The
early-stopping result strengthens the over-pessimism result. In the steady state, agents must
be sufficiently pessimistic as to overcome the opposite intuition about late stopping just
discussed.
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, every steady-state stopping threshold c∞ is
strictly lower than the objectively optimal threshold, c•.
To understand why, note the biased agent believes in different distributions of X2 follow-
ing different realizations of X1, with more pessimistic beliefs after higher realizations. In a
steady state (µ∞1 , µ∞2 , c∞), the agent’s subjective belief about X2 following X1 = c∞ must be
a leftward shift of the true distribution f2(· | µ•2). Else, the agent would have subjective dis-
tributions of X2 that stochastically dominate the true distribution whenever Sc∞ prescribes
continuing, so heuristically she could improve the fit of her model by lowering her belief
about µ2. The biased agent’s indifference at c∞ is thus based on an overly pessimistic belief
about the continuation value, so we must have c∞ < c•.
3.2 Social Learning with Agents Acting One by One
This section shows the steady state defined and studied earlier corresponds to the long-
run learning outcome for a society of biased agents acting one at a time. I outline the
convergence proof for a simpler variant of Theorem 1, where agents start off knowing µ•1 and
only entertain uncertainty over µ2. That is, the feasible fundamentals are given by Remark
1(c) rather than Remark 1(b). This simplification is without much loss: even when agents
are initially uncertain about µ1, they will almost surely learn it in the long run regardless of
the stochastic process of their predecessors’ stopping strategies. Intuitively, this is because
X1 can never be censored, so no belief distortion in µ1 is possible.13 Once agents have learned
µ•1, the rest of the argument proceeds much like the case where µ•1 is known from the start.
In the next section I comment on the key steps in extending the proof to the case uncertainty
over two-dimensional fundamentals (µ1, µ2), but will defer the details to Online Appendix
OA 3.
In the learning environment, time is discrete and partitioned into rounds t = 1, 2, 3, ...
One short-lived agent arrives per round. Agent 1 starts with a prior belief M0 given by a
prior density m0 : [µ2, µ¯2] → R>0, while agent t ≥ 2 adopts the final belief M˜t−1 of agent
t− 1 as her prior belief.14 Next, agent t chooses a cutoff threshold C˜t maximizing expected
13This is similar to the intuition for why µ∗1(c) = µ•1 for every c.
14The same learning dynamics obtain in an environment where every agent starts with the common prior
belief M0 and observes the stage-game histories of all predecessors.
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payoff based on expected utility and plays the stage game. She updates her belief from M˜t−1
to M˜t by applying Bayes’ rule to her stage-game history, H˜t ∈ H.
The sequences (M˜t), (C˜t), (H˜t) are stochastic processes whose randomness stem from ran-
domness of the stage-game draws realizations in different rounds. The convergence theorem
is about the almost sure convergence of processes (M˜t) and (C˜t). To define the probability
space formally, consider the R2-valued stochastic process (Xt)t≥1 = (X1,t, X2,t)t≥1, where Xt
and Xt′ are independent for t 6= t′ . Within each t, X1,t ∼ f1(· | µ•1), X2,t ∼ f2(· | µ•2) are also
independent. Interpret Xt as the pair of potential draws in the t-th round of the stage game.
Clearly, there exists a probability space (Ω,A,P), with sample space Ω = (R2)∞ interpreted
as paths of the process just described, A the Borel σ-algebra on Ω, and P the measure on
sample paths so that the process Xt(ω) = ωt has the desired distribution. The term “almost
surely” means “with probability 1 with respect to the realization of the infinite sequence of
all (potential) draws”, i.e. P-almost surely. The processes (M˜t), (C˜t), (H˜t) are defined on
this probability space and adapted to the filtration (Ft)t≥1, where Ft is the sub-σ-algebra
generated by draws up to round t, Ft = σ((Xs)ts=1).
Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, by Proposition 4 there exists a unique steady state
(µ•1, µ∞2 , c∞). Theorem 1′ shows that, provided the support of m0 contains µ∞2 , m
′
0 is con-
tinuous, and the second derivative of ln(f2(· | µ•2)) is uniformly bounded, the stochastic
processes (C˜t) and (M˜t) almost surely converge to the steady state. This is a global conver-
gence result since the bounded interval [µ2, µ¯2] can be arbitrarily large and the prior density
m0 can assign arbitrarily small probability to neighborhoods around µ∞2 .
Theorem 1′. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold and the second derivative of ln (f2(x | µ•2))
is uniformly bounded for x ∈ R. Suppose also µ2 ≤ µ∞2 ≤ µ¯2 where µ∞2 is the unique steady-
state belief, and prior density m0 : [µ2, µ¯2] → R>0 is continuously differentiable. Almost
surely, limt→∞ C˜t = c∞ and limt→∞ Eµ2∼M˜t|µ2 − µ∞2 | = 0, where c∞ is the unique steady-
state cutoff threshold.
I will now discuss the obstacles to proving convergence and provide an outline of my
argument. In each round t, the cutoff choice of the t-th agent determines how history H˜t
will be censored. We can think of each c ∈ R as generating a different “type” of data. As we
saw in Proposition 2, different “types” of data (in large samples) lead to different inferences
about the fundamentals for biased agents, so the cutoff C˜t influences the belief that will be
passed on to agent t + 1. Yet C˜t is an endogenous, ex-ante random object that depends on
the belief of the t-th agent, meaning that belief and behavior co-evolve to complicate the
analysis of learning dynamics.
To be more precise, the log-likelihood of all X2 data up to the end of round t under
fundamental µ2 ∈ [µ2, µ¯2] is the random variable
t∑
s=1
ln(f2(X2,s;µ2 − γ(X1,s − µ•1)) · 1{X1,s ≤ C˜s}.
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The s-th summand contains the indicator 1{X1,s ≤ Cs}, referring to the fact that X2,s would
be censored if X1,s exceeds the cutoff C˜s. The cutoff C˜s depends on histories in periods
1, 2, ..., s − 1, hence indirectly on (Xk)k<s. This makes the summands non-exchangeable:
they are correlated and non-identically distributed. So the usual law of large numbers does
not apply.
A first step to gaining traction on this problem is use a statistical tool from Heidhues,
Koszegi, and Strack (2018), a version of law of large numbers for martingales whose quadratic
variation grows linearly.
Proposition 10 from Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018): Let (yt)t be a martingale
that satisfies a.s. [yt] ≤ vt for some constant v ≥ 0. We have that a.s. limt→∞ ytt = 0.
After simplifying the problem with this result, I establish a pair of mutual bounds on
asymptotic behavior and asymptotic beliefs. If we know cutoff thresholds are asymptotically
bounded between cl and ch, cl < ch, then beliefs about µ2 must be asymptotically supported
on the interval [µ∗2(cl), µ∗2(ch)]. Conversely, if belief is asymptotically supported on the subin-
terval [µl2, µh2 ] ⊆ [µ2, µ¯2], then cutoff thresholds must be asymptotically bounded between
C(µ•1, µl2; γ) and C(µ•1, µh2 ; γ).
Lemma A.19. For cl ≥ C(µ•1, µ2; γ), if almost surely lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥ c
l, then almost surely
lim
t→∞ M˜t( [µ2, µ
∗
2(cl)) ) = 0.
Also, for ch ≤ C(µ•1, µ¯2; γ), if almost surely lim sup
t→∞
C˜t ≤ ch, then almost surely
lim
t→∞ M˜t( (µ
∗
2(ch), µ¯2]) = 0.
Lemma A.20. For µ2 ≤ µl2 < µh2 ≤ µ¯2, if limt→∞ M˜t([µl2, µh2 ]) = 1 almost surely, then
lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥ C(µ•1, µl2; γ) and lim supt→∞ C˜t ≤ C(µ•1, µh2 ; γ) almost surely.
Applying this pair of lemmas to supp(M0) = [µ2, µ¯2], we conclude that asymptotically
M˜t must be supported on the subinterval [I(µ2), I(µ¯2)], where I is the iteration map from
Definition 7 first used in analyzing the existence and uniqueness of steady states. Under
Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, Proposition 4 implies that I is a contraction mapping whose
iterates converge to µ∞2 . Therefore by repeatedly applying the pair of Lemmas A.19 and
A.20, we can refine the bound on asymptotic beliefs down to the singleton {µ∞2 }, showing
the almost-sure convergence of beliefs there. The almost-sure convergence of behavior follows
easily from Lemma A.20.
3.3 Uncertainty About µ1
The hypotheses of Theorem 1 differ from those of Theorem 1′ in that agents start off with
uncertainty about µ1. I now comment on the key step to proving almost-sure convergence
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of beliefs and behavior in the environment with two-dimensional uncertainty about funda-
mentals.
The structure of the inference problem in my setting is such that I can separately bound
the agents’ asymptotic beliefs in two “directions,” thus reducing the task of proving a two-
dimensional belief bound into a pair of tasks involving one-dimensional belief bounds. To
understand why, consider a pair of fundamentals, (µ1, µ2) and (µ
′
1, µ
′
2) = (µ1 +d, µ2−γd) for
some d > 0, satisfying µ1, µ
′
1 ≤ µ•1. That is, (µ1, µ2) and (µ′1, µ′2) lie on the same line with
slope −γ. For any uncensored history (x1, x2) ∈ R2, the likelihood of second-period draw x2
is the same under both pairs of fundamentals,
f2(x2 | µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)) = f2(x2 | µ′2 − γ(x1 − µ
′
1)).
This is because the feasible model Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) has a lower first-period mean but also a
higher second-period unconditional mean, compared to the model Ψ(µ′1, µ
′
2; γ). An agent
who believes in the first model feels less disappointed by the draw x1, since she evaluates it
against a lower expectation. This leads a weaker anticipation of positive reversal under the
gambler’s fallacy, compared to another agent who believes in the second model. But, this
difference is canceled out by the more optimistic belief about the unconditional distribution
of second-period draw, µ2 > µ
′
2.
This argument shows that both pairs of fundamentals (µ1, µ2) and (µ
′
1, µ
′
2) explain X2
data equally well in all uncensored histories. This is important as it shows regardless of agent
t’s strategy, she would always find that (µ1, µ2) and (µ
′
1, µ
′
2) lead to the same likelihood of
second-period data in her history H˜t. At the same time, (µ
′
1, µ
′
2) provides a strictly better
fit for X1 data on average than (µ1, µ2), since µ1 < µ
′
1 ≤ µ•1. This means in the long run,
fundamentals (µ1, µ2) should receive much less posterior probability than (µ
′
1, µ
′
2), as the
latter better rationalize the data overall.
This heuristic comparison of the asymptotic goodness-of-fit for two feasible models is
formalized by computing the directional derivative for data log-likelihood along the vector(
1
−γ
)
in the space of fundamentals. I establish an (almost-sure) positive lowerbound on
this directional derivative to the left of µ•1, and an analogous negative upperbound to the
right of µ•1. This allows me to show the region colored in red receives 0 posterior probability
asymptotically, by comparing each point in red with a corresponding point in blue along a
line of slope −γ. By repeating this argument (and applying the symmetric bound to the
right of µ•1), I show that belief is asymptotically concentrated along an -width vertical strip
containing the steady state beliefs, (µ•1, µ∞2 ).
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Having restricted the long-run belief to a small vertical strip, we have completed one
“direction” of the belief bounds and effectively reduced the dimensionality of uncertainty
back to one. The rest of the argument proceeds similarly to the case where agents know µ•1
discussed before, iteratively restricting agents’ asymptotic behavior and asymptotic belief
about µ2. These restrictions amount to “vertical” belief refinements within the -strip, so
eventually belief is restricted to the single point (µ•1, µ∞2 ), the unique steady-state belief.
4 The Positive-Feedback Cycle
In this section, I consider a social-learning environment where agents arrive in large gen-
erations and all agents in the same generation act simultaneously. I will prove Theorem
2, fully characterizing the learning dynamics in this environment. I will also discuss the
positive-feedback loop between distorted beliefs about fundamentals and distorted stopping
behavior.
4.1 Social Learning in Large Generations
There is an infinite sequence of generations, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}. Each generation is “large” and
will be modeled as a continuum of agents, n ∈ [0, 1]. In the search problem of Example 1, for
instance, different generations refer to cohorts of HR managers working in different hiring
cycles. Each agent lives for one generation, so agent n from generation 1 is unrelated to
agent n from generation 2. The realizations of draws X1, X2 are independent across all stage
games, including those from the same generation. Generation 0 agents play some strategy
Sc[0] , where c[0] ∈ R is the initial condition of social learning.
Write hτ,n ∈ H for the stage-game history of agent n from generation τ. Before playing
her own stage game, each agent in generation t ≥ 1 observes an infinite dataset consisting of
all histories (hτ,n)n∈[0,1] from each predecessor generation, 0 ≤ τ ≤ t−1. If all15 generation τ
predecessors used the stopping strategy Scτ for some cτ ∈ R, then the sub-dataset (hτ,n)n∈[0,1]
15All generation τ predecessors had the same information about the fundamentals, so all of them would
have found the same stopping strategy subjectively optimal.
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has the distributionH•(cτ ). Agents are told the stopping strategies of their predecessors from
all past generations16 and use the entire dataset of histories to infer fundamentals. The space
of feasible fundamentals isM = R2 as in Remark 1(a), so agents can flexibly estimate the
unconditional means of draws from different periods, subject to their dogmatic belief in
reversals.
Agents only infer from predecessors’ histories, not from their behavior. This is rational
as information sets are nested across generations. For t2 > t1, generation t2 observes all
the social information that generation t1 saw. In addition, generation t2’s dataset contains a
complete record of everything that happened in generation t1’s stage games. Since generation
t1 has no private information that is unobserved by generation t2, the behavior of these
predecessors is uninformative about the fundamentals beyond what generation t2 can learn
from the dataset of histories.
In the large-generations model, generation t agents infer fundamentals (µ1,[t], µ2,[t]) that
minimize the sum of the KL divergences between the implied history distribution under the
feasible model Ψ(µ1,[t], µ2,[t]; γ) on the one hand, and the t observed history distributions in
generations 0 ≤ τ ≤ t− 1 on the other hand. Then, these agents use the stopping strategy
optimal for the inferred feasible model. I formally define generation t’s minimization objective
below.
Definition 8. The large-generations pseudo-true fundamentals with respect to cutoff thresh-
olds (cτ )t−1τ=0 solve
min
µ1,µ2∈R
t−1∑
τ=0
DKL( H•(cτ ) || H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); cτ ) ), (1)
where DKL is KL divergence from Definition 5. Denote the minimizers as µ∗1(c0, ..., ct−1) and
µ∗2(c0, ..., ct−1).
I interpret the continuum of agents in each generation as an idealized, tractable modeling
device representing a large but finite number of agents. Appendix OA 4 provides a finite-
population foundation for inference and behavior in the continuum-population model. There,
for the Gaussian case, I show that when an agent observe t finite sub-datasets of histories
drawn from distributions H•(cτ ) for 0 ≤ τ ≤ t−1, as these datasets grow large her inference
and behavior almost surely converge to the infinite-population analogs.
4.2 Learning Dynamics in Large Generations
Now I develop the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Starting from any initial condition and any
m0, cutoffs (c[t])t≥1 and beliefs (µ[t])t≥1 form monotonic sequences across generations. When
16These stopping rules can also be exactly inferred from the infinite dataset.
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Assumption 3 also holds, there exists a unique steady state µ∞2 , c∞ ∈ R so that c[t] → c∞
and (µ1,[t], µ2,[t])→ (µ•1, µ∞2 ) monotonically, regardless of the initial condition and m0. This
steady state is the same as the one in Theorem 1.
Towards a proof, first consider learning dynamics in a related auxiliary environment.
The auxiliary environment is identical to the large-generations environment just described,
except that agents in each generation t ≥ 1 only infer from the histories of the immediate
predecessor generation, t − 1. Write µA[t] and cA[t] for the inference and cutoff threshold in
generation t of the auxiliary environment, where the superscript “A” distinguishes them
from the corresponding processes of the baseline large-generations environment.
We have µA1,[t] = µ•1 for every t ≥ 1, from from Proposition 2. Also, it is easy to see that
(µA2,[t])t≥1 are iterates of the I map from Definition 7, and that they must be monotonic since
the pair of comparative statics ∂C
∂µ2
> 0 and dµ
∗
2
dc
> 0 share the same sign. Changes in beliefs
across successive generations are amplified, not dampened, by the corresponding changes in
cutoff thresholds.
The monotonicity and convergence results of Theorem 2 follow from comparing the learn-
ing dynamics of the baseline large-generations environment to the dynamics of the auxiliary
environment. Roughly speaking, for agents in late enough generations of the baseline large-
generations environment, most of the histories in their dataset are censored according to
stopping thresholds very similar to the limit threshold. So, observing sub-datasets of histo-
ries from all past generations induces very similar inferences as observing just one dataset
of histories from the immediate predecessor generation.
While the large-generations environment I set out to study has the same long-run learning
outcome as the auxiliary environment, the two environments may differ in their short-run
welfare. For example, in settings where learning leads generations further and further astray
from the objectively optimal strategy, the auxiliary environment speeds up this harmful
learning. This is because the less-censored histories from the earlier generations no longer
moderate the society’s descent into pessimism when agents only infer from the immediate
predecessor generation. In Figure 1, I plot the dynamics of beliefs in the first four generations
for a society playing the stage game from Example 1 with q = 0. Consider the Gaussian case
with µ•1 = µ•2 = 0, γ = −0.5, σ2 = 1, and the society starts at the objectively optimal cutoff
threshold, c[0] = 0. Society mislearns monotonically in both the baseline large-generations
environment and the auxiliary environment. This mislearning is more exaggerated in the in
the auxiliary environment, but both environments lead to the same long-run outcome.
The map I(·; γ) connects the environment where large generations of agents act simul-
taneously to the environment where agents act one by one. We can think of I(·; γ) as the
one-generation-forward belief map in the auxiliary society, whose belief dynamics are closely
related to the belief dynamics of the baseline large-generations environment. There are no
large generations at all in the environment where agents act one by one, but there I still plays
a critical role in establishing the long-run convergence of beliefs and behavior. Intuitively,
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Dynamics of Beliefs in the First Four Generations
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Figure 1: The dynamics of beliefs about µ2 in the first four generations for the Gaussian
case (with σ2 = 1). The stage game is search (without recall), with true fundamentals are
µ•1 = µ•2 = 0, bias parameter γ > 0, and initial condition is c[0] = 0. In both the baseline
large-generations environment and the auxiliary environment, beliefs are monotonic across
generations, an illustration of Theorem 2. Beliefs in both environments converge to the same
steady-state beliefs, though the rate of convergence is faster in the auxiliary environment.
in the learning environment of Section 3, a belief based on the histories of one predecessor
from each of many past generations replaces a belief based on a large dataset of histories
from many agents all belonging to the same past generation.
I combine the asymptotic early-stopping result of Theorem 1 with the monotonic learning
dynamics of Theorem 2 to deduce:
Corollary 1. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. In the large-generations environment,
if society starts at the objectively optimal initial condition c[0] = c•, then expected payoff
strictly decreases across all successive generations.
This stark “monotonic” mislearning result relies crucially on the endogenous-data setting.
Each generation uses a lower acceptance threshold relative to their predecessors, a change
with the side effect of changing censoring threshold of their successors’ data. The new
“type” of censored data causes the next generation to become more pessimism about the
fundamentals than any past generation.
5 Extensions
In this section I explore a number of alternative model specifications to examine the robust-
ness of my main results. The Online Appendix contains the proofs of results in this section
and additional extensions.
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5.1 Comparative Statics
In the first extension, I consider how learning dynamics react to changes in stage-game
parameters. In general, when agents learn from exogenous data, their decision problem does
not influence learning outcomes. This observation holds independently of whether agents
are misspecified. On the other hand, correctly specified agents in my setting always learn
correctly in the long run, so the stage game is again irrelevant. With misspecified learners in
an endogenous-data setting, however, changes in the stage game carry long-run consequences
on agents’ beliefs about the fundamentals.
Definition 9. Given a pair of second-period payoff functions uH2 , uL2 , say uH2 payoff dominates
uL2 (abbreviated uH2  uL2 ) if for every x1 ∈ R, uH2 (x1, x2) ≥ uL2 (x1, x2) for every x2 ∈ R, and
also uH2 (x1, x2) > uL2 (x1, x2) for a positive-measure set of x2 in R.
For instance, in Example 1, increasing q (the probability of recall) creates a new optimal-
stopping problem that payoff dominates the old one. More generally, starting from any stage
game with payoff functions u1 and u2, we can impose an extra waiting cost κwait > 0 for
continuing into the second period. This generates a new stage game with payoff functions u1
and uL2 with uL2 = u2−κwait. The modified stage game is payoff dominated by the unmodified
one.
When uH2  uL2 , a society facing the problem (u1, uH2 ) always uses a higher stopping
threshold than a society facing the problem (u1, uL2 ), given the same beliefs about funda-
mentals. To state this formally, let Cu1,u2 be the optimal cutoff threshold function for the
stage game (u1, u2).
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds for stage games (u1, uH2 ) and (u1, uL2 ), and uH2  uL2 .
For all µ1, µ2 ∈ R, γ > 0, Cu1,uH2 (µ1, µ2; γ) > Cu1,uL2 (µ1, µ2; γ).
The next proposition shows that when one stage game payoff dominated another in terms
of second-period payoffs, the dominated stage game leads to more pessimistic beliefs and a
lower cutoff threshold in the steady state.
Proposition 6. Suppose both (u1, uH2 ) and (u1, uL2 ) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 3, and that
uH2  uL2 . Under Assumption 2, the steady state of (u1, uH2 ) features strictly more optimistic
belief about the second-period fundamental and a strictly higher cutoff threshold than the
steady state of (u1, uL2 ).
Combined with my main results on learning dynamics (Theorems 1 and 2), Proposition 6
illustrates how changing the stage-game payoff structure affects long-run inference. Consider
two societies of gambler’s fallacy agents with the same bias parameter γ > 0, facing stage
games (u1, uH2 ) and (u1, uL2 ) respectively, where uH2 payoff dominates uL2 . Even if the latter
society starts with a much more optimistic belief about µ2, in the long run the second society
will end up with strictly more pessimistic beliefs and will use strictly lower cutoff thresholds.
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Since steady-state beliefs are too pessimistic in both societies, the second society’s long-run
beliefs are more distorted.
This comparative statics result provides novel predictions about how the economic envi-
ronment affects biased agents’ inference. Applied to the hiring context from Example 1, this
result says when managers are more impatient (i.e., suffer a greater waiting cost) or when
they have a lower chance of recalling previous applicants, then they will end up with more
pessimistic beliefs about the labor pool. The direction of the comparative statics is another
expression of the positive-feedback cycle between stopping threshold and inference. When
managers become more impatient, for instance, they use a lower acceptance threshold as
they wish to finish recruiting earlier. The lower cutoff intensifies the censoring effect on his-
tories, leading to more pessimistic inference about the fundamentals. The extra pessimism,
in turn, leads future managers to further lower their acceptance threshold, amplifying the
initial change in behavior that came from the increase in waiting cost.
From a policy perspective, subsidizing longer search (i.e., decreasing κwait) unambiguously
improves asymptotic learning accuracy for biased agents. So, even a policymaker who is
ignorant of (µ•1, µ•2) can partially correct society’s long-run beliefs. We can also think of
this policy as a test of misspecification, as it alters steady-state beliefs only when agents
are misspecified. The test can be conducted without knowledge of the true data-generating
process.
5.2 Fictitious Variation and Censored Datasets
For this and subsequent extensions, I specialize to the Gaussian case.
So far, I have assumed agents hold dogmatic and correct beliefs about the variance of
X1 and the conditional variance of X2|(X1 = x1). In this extension, I expand the set of
feasible models and consider agents who are uncertain about the variances of the draws and
jointly estimate means and variances. I show that agents exaggerate variances in a way that
depends on the severity of data censoring, and study how this belief in fictitious variation
strengthens the positive-feedback cycle between beliefs and behavior.
For µ1, µ2 ∈ R, σ21, σ22 ≥ 0, and γ ≥ 0, let Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21, σ22; γ) refer to the joint distribution
X1 ∼ N (µ1, σ21)
(X2 | X1 = x1) ∼ N (µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1), σ22).
Objectively, X1, X2 are independent Gaussian random variables each with a variance of
(σ•)2 > 0, so the true joint distribution of (X1, X2) is Ψ• = Ψ(µ•1, µ•2, (σ•)2, (σ•)2; 0). Suppose
agents have a full-support belief over the class of feasible models{
Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21, σ22; γ) : µ1, µ2 ∈ R, σ21, σ22 ≥ 0
}
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for a fixed bias parameter γ > 0. For this extension, “fundamentals” refer to the four
parameters µ1, µ2, σ21, σ22.
Following Definition 5, write DKL(H•(c) ‖ H(Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21, σ22; γ); c)) ) to denote the KL
divergence between the true distribution of histories with censoring threshold c and the
implied history distribution under the fundamentals µ1, µ2, σ21, σ22. This divergence is given
by
∫ ∞
c
φ(x1;µ•1, (σ•)2) · ln
(
φ(x1;µ•1, (σ•)2)
φ(x1;µ1, σ21)
)
dx1 (2)
+
∫ c
−∞
{∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, (σ•)2) · φ(x2;µ•2, (σ•)2) · ln
[
φ(x1;µ•1, (σ•)2) · φ(x2;µ•2, (σ•)2)
φ(x1;µ1, σ22) · φ(x2;µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1), σ22)
]
dx2
}
dx1,
where φ(x;µ, σ2) is the Gaussian density with mean µ and variance σ2, evaluated at x.
The next Proposition characterizes the pseudo-true fundamentals µ∗1, µ∗2, (σ∗1)2, (σ∗2)2 that
minimize Equation (2) in closed-form expressions.
Proposition 7. The solutions of
min
µ1,µ2∈R,σ21 ,σ22≥0
DKL(H•(c) ‖ H(Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21, σ22; γ); c)) )
are µ∗1 = µ•1, µ∗2 = µ•2 − γ (µ•1 − E [X1 | X1 ≤ c]) , (σ∗1)2 = (σ•)2, and
(σ∗2)2 = (σ•)2 + γ2Var[X1 | X1 ≤ c].
Comparing Proposition 7 with the expressions for µ∗1, µ∗2 in Example 2 shows that the
agent makes the same misinference about the means regardless of whether she knows the
variances. This shows the robustness of the over-pessimism prediction in an environment
where agents jointly estimate both means and variances.
Biased agents correctly estimate the first-period variance, (σ∗1)2 = (σ•)2, but over-
estimate second-period variance. The magnitude of this distortion increases in the severity
of the gambler’s fallacy but decreases with the severity of the censoring, as Var[X1 | X1 ≤ c]
increases in c for X1 Gaussian.
Here is the intuition. Whereas the objective conditional distribution of X2|(X1 = x1) is
independent of x1, the agent entertains different beliefs about this distribution for different
x1. The agent’s inference about µ∗2 ensures her belief about X2|X1 = x1 fits the data well
following “typical” realizations of x1 under the censoring restriction X1 ≤ c. But the agent
continues to be surprised by streaks of bad draws in the data. To better account for these
surprising observations, the agent increases estimated conditional variance of X2|(X1 = x1)
and attributes these unexpected realizations of X2 to “noise.” More “noise” is needed when
Var[X1|X1 ≤ c] larger, for the frequency of these surprising observations depends on how
much X1 tends to deviate from its typical value of E[X1|X1 ≤ c] under the restriction X1 ≤ c.
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An equivalent formulation of this result helps interpret the distorted (σ∗2)2.We may write
the feasible model Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21, σ22; γ) with σ22 ≥ σ21 as
X1 = µ1 + 1
X2 = µ2 + ζ + 2
where 1 ∼ N (0, σ21), 2|1 ∼ N (−γ1, σ21), and ζ ∼ N (0, σ2ζ ), with ζ independent of 1, 2.
In the context where X1 and X2 represent the quality realizations of two candidates from
the early and late applicant pools, ζ is a vacancy-specific shock to the average quality of the
second-period applicant. A positive σ2ζ means there are some vacancies for which the late
applicants are an especially poor fit and some others for which they are especially suitable.
Proposition 7 says that in an environment where all jobs are objectively homogeneous with
respect to the fit of the late applicants, biased managers who find it possible that jobs are
heterogeneous in this dimension will indeed estimate a positive amount of this heterogeneity,
σ2ζ > 0, from the censored histories of their predecessors. This added heterogeneity allows
agents to better rationalize histories (X1, X2) where both candidates have unusually high/low
qualities as vacancies that happen to be an especially good/bad fit for second-period appli-
cants. That is, the biased managers reason that the realization of the vacancy-specific fixed
effect, ζ, must have been far from 0.
This phenomenon relates to findings in Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010),
who refer to exaggeration of variance under the gambler’s fallacy as fictitious variation. The
key innovation of Proposition 7 is to show, in an endogenous-data setting, how the degree of
fictitious variation depends on the severity of censoring. To highlight this point, I now derive
two results focusing on the interplay between fictitious variation and endogenous censoring.
For simplicity, I derive these results using the auxiliary large-generations environment defined
in Section 4.1, where agents arrive in large generations and only infer from the histories of
the immediate predecessor generation.
The first result says that when the second-period payoff u2(x1, x2) is a linear or convex
function of x2, the positive-feedback cycle from Section 4 continues to obtain — cutoffs,
beliefs about fundamentals, and beliefs about variances form monotonic sequences across
generations. This weak convexity includes the case of search with recall in Example 1 for
any recall probability 0 ≤ q < 1 and highlights a new channel for amplifying changes in
behavior across generations — inference about variance.
Definition 10. The optimal-stopping problem is convex if for every x1 ∈ R, x2 7→ u2(x1, x2)
is convex with strict convexity for x2 in a positive-measure subset of R. The optimal-stopping
problem is concave if for every x1 ∈ R, x2 7→ u2(x1, x2) is concave with strict concavity for
x2 in a positive-measure subset of R.
Proposition 8. Suppose the optimal-stopping problem is convex. Suppose agents start with
a full-support prior over {Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21, σ22; γ) : µ1, µ2 ∈ R, σ21, σ22 ≥ 0} and society starts at the
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initial condition c[0] ∈ R. For t ≥ 1, denote the beliefs of generation t as (µ1,[t], µ2,[t], σ21,[t], σ22,[t])
and their cutoff threshold as c[t]. Then µ1,[t] = µ•1, (σ1,[t])2 = (σ•)2 for all t, while (µ2,[t])t≥1,
(σ2,[t])2t≥1, and (c[t])t≥1 are monotonic sequences.
The intuition is straightforward. Suppose generation t uses a more relaxed acceptance
threshold c[t] < c[t−1] than generation t − 1, resulting in a more severely censored dataset.
By the usual censoring effect without variance uncertainty, generation t + 1 becomes more
pessimistic about second-period mean than generation t. In addition, by Proposition 7 we
know that generation t+1 suffers less from fictitious variation than generation t. This implies
generation t+ 1 agents would perceive less continuation value than generation t agents even
if they held the same beliefs about the means, for a larger variance in X2|(X1 = x1) improves
the expected payoff when continuing due to the convexity of u2 in x2. Combining these two
forces, we deduce c[t+1] < c[t].
The intuition just discussed shows that uncertainty about variance strengthens the mono-
tonicity result. To be more precise, suppose c[t] < c[t−1]. Consider a hypothetical generation
t+1 agent who dogmatically adopts generation t’s beliefs about variances, σ21,[t] and σ22,[t], and
infers from the class of models {Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21,[t], σ22,[t]; γ) : µ1, µ2 ∈ R}. Based on generation t′s
histories, this hypothetical agent makes inferences about means and chooses a cutoff thresh-
old, µˆ1,[t+1], µˆ2,[t+1], cˆ[t+1]. By comparing Proposition 7 and Example 2, µˆ1,[t+1] = µ1,[t+1],
µˆ2,[t+1] = µ2,[t+1], but c[t+1] < cˆ[t+1] < c[t]. That is, while the cutoff threshold of this hy-
pothetical agent follows the monotonicity pattern in the previous two generations, cˆ[t+1] <
c[t] < c[t−1], the cutoff adjusts downwards by an even greater amount, c[t+1] < cˆ[t+1], when
agents are uncertain about variances.
The second result compares the learning dynamics of two societies facing the same
optimal-stopping problem and starting at the same initial condition. One society knows the
correct variances of X1 and X2|(X1 = x1). The other society is uncertain about the variances
and infers them from data. Proposition 9 shows that in Generation 1, the two societies hold
the same beliefs about the means of the distributions. But in all later generations t ≥ 2, the
society with uncertainty about variances ends up with a more pessimistic/optimistic belief
about the second-period mean compared with the society that knows the variances, pro-
vided the optimal-stopping problem is convex/concave. This divergence depends crucially
on the endogenous-learning setting, for Proposition 7 implies that the two societies make
the same inferences about the means when given the same data. Allowing uncertainty on
one dimension (variance) ends up affecting society’s long-run inference in another dimension
(mean).
Formally, consider two societies of agents, A and B. Agents in society A start with a full-
support prior over {Ψ(µ1, µ2, (σ•)2, (σ•)2; γ) : µ1, µ2 ∈ R}. Agents in society B start with a
full-support prior over {Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21, σ22; γ) : µ1, µ2 ∈ R, σ21, σ22 ≥ 0}. Fix the same Generation
0 initial condition c[0] ∈ R for both societies. For t ≥ 1, denote the beliefs of Generation t in
society k ∈ {A,B} as (µ1,[k,t], µ2,[k,t], (σ1,[k,t])2, (σ2,[k,t])2) and their cutoff threshold as c[k,t].
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Proposition 9. In the first generation, µ1,[A,1] = µ1,[B,1] and µ2,[A,1] = µ2,[B,1]. If the optimal-
stopping problem is convex, then µ2,[B,t] > µ2,[A,t] and c[B,t] > c[A,t] for every t ≥ 2. If the
optimal-stopping problem is concave, then µ2,[B,t] < µ2,[A,t] and c[B,t] < c[A,t] for every t ≥ 2.
5.3 Objectively Correlated (X1, X2) and Uncertainty About γ
So far I have assumed that draws (X1, X2) within the stage game are objectively independent,
and that agents have a dogmatic γ > 0, interpreted as the severity of the gambler’s fallacy
bias. This extension considers a joint relaxation of these two assumptions.
Suppose the true model is (X1, X2) ∼ Ψ(µ•1, µ•2; γ•), where possibly γ• 6= 0. Agents jointly
estimate (µ1, µ2, γ) ∈ R3, with a prior supported on R × R × [γ, γ¯] where [γ, γ¯] is a finite
interval. The next result generalizes the pseudo-true fundamentals in Example 2. It shows
that when γ• /∈ [γ, γ¯], the agent infers γ∗ equal to the boundary point of the interval that is
closer to γ•. Given the estimated pseudo-true parameter γ∗, the estimates of the first- and
second-period fundamentals take similar forms to those in Example 2.
Proposition 10. Suppose γ• /∈ [γ, γ¯]. Let γ˜ = γ¯ if γ• > γ¯, otherwise γ˜ = γ when γ• < γ.
The solution of the KL-divergence minimization problem
min
µ1,µ2∈R,γ∈[γ,γ¯]
DKL(H(Ψ(µ•1, µ•2; γ•); c) || H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); c))
is given by µ∗1(c) = µ•1, µ∗2(c) = µ•2 + (γ• − γ˜) · (µ•1 − EΨ• [X1|X1 ≤ c]), γ∗(c) = γ˜.
Intuitively, we may expect the closest distance (in the KL divergence sense) from the set
of feasible models {Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) : µ1, µ2 ∈ R} to the objective distribution Ψ(µ•1, µ•2; γ•) to
decrease in |γ − γ•|. Proposition 10 confirms this intuition, showing that the pseudo-true
model from the set {Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) : µ1, µ2 ∈ R, γ ∈ [γ, γ¯]} lies in the subset {Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) :
µ1, µ2 ∈ R, γ = γ˜}, where γ˜ is the closest point (in the Euclidean sense) to γ• in the interval
[γ, γ¯].
When γ• = 0 and γ¯ < 0, this result shows that over-pessimism in inference is robust
to agents learning the correlation of X1 and X2, provided the support of their uncertainty
about correlation lies to the left of 0 and excludes 0. In this case, it is also easy to see that
the learning dynamics in the large-generations auxiliary environment are the same as when
agents start with a dogmatic belief in γ = γ¯.
5.4 Inference under the Constraint µ1 = µ2
I now consider the special case where the true fundamentals are time-invariant, µ•1 = µ•2 =
µ• ∈ R. If agents’ feasible fundamentals areM = R2 as in Remark 1(a), then Proposition
2 continues to apply. But now suppose agents know the fundamentals are time-invariant
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and only have uncertainty over this common value, so the set of feasible fundamentals is the
diagonal M = {(x, x) : x ∈ R}, as in Remark 1(d). I investigate inference in this setting
when agents’ prior belief over feasible models is supported on {Ψ(µ, µ; γ) : µ ∈ R}.
Let µ∗M(c) ∈ R stand for the common fundamental that minimizes the KL divergence
relative to the history distribution H•(c), that is
µ∗M(c) := arg min
µ∈R
DKL(H•(c) ‖ H(Ψ(µ, µ; γ); c))
The next result characterizes µ∗M(c).
Proposition 11. µ∗M(c) = 11+P[X1≤c]·(1+γ)2µ
◦
1(c) +
P[X1≤c]·(1+γ)2
1+P[X1≤c]·(1+γ)2µ
◦
2(c), where µ◦1(c) = µ• and
µ◦2(c) = µ• − γ1+γ (µ• − E[X1 | X1 ≤ c]).
Agents face two kinds of data about the common fundamental: observations of first-
period draws and observations of second-period draws. Feasible models Ψ(µ◦1(c), µ◦1(c); γ)
and Ψ(µ◦2(c), µ◦2(c); γ) minimize the KL divergence of these two kinds of data, respectively.17
The overall KL-divergence minimizing estimator is a certain convex combination between
these two points. Through the term P[X1 ≤ c], the relative weight given to µ◦2(c) increases as
the cutoff c increases, because the second-period data is observed more often if the dataset
of histories is censored with a higher cutoff in the first period.
For any censoring threshold c generating the history distribution, agents underestimates
the common fundamental. We have µ◦2(c) < µ• while µ◦1(c) = µ•. This shows the robustness
of the over-pessimism result from the setting with M = R2. However, the extent of over-
pessimism about µ2 is dampened relative to agents who can flexibly estimate different µ1
and µ2 for the two periods. Compared with the unconstrained pseudo-true fundamentals
from Example 2, we have µ◦2(c) > µ∗2(c) since γ1+γ < γ, hence µ
∗
M(c) > µ∗2(c). This makes
intuitive sense: when unconstrained, agents come to two different beliefs about µ1 and µ2,
even though they are objectively the same. They hold correct beliefs about µ1 but pessimistic
beliefs about µ2. When constrained to a common inference across two fundamentals, agents
distort their belief about µ1 downwards and their belief about µ2 upwards, relative to the
unconstrained environment.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies endogenous learning dynamics of misspecified agents. I focus on the
gambler’s fallacy, a non-self-confirming misspecification where no feasible beliefs of the bi-
ased agents can exactly match the data. In natural optimal-stopping problems, agents tend
17Note that µ◦2(c) differs from the pseudo-true fundamental µ∗2(c) from Example 2. The estimator µ◦2(c)
minimizes the KL divergence of second-period draws under the constraint that the same fundamental must
be inferred for both periods, whereas µ∗2(c) minimizes this divergence when first-period fundamental is fixed
at its true value, µ•1.
34
to stop after “good enough” early draws, where the threshold for “good enough” evolves
as agents update their beliefs about the underlying distributions. Stopping decisions thus
impose an endogenous censoring effect on histories, which in turn affects the beliefs of subse-
quent agents. The statistical bias interacts with data censoring, generating over-pessimism
about the fundamentals and resulting in stopping too early in the long run. These asymp-
totic mistakes are driven by a positive-feedback loop between distorted beliefs and distorted
behavior.
I have studied a particular behavioral bias (the gambler’s fallacy) in a natural environ-
ment where censoring happens (histories in optimal-stopping problems). The key mechanism
I highlight, the interaction between data censoring and bias, applies more broadly and de-
livers different predictions in different contexts. For example, the same mechanism would
lead to an over-estimation of µ2 if the agents believe in some γ < 0. I am leaving open the
interaction of other kinds of behavioral learning with other censoring mechanisms to future
work.
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Appendix
A Proofs of Results in Sections 2, 3, and 4
A.1 Proof of Claim 1
Proof. For Example 1, clearly u1 and u2 are strictly increasing functions of x1 and x2 re-
spectively. We also have that |u2(x′1, x¯2) − u2(x′′1 , x¯2)| ≤ q(x′1 − x′′1) for x′1 > x′′1 and any
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x¯2, while u
′
1(x1) = 1. This shows Assumption 1(b) holds. If x1 > 0 and x2 < 0, then
u2(x1, x2) = q · x1 + (1 − q)x2 < x1 = u1(x1), and conversely x1 < 0, x2 > 0 imply
u2(x1, x2) > u1(x1). This shows Assumption 1(c) holds. It is clear that u1, u2 are continuous.
Also,
|u2(x¯1, x2 + k¯)| ≤ q(|x¯1|+ |x2 + k¯|) + (1− q)|x2 + k¯| ≤ q|x¯1|+ |k¯|+ |x2|.
Since the objective distribution satisfies E(|X2|) <∞, we have E(|u2(x¯1, x2 + k¯)|) ≤ q|x¯1|+
|k¯|+ E(|X2|) <∞. This shows Assumption 1(d) holds.
A.2 Proofs of Proposition 1 and Lemma 2
The argument behind Proposition 1 consists of three lemmas (A.1, A.3, and A.4) that
correspond to the three statements in the proposition. Along the way, I will also prove
Lemma 2.
A.2.1 The Optimal Strategy Has a Cutoff Form
In the first part, I establish lemma A.1.
Lemma A.1. Under Assumption 1 and the feasible model Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) for any γ > 0,
there exists a cutoff C(µ1, µ2; γ), such that: (i) the agent strictly prefers stopping after
any x1 > C(µ1, µ2; γ); (ii) the agent is indifferent between continuing and stopping after
x1 = C(µ1, µ2; γ); (iii) the agent strictly prefers continuing after any x1 < C(µ1, µ2; γ).
Suppose X1 = x1. Consider the payoff difference between accepting it and continuing
under the feasible model Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) for γ ≥ 0:
D(x1;µ1, µ2, γ) := u1(x1)− EΨ(µ1,µ2;γ)[u2(x1, X2)|X1 = x1].
I abbreviate this as D(x1) when Ψ is fixed. Lemma A.2 summarizes some properties of D.
(The proofs of some technical results stated in the Appendix, like Lemma A.2, appear in the
Online Appendix.)
Lemma A.2. D is strictly increasing and continuous. If γ > 0, then there are x′1 < x
′′
1 so
that D(x′1) < 0 < D(x
′′
1).
Lemma A.1 follows readily from Lemma A.2.
Proof. Applying Lemma A.2 and using the fact that γ > 0, D changes sign and is strictly
increasing and continuous. So, there exists a unique c∗ ∈ R satisfying D(c∗) = 0. It is clear
that the best stopping strategy under Ψ is the cutoff strategy that stops after every x1 > c∗
and continues after every x1 < c∗. This establishes property (ii) of the optimal strategy.
Properties (i) and (iii) follow from the fact that D is strictly increasing.
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A.2.2 Cutoff Threshold Increasing in µ2
In the second part, I prove the lemma:
Lemma A.3. Under Assumption 1, for any µ1 ∈ R and γ > 0, the indifference threshold
C(µ1, µ2; γ) is strictly increasing in µ2.
Proof. Let µˆ1, µˆ2, ˆˆµ2 ∈ R with ˆˆµ2 > µˆ2. I show that C(µˆ1µˆ2; γ) < C(µˆ1 ˆˆµ2; γ).
By Lemma A.1, the threshold C(µˆ1, µˆ2; γ) is characterized by the indifference condition,
u1(C(µˆ1, µˆ2; γ)) = EX˜2∼f2(·|µˆ2−γ(C(µˆ1,µˆ2;γ)−µˆ1))[u2(C(µˆ1, µˆ2; γ), X˜2)]
But if agent were to instead believe (µˆ1 ˆˆµ2) where ˆˆµ2 > µˆ2, then the conditional distribution
of X2 given X1 = C(µˆ1, µˆ2; γ) would be f2(· | ˆˆµ2 − γ(C(µˆ1, µˆ2; γ)− µˆ1)). We have
u1(C(µˆ1, µˆ2; γ)) < EX˜2∼f2(·| ˆˆµ2−γ(C(µˆ1,µˆ2;γ)−µˆ1))[u2(C(µˆ1, µˆ2; γ), X˜2)]
by Assumption 1(a). This means C(µˆ1, µˆ2; γ) < C(µˆ1, ˆˆµ2; γ) by Lemma A.1, as only values
of X1 below C(µˆ1, ˆˆµ2; γ) lead to strict preference for continuing.
A.2.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. In fact, this lemma holds for any µ1 ∈ R. I first prove this for Assumption 3(a).
For µ′′2 > µ
′
2, write the corresponding optimal cutoffs as c
′′ := C(µ1, µ
′′
2 ; γ) and c
′ :=
C(µ1, µ
′
2; γ). I show that |c′′ − c′| < `|µ′′2 − µ′2|.
Under the model Ψ(µ1, µ
′′
2 ; γ), the expected continuation payoff after X1 = c
′+`(µ′′2−µ′1)
is
E ˜˜X2∼f2(·|µ′′2−γ(c′+`(µ′′2−µ′1)−µ1))[u2(c
′ + `(µ′′2 − µ
′
1), ˜˜X2]
=EX˜2∼f2(·|µ′2−γ(c′−µ1))[u2(c
′ + `(µ′′2 − µ
′
1), X˜2 + (µ
′′
2 − µ
′
1)− γ`(µ
′′
2 − µ
′
1)]
=EX˜2∼f2(·|µ′2−γ(c′−µ1))[u2(c
′ + `d, X˜2 + (1− γ`)d)]
where we put d = |µ′′2 − µ′2| > 0. From Assumption 3(a), for every x2 ∈ R, u2(c′ + `d, x2 +
(1− γ`)d)− u2(c′ , x2) < u1(c′ + `d)− u1(c′). This means
EX˜2∼f2(·|µ′2−γ(c′−µ1))[u2(c
′ + `d, X˜2 + (1− γ`)d)− u2(c′ , X˜2)] < u1(c′ + `d)− u1(c′)
EX˜2∼f2(·|µ′2−γ(c′−µ1))[u2(c
′ + `d, X˜2 + (1− γ`)d)]− u1(c′ + `d) < EX˜2∼f2(·|µ′2−γ(c′−µ1))[u2(c
′
, X˜2)]− u1(c′).
The cutoff c′ satisfies the indifference condition, u1(c
′) = EX˜2∼f2(·|µ′2−γ(c′−µ1))[u2(c
′
, X˜2)], so
RHS is 0. But LHS is the difference between expected continuation payoff and stopping
payoff at X1 = c
′ + `(µ′′2 − µ′1) under the model Ψ(µ1, µ′′2 ; γ), which shows the agent strictly
39
prefers stopping. This means c′′ < c′ + `(µ′′2 − µ′1). But µ2 7→ C(µ1, µ2; γ) is increasing by
Lemma A.3, which means c′′ > c′ . Together, these two inequalities imply |c′′−c′| < `(µ′′2−µ′1).
Now, replace Assumption 3(a) with Assumption 3(b). By Lipschitz continuity of u2,
suppose |u2(x′2) − u2(x′′2)| < L · |x′2 − x′′2 | for some L > 0 and all x′2, x′′2 ∈ R. Let β =
min( /γ
Lγ+ ,
1
2γ ) and put ` =
1
γ
−β, so 0 < ` < 1
γ
. Let any ∆ > 0 be given. Let c = C(µ1, µ2, γ).
I show that C(µ1, µ2 + ∆, γ) < c+ `∆.
We have u1(c+ `∆)− u1(c) > ( 1γ − β)∆ > ( 1γ − /γLγ+)∆ and
EΨ(µ1,µ2+∆;γ)[u2(X2) | X1 = c+ `∆]− EΨ(µ1,µ2;γ)[u2(X2) | X1 = c]
≤ L · (∆− `∆γ) = ∆Lγβ ≤ ∆Lγ · /γ
Lγ + 
By simple algebra, ( 1
γ
− /γ
Lγ+)∆ = ∆Lγ · /γLγ+ . Since u1(c) = EΨ(µ1,µ2,γ)[u2(X2) | X1 = c],
we conclude u1(c+ `∆) > EΨ(µ1,µ2+∆,γ)[u2(X2) | X1 = c+ `∆]. By Lemma A.1, this implies
c+ `∆ > (µ1, µ2 + ∆, γ).
A.2.4 Lipschitz Continuity with Constant 1/γ
Now I prove the lemma:
Lemma A.4. Under Assumption 1, for every γ > 0 and µ1 ∈ R, µ2 7→ C(µ1, µ2; γ) is
Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant 1/γ.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 2 also applies when ` = 1
γ
, which implies that when the inequality
in Assumption 3(a) is satisfied with ` = 1
γ
, µ2 7→ C(µ1, µ2; γ) is Lipschitz continuous with
Lipschitz constant 1/γ. But this reduces the inequality to u1(x1 + 1γd) − u1(x1) ≥ u2(x1 +
1
γ
d, x2)− u2(x1, x2), which is true by Assumption 1(b).
A.3 Proof of Claim 2
Proof. For d > 0,
u1(x1 +
1
1 + γ d)− u1(x1) =
1
1 + γ d
while
u2(x1 +
1
1 + γ d, x2 + (1−
γ
1 + γ )d)− u2(x1, x2)
=u2(x1 +
1
1 + γ d, x2 +
1
1 + γ d)− u2(x1, x2)
=qmax(x1 +
1
1 + γ d, x2 +
1
1 + γ d) + (1− q)(x2 +
1
1 + γ d)− qmax(x1, x2)− (1− q)x2
=q 11 + γ d+ (1− q)
1
1 + γ d =
1
1 + γ d.
40
This shows that when ` = 11+γ , we have u1(x1 + `d)− u1(x1) = u2(x1 + `d, x2 + (1− γ`)d)−
u2(x1, x2) for every x1, x2 ∈ R, d > 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
A.4.1 Preliminary Definitions and Lemmas
I first require some preliminary definitions and lemmas.
The first result says for any censoring threshold c ∈ R ∪ {∞}, KL divergence cannot be
minimized at (µ1, µ2) where µ1 6= µ•1.
Lemma A.5. For every γ > 0, c ∈ R ∪ {∞}, µ1, µ2 ∈ R with µ1 6= µ•1, we have
DKL(H•(c)‖H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); c)) > DKL(H•(c)‖H(Ψ(µ•1, µ2 − γ(µ•1 − µ1); γ); c))
Lemma A.5 shows that solutions to the KL divergence minimization problem (if any
exist) can only take the form (µ•1, µ2) for some µ2 ∈ R. Thus motivated, we define
L(µ2 | x1) :=
∫ ∞
−∞
f2(x2 | µ•2) ln[f2(x2 | µ2 − γ(x1 − µ•1))]dx2,
the expected log-likelihood of second-period data under the fundamentals (µ•1, µ2) and after
the realization X1 = x1. Also, put
L¯(µ2 | c) :=
∫ c
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) · L(µ2 | x1)dx1
for c ∈ R ∪ {∞}. Note L¯(µ2 | c) is −DKL(H•(c)‖H(Ψ(µ•1, µ2; γ); c)) up to a constant not
depending on µ2.
I establish some properties of L and L¯ that will be used in the remainder of the proof.
Lemma A.6. For all x1, µ2 ∈ R, L(µ2 | x1) = L(µ•2 | x1 − 1γ (µ2 − µ•2)), so ∂∂µ2L(µ2 | x1) =
− 1
γ
∂
∂x1
L(µ•2 | x1 − 1γ (µ2 − µ•2)).
Proof. Follows easily from the definition of L(µ2 | x1).
Lemma A.7. For every µ2 ∈ R, L(µ2 | ·) is strictly concave. For every x1 ∈ R, L(· | x1) is
strictly concave. For every c ∈ R ∪ {∞}, L¯(· | c) is strictly concave. Finally, ∂2
∂x1∂µ2
L(µ2 |
x1) > 0.
Finally, I note a convenient property of strict log-concavity.
Lemma A.8. If f(x) > 0 is strictly log concave, then for any K > 0, x 7→ f(x+K)
f(x) is strictly
decreasing.
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A.4.2 Existence and Uniqueness of KL Divergence Minimizers
If µ∗2 ∈ R satisfies the FOC ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ∗2 | c) = 0, then (µ•1, µ∗2) is the unique KL divergence mini-
mizer across all R2. This is because µ∗2 satisfies the FOC in minimizingDKL(H•(c)‖H(Ψ(µ•1, µ2; γ); c))
across µ2 ∈ R, a strictly convex objective function by the third statement in Lemma A.7. Fur-
thermore, DKL(H•(c)‖H(Ψ(µ•1, µ∗2; γ); c)) < DKL(H•(c)‖H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); c)) for any µ1 6= µ•1,
µ2 ∈ R by Lemma A.5.
The next Lemma shows the FOC has a solution at µ2 = µ•2 when c =∞.
Lemma A.9. ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ•2 | ∞) = 0.
Proof. I first show L(µ•2 | x1) is symmetric around x1 = µ•1. Suppose xh1 − µ•1 = µ•1 − xl1 > 0.
Then, L(µ•2 | xh1) is:∫ ∞
−∞
f2(x2 | µ•2) ln[f2(x2 | µ•2 − γ(xh1 − µ•1))]dx2
=
∫ µ•2
−∞
f2(x2 | µ•2) ln[f2(x2 | µ•2 − γ(xh1 − µ•1))]dx2 +
∫ ∞
µ•2
f2(x2 | µ•2) ln[f2(x2 | µ•2 − γ(xh1 − µ•1))]dx2
=
∫ µ•2
−∞
f2(x2 | µ•2) ln[f2(x2 + γ(xh1 − µ•1) | µ•2)]dx2 +
∫ ∞
µ•2
f2(x2 | µ•2) ln[f2(x2 + γ(xh1 − µ•1) | µ•2)]dx2
Using the symmetry of f2(· | µ•2) around µ•2, let g˜2(y) = f2(µ•2 + y | µ•2) = f2(µ•2 − y | µ•2)
for y ≥ 0. Let y2 = µ•2 − x2 in the first integral and y2 = x2 − µ•2 in the second integral in
the sum. We then get
L(µ•2 | xh1) =
∫ ∞
0
g˜2(y2)
(
ln[f2(µ•2 − y2 + γ(xh1 − µ•1) | µ•2] + ln[f2(µ•2 + y2 + γ(xh1 − µ•1) | µ•2)]
)
dy2.
Analogous argument shows
L(µ•2 | xl1) =
∫ ∞
0
g˜2(y2)
(
ln[f2(µ•2 − y2 + γ(xl1 − µ•1) | µ•2] + ln[f2(µ•2 + y2 + γ(xl1 − µ•1) | µ•2)]
)
dy2.
For every y2 ≥ 0, we have |[µ•2− y2 + γ(xl1− µ•1)]− [µ•2]| = |µ•2 + y2 + γ(xh1 − µ•1)− [µ•2]| since
xl1 − µ•1 = −(xh1 − µ•1). As f2(· | µ•2) is symmetric about µ•2, this shows
ln[f2(µ•2 − y2 + γ(xl1 − µ•1) | µ•2] = ln[f2(µ•2 + y2 + γ(xh1 − µ•1) | µ•2)].
A similar symmetry argument shows ln[f2(µ•2 +y2 +γ(xl1−µ•1) | µ•2)] = ln[f2(µ•2−y2 +γ(xh1−
µ•1) | µ•2] for all y2 ≥ 0. Hence we conclude L(µ•2 | xh1) = L(µ•2 | xl1).
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To finish the argument, apply the second statement in Lemma A.6 to get:
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ•2 | ∞) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) · (−
1
γ
) · ∂L
∂x1
(µ•2 | x1 −
1
γ
(µ•2 − µ•2))dx1
= −1
γ
∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂L
∂x1
(µ•2 | x1)dx1
= −1
γ
(∫ µ•1
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂L
∂x1
(µ•2 | x1)dx1 +
∫ ∞
µ•1
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂L
∂x1
(µ•2 | x1)dx1
)
By symmetry of x 7→ L(µ•2 | x1) around x1 = µ•1 just established, ∂L∂x1 (µ•2 | µ•1−y) = − ∂L∂x1 (µ•2 |
µ•1 + y) for all y ≥ 0. At the same time, f1(µ•1− y | µ•1) = f1(µ•1 + y | µ•1). Therefore the sum
of the two integrals is 0.
In fact, the FOC also has a solution for any c ∈ R, as the next lemma shows.
Lemma A.10. For any c¯ ∈ R, there exists some µ∗2 ∈ R so that ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ∗2 | c¯) = 0.
A.4.3 Monotonicity of µ∗2(c) in c
So far, I have shown that (µ∗1(c), µ∗2(c)) ∈ R2 are well-defined for all c ∈ R∪{∞} and charac-
terize the unique solution pair to the KL divergence minimization problem, with µ∗1(c) = µ•1
and µ∗2(∞) = µ•2. To finish proving Proposition 2, it remains to show that µ∗2(c) is strictly
increasing over (−∞,∞].
Lemma A.11. Let cl, c, ch ∈ R ∪ {∞} with cl < c < ch. Then ∂∂θL(µ∗2(c) | cl) < 0
and ∂
∂θ
L(µ∗2(c) | ch) > 0. As a result, whenever c′ , c′′ ∈ (−∞,∞] with c′ < c′′, we have
µ∗2(c
′) < µ∗2(c
′′).
Proof. First-order condition for µ∗2(c) implies that
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(c) | c) = 0⇒ −
1
γ
∫ c
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) ·
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ∗2(c))dx1 = 0.
From Lemma A.7, x1 7→ ∂∂x1L(0 | x1− 1γµ∗2(c)) is strictly decreasing. If at the rightmost point
on integration interval, we have ∂
∂x1
L(0 | c − 1
γ
µ∗2(c)) ≥ 0, then ∂∂x1L(0 | x1 − 1γµ∗2(c)) > 0
for all x1 < c. This would lead to ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ
∗
2(c) | c) 6= 0, a contradiction. Therefore ∂∂x1L(0 |
c− 1
γ
µ∗2(c)) < 0.
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For ch > c, we have that
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(c) | ch) = = −
1
γ
∫ ch
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) ·
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ∗2(c))dx1
=− 1
γ
∫ c
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) ·
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ∗2(c))dx1
+ (−1
γ
)
∫ ch
c
f1(x1 | µ•1) ·
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ∗2(c))dx1
=0 + (−1
γ
)
∫ ch
c
f1(x1 | µ•1) ·
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
θ∗(c))dx1.
Since ∂
∂x1
L(0 | c − 1
γ
µ∗2(c)) < 0, we also get ∂∂x1L(0 | x1 − 1γµ∗2(c)) < 0 for any x1 > c since
L(0 | ·) is strictly concave by Lemma A.7. Therefore ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(c) | ch) > 0 since the density
f1(x1 | µ•1) is strictly positive.
For cl < c, we have that
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(c) | cl) = −
1
γ
∫ cl
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) ·
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ∗2(c))dx1.
If ∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1γµ∗2(c)) ≥ 0 for all x1 ≤ cl, then clearly this gives ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ∗2(c) | cl) < 0 as
desired. Otherwise, write the integral as
−1
γ
[∫ c
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) ·
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ∗2(c))dx1 −
∫ c
cl
f1(x1 | µ•1) ·
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ∗2(c))dx1
]
,
which simplifies to 1
γ
∫ c
cl
f1(x1 | µ•1) · ∂∂x1L(0 | x1 − 1γµ∗2(c)dx1. If ∂∂x1L(0 | x1 − 1γµ∗2(c)) ≥ 0
for any x1 ∈ [cl, c], then we must also get ∂∂x1L(0 | x1 − 1γµ∗2(c)) ≥ 0 for all x1 ≤ cl, but this
returns us to the case we have already considered. Thus ∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1γµ∗2(c)) < 0 for all
x1 ∈ [cl, c],and the integral is strictly negative, showing ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ∗2(c) | cl) < 0.
Finally, consider c′ , c′′ ∈ (−∞,∞] with c′ < c′′ . We must have ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(c
′) | c′′) > 0 by
what we have established. But L¯(· | c′′) is strictly concave from Lemma A.7 and its FOC
has a solution by Lemma A.10. So µ∗2(c
′′) > µ∗2(c
′).
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A.5 Proof of the Expression for µ∗2(c) in Example 2
Proof. Rewrite Definition 5 as
∫ ∞
c
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · ln
(
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2)
φ(x1;µ1, σ2)
)
dx1
+
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ·
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x2;µ•2, σ2) · ln
[
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2)
φ(x1;µ1, σ2)
]
dx2dx1
+
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ·
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x2;µ•2, σ2) · ln
[
φ(x2;µ•2, σ2)
φ(x2;µ2 − γ(x− µ1), σ2)
]
dx2dx1
which is: ∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · ln
(
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2)
φ(x1;µ1, σ2)
)
dx1
+
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ·
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x2;µ•2, σ2) ln
[
φ(x2;µ•2, σ2)
φ(x2;µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1), σ2)
]
dx2dx1
The KL divergence between N (µtrue, σ2true) and N (µmodel, σ2model) is
ln σmodel
σtrue
+ σ
2
true + (µtrue − µmodel)2
2σ2model
− 12 ,
so we may simplify the first term and the inner integral of the second term:
(µ1 − µ•1)2
2σ2 +
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ·
[
σ2 + (µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)2
2σ2 −
1
2
]
dx1.
Dropping constant terms not depending on µ1 and µ2 and multiplying by σ2, we get a
simplified expression of the objective,
ξ(µ1, µ2) :=
(µ1 − µ•1)2
2 +
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ·
[
(µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)2
2
]
dx1
We have the partial derivatives by differentiating under the integral sign,
∂ξ
∂µ2
=
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · (µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)dx1
∂ξ
∂µ1
= (µ1 − µ•1) + γ
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · (µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)dx1
= (µ1 − µ•1) + γ
∂ξ
∂µ2
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By the first order conditions, at the minimum (µ∗1, µ∗2), we must have ∂ξ∂µ2 (µ
∗
1, µ
∗
2) = ∂ξ∂µ1 (µ
∗
1, µ
∗
2) =
0 ⇒ µ∗1 = µ•1. So µ∗2 satisfies ∂ξ∂µ2 (µ•1, µ∗2) = 0, which by straightforward algebra shows
µ∗2(c) = µ•2 − γ (µ•1 − E [X1 | X1 ≤ c]) .
A.6 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let c ∈ R, K > 0 be given. I show that |µ∗2(c+K)− µ∗2(c)| < γK. We have
L¯(µ2 | c) =
∫ c
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1)L(0 | x1 −
1
γ
µ2)dx1
and so
L¯(µ2 + γK | c+K) =
∫ c+K
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1)L(0 | (x1 −K)−
1
γ
µ2)dx1
=
∫ c
−∞
f1(x1 +K | µ•1)L(0 | x1 −
1
γ
µ2)dx1
This implies
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ2 + γK | c+K) = −1
γ
∫ c
−∞
f1(x1 +K | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ2)dx1.
When µ2 = µ∗2(c), first-order condition implies that ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ
∗
2(c) | c) = 0, that is
∫ c
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ∗2(c))dx1 = 0.
We may write ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(c) + γK | c+K) as
−1
γ
∫ c
−∞
(
f1(x1 +K | µ•1)
f1(x1 | µ•1)
)
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ∗2(c))dx1.
The term x1 7→ ∂∂x1L(0 | x1 − 1γµ∗2(c)) is positive for low values of x1 and negative for
high values of x1, due to strict concavity of L(0 | ·) by Lemma A.7. Let r be such that
∂
∂x1
L(0 | r − 1
γ
µ∗2(c)) = 0. Then,
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(c) + γK | c+K) <−
1
γ
·
∫ r
−∞
(
f1(r +K | µ•1)
f1(r | µ•1)
)
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ∗2(c))dx1
− 1
γ
·
∫ c
r
(
f1(r +K | µ•1)
f1(r | µ•1)
)
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ∗2(c))dx1.
By Lemma A.8, x 7→ f1(x+K|µ•1)
f1(x|µ•1) is strictly decreasing. So the weight
(
f1(r+K|µ•1)
f1(r|µ•1)
)
under-weighs
the integrand on the interval (−∞, r), while the same weight over-weighs the integrand on
46
(r, c). This amounts to an under-weighting of the positive part of the integrand and an over-
weighting of the negative part, thus under-estimating the integral value. Accounting for the
term − 1
γ
gives the inequality above.
FOC ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(c) | c) = 0 then implies RHS must be 0. So, ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ∗2(c) +γK | c+K) < 0.
Since L¯(· | c+K) is strictly concave by Lemma A.7, this implies µ∗2(c+K) < µ∗2(c)+γK.
Given that we must have µ∗2(c + K) > µ∗2(c) from Proposition 2, this shows |µ∗2(c + K) −
µ∗2(c)| < γK.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Consider the map I as discussed in the text, I(µ2) := µ∗2(C(µ•1, µ2; γ)). If µˆ2 is a
fixed point of I, then there is a steady state with µ∞1 = µ•1, µ∞2 = µˆ2, c∞ = C(µ•1, µˆ2; γ). So,
existence of steady states follows from existence of fixed points of I.
Conversely, suppose (µ∞1 , µ∞2 , c∞) is a steady state. From Proposition 2, µ∞1 = µ∗1(c∞) =
µ•1. From the definition of a steady state, µ∞2 = µ∗2(c∞) and c∞ = C(µ∞1 , µ∞2 ; γ) =
C(µ•1, µ∞2 ; γ). That is to say, µ∞2 = µ∗2(C(µ•1, µ∞2 ; γ)), so µ∞2 is a fixed point of I. So,
uniqueness of steady states follows from uniqueness of fixed points of I.
Since µ2 7→ C(µ•1, µ2; γ) is a contraction mapping with Lipschitz constant ` < 1/γ by
Lemma 2 and µ∗2(c) is a contraction mapping with Lipschitz constant γ by Lemma 1, their
composition I is a contraction mapping with Lipschitz constant `γ < 1. This proposition
follows from properties of contraction mappings.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
I will use the following lemma.
Lemma A.12. For any c ∈ R, µ∗2(c)− γ(c− µ•1) < µ•2.
Here is the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. Suppose (µ•1, µ∞2 , c∞) is a steady state. If c• =∞, then c∞ < c• trivially as c∞ ∈ R.
Now suppose c• 6= ∞. By Proposition 1, agent is indifferent between stopping and
continuing after X1 = c∞ under the feasible model Ψ(µ•1, µ∞2 ; γ). This implies
u1(c∞) = EΨ(µ•1,µ∞2 ;γ)[u2(c
∞, X2)|X1 = c∞]
= EX˜2∼f2(·|µ∞2 −γ(c∞−µ•1))[u2(c
∞, X˜2)]
By the definition of steady state, µ∞2 = µ∗2(c∞). By Lemma A.12, µ∗2(c∞)−γ(c∞−µ•1) < µ•2.
Therefore, f2(· | µ∞2 − γ(c∞ − µ•1)) is first-order stochastically dominated by f2(· | µ•2).
Since u2 is strictly increasing in its second argument by Assumption 1(a), we therefore have
u1(c∞) < EX˜2∼f2(·|µ•2)[u2(c
∞, X˜2)]. The LHS is the objective payoff of stopping at c∞ while the
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RHS is the objective expected payoff of continuing at c∞. Since the best stopping strategy
under the objective model Ψ• has the cutoff form, we must have c∞ < c•.18
A.9 Proof of Theorem 1′
The hypotheses of Theorem 1′ will be maintained throughout this section. I also also ab-
breviate f1(· | µ•1) =: g1(·) and f2(· | µ•2) =: g2(·). Finally, let κg2 ∈ R>0 be such that∣∣∣ d2
dx2 ln(g2(x))
∣∣∣ < κg2 for all x ∈ R.
A.9.1 Optimality of Cutoff Strategies
I first develop an extension of Lemma A.1. I show that for an agent who knows µ•1 and has
some belief over µ2 with supported bounded by [µ2, µ¯2], there exists a cutoff strategy that
uniquely maximizes payoff across all cutoff strategies, so the “myopically optimal” cutoff
strategy is well defined. Furthermore, this myopically optimal cutoff strategy also achieves
weakly larger expected payoff compared to any arbitrary stopping strategy19. So, restriction
to cutoff strategies is without loss.
Lemma A.13. For an agent who knows µ•1 and who holds some belief ν ∈ ∆([µ2, µ¯2]) about
second-period fundamental, there exists c∗ ∈ R such that: (i) the cutoff strategy Sc∗ achieves
weakly higher expected payoff than any other (not necessarily cutoff-based) stopping strategy
S : R → {Stop, Continue}; (ii) for any other c′ 6= c∗, Sc∗ achieves strictly higher expected
payoff than Sc′ .
A.9.2 The Log Likelihood Process
Next, I define the processes of data log likelihood (for a given fundamental). For each
µ2 ∈ [µ2, µ¯2], let `t(µ2)(ω) be the log likelihood that the true second-period fundamental is
µ2 and histories (H˜s)s≤t(ω) are generated by the end of round t. It is given by
`t(µ2)(ω) := ln(m0(µ2)) +
t∑
s=1
ln(lik(H˜s(ω);µ2))
where lik(x1,∅;µ2) := g1(x1) and lik(x1, x2;µ2) := g1(x1) · f2(x2 | µ2 − γ(x1 − µ•1)).
I record a useful decomposition of `′t(µ2), the derivative of the log-likelihood process. Let
λ(z) := d
dz
ln(g2(z)) = g
′
2(z)
g2(z) .
Define two stochastic processes:
ϕs(µ2) := −λ(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ•1)) · 1{X1,s ≤ C˜s}
18In particular this implies if there exists at least one steady state, then c• 6= −∞.
19One can construct other stopping strategies with the same expected payoff by, for example, modifying
the stopping decision of the optimal cutoff strategy at finitely many x1.
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ϕ¯s(µ2) :=
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ2 | C˜s)
Note that ϕ¯s(µ2) is measurable with respect to Fs−1, since (Ct) is a predictable process.
Write ξs(µ2) := ϕs(µ2)− ϕ¯s(µ2) and yt(µ2) := ∑ts=1 ξs(µ2). Write zt(µ2) := ∑ts=1 ϕ¯s(µ2).
Lemma A.14. `′t(µ2) =
m
′
0(µ2)
m0(µ2) + yt(µ2) + zt(µ2)
Proof. We may expand `t(µ2) as
ln(m0(µ2)) +
t∑
s=1
ln(g1(X1,s)) +
t∑
s=1
ln(f2(X2,s | µ2 − γ(X1,s − µ•1))) · 1{X1,s ≤ C˜s}.
The derivative of the first term is m
′
0(µ2)
m0(µ2) . The second term does not depend on µ2. In the third
term, we use the fact that f2(· | τ) are translations of each other and that g2(·) = f2(· | µ•2)
to write:
f2(X2,s | µ2 − γ(X1,s − µ•1)) = g2(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ•1)).
This shows that the derivative of each summand in the third term with respect to µ2 is
−g
′
2(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ•1))
g2(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ•1))
· 1{X1,s ≤ C˜s} = ϕs(µ2).
So in sum, `′t(µ2) =
m
′
0(µ2)
m0(µ2) +
∑t
s=1 ϕs(µ2). The lemma then follows from simple rearrange-
ments.
Now I derive two results about the ξt(µ2) processes for different values of µ2.
Lemma A.15. There exists κξ < ∞ so that for every µ2 ∈ [µ2, µ¯2] and for every t ≥ 1,
ω ∈ Ω, E[ξ2t (µ2)|Ft−1](ω) ≤ κξ.
The proof can be found in the Online Appendix.
Lemma A.16. For every t ≥ 1, µ2 ∈ [µ2, µ¯2] and ω ∈ Ω, |ξ
′
t(µ2)(ω)| ≤ 2κg2.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma A.15, we established E[ϕt(µ2)|Ft−1] = ϕ¯t(µ2). So, we have
|ξ′t(µ2)(ω)| ≤ |ϕ′t(µ2)(ω)|+ |E[ϕ′t(µ2) | Ft−1](ω)|. We have
ϕ
′
t(µ2) = λ
′(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ•1)) · 1{X1,s ≤ C˜s},
with |λ′(z)| ≤ κg2 for all z ∈ R. This shows |ϕ′t(µ2)(ω)| ≤ κg2 for all ω, and similarly
|E[ϕ′t(µ2) | Ft−1](ω)| ≤ κg2 for all ω.
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A.9.3 Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018)’s Law of Large Numbers
I use a statistical result from Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018) to show that the yt term
in the decomposition of `′t almost surely converges to 0 in the long run, and furthermore
this convergence is uniform on [µ2, µ¯2]. This lets me focus on summands of the form ϕ¯s(µ2),
which can be interpreted as the expected contribution to the log likelihood derivative from
round s data. This lends tractability to the problem as ϕ¯s(µ2) only depends on C˜s, but not
on X1,s or X2,s.
Lemma A.17. For every µ2 ∈ [µ2, µ¯2], limt→∞ |
yt(µ2)
t
| = 0 almost surely.
Proof. Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018)’s Proposition 10 shows that if (yt) is a martin-
gale such that there exists some constant v ≥ 0 satisfying [y]t ≤ vt almost surely, where [y]t
is the quadratic variation of (yt), then almost surely limt→∞ ytt = 0.
Consider the process yt(µ2) for a fixed µ2 ∈ [µ2, µ¯2]. By definition yt =
∑t
s=1 ϕs(µ2) −
ϕ¯s(µ2). As established in the proof of Lemma A.15, for every s, ϕ¯s(µ2) = E[ϕs(µ2)|Fs−1].
So for t′ < t,
E[yt(µ2)|Ft′ ] =
t
′∑
s=1
ϕs(µ2)− ϕ¯s(µ2) + E[
t∑
s=t′+1
ϕs(µ2)− ϕ¯s(µ2)|Ft′ ]
=
t
′∑
s=1
ϕs(µ2)− ϕ¯s(µ2) +
t∑
s=t′+1
E[E[ϕs(µ2)− ϕ¯s(µ2)|Fs−1] | Ft′ ]
=
t
′∑
s=1
ϕs(µ2)− ϕ¯s(µ2) + 0 = yt′ (µ2).
This shows (yt(µ2)) is a martingale. Also,
[y(µ2)]t =
t−1∑
s=1
E[(ys(µ2)− ys−1(µ2))2|Fs−1]
=
t−1∑
s=1
E[ξ2s (µ2)|Fs−1] ≤ κξ · t
by Lemma A.15. Therefore Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018) Proposition 10 applies.
Lemma A.18. limt→∞ supµ2∈[µ2,µ¯2] |
yt(µ2)
t
| = 0 almost surely.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 11 in Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018), it suffices to
find a sequence of random variables Bt such that supµ2∈[µ2,µ¯2] |ξ
′
t(µ2)| ≤ Bt almost surely,
supt≥1 1t
∑t
s=1 E[Bs] <∞, and limt→∞ 1t
∑t
s=1(Bs−E[Bs]) = 0. But Lemma A.16 establishes
the constant random variable Bt = 2κg2 as a bound on ξ
′
t(µ2) for every t, µ2, ω, which satisfies
these requirements.
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A.9.4 Bounds on Asymptotic Beliefs and Asymptotic Cutoffs
For each t, let M˜t be the (random) posterior belief induced by the (random) posterior density
m˜t after updating prior m0 using t rounds of histories.
Lemma A.19. For cl ≥ C(µ•1, µ2; γ), if almost surely lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥ c
l, then almost surely
limt→∞ M˜t( [µ2, µ
∗
2(cl)) ) = 0. Also, for ch ≤ C(µ•1, µ¯2; γ), if almost surely lim sup
t→∞
C˜t ≤ ch,
then almost surely limt→∞ M˜t( (µ∗2(ch), µ¯2]) = 0.
Proof. I first show that for all  > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that almost surely,
lim inf
t→∞ infµ2∈[µ2,µ∗2(cl)−]
`
′
t(µ2)
t
≥ δ.
From Lemma A.14, we may rewrite LHS as
lim inf
t→∞ infµ2∈[µ2,µ∗2(cl)−]
[
1
t
m
′
0(µ2)
m0(µ2)
+ yt(µ2)
t
+ zt(µ2)
t
]
,
which is no smaller than taking the inf separately across the three terms in the bracket,
lim inf
t→∞ infµ2∈[µ2,µ∗2(cl)−]
1
t
m
′
0(µ2)
m0(µ2)
+ lim inf
t→∞ infµ2∈[µ2,µ∗2(cl)−]
yt(µ2)
t
+ lim inf
t→∞ infµ2∈[µ2,µ∗2(cl)−]
zt(µ2)
t
.
Since m′0 is continuous and m0 is strictly positive (and continuous) on [µ2, µ¯2] by the
hypotheses of Theorem 1′ , m′0/m0 is bounded on [µ2, µ¯2], so we in fact have
lim
t→∞ infµ2∈[µ2,µ∗2(cl)−]
1
t
m
′
0(µ2)
m0(µ2)
= 0.
To deal with the second term,
lim inf
t→∞ infµ2∈[µ2,µ∗2(cl)−]
yt(µ2)
t
≥ lim inf
t→∞ infµ2∈[µ2µ¯2]
yt(µ2)
t
= − lim inf
t→∞ supµ2∈[µ2µ¯2]
−yt(µ2)
t
.
Lemma A.18 gives limt→∞ supµ2∈[µ2µ¯2]
−yt(µ2)
t
= 0 almost surely, so this second term is non-
negative almost surely.
It suffices then to find δ > 0 and show lim inft→∞ infµ2∈[µ2,µ∗2(cl)−]
zt(µ2)
t
≥ δ almost surely.
Put δ := ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(cl)−  | cl) and I will show ϕ¯s(µ2)(ω) ≥ δ whenever C˜s(ω) ≥ cl and µ2 ≤
µ∗2(cl)−. To see this, note that when C˜s(ω) = c ∈ R, ϕ¯s(µ2)(ω) = ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ2 | c) and L¯(· | c) is
strictly concave in its first argument by Lemma A.7. Therefore, if ϕ¯s(µ∗2(cl)−)(ω) ≥ δ, then
we also get ϕ¯s(µ2)(ω) ≥ δ for any µ2 ≤ µ∗2(cl)−. So it suffices to show ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ∗2(cl)− | c) ≥ δ
whenever c ≥ cl.
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We have
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ2 | cl) =
∫ cl
−∞
g1(x1) ·
∫ ∞
−∞
(−1) · g2(x2) · λ(x2 − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(x1 − µ•1))dx2dx1.
First-order condition implies that ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(cl) | cl) = 0. Since λ is strictly decreasing, this
implies δ = ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(cl) −  | cl) > 0. Also, again using λ strictly decreasing, the inner
integrand is strictly increasing in x1. Thus, ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ
∗
2(cl)−  | cl) > 0 implies∫ ∞
−∞
(−1) · g2(x2) · λ(x2 − (µ∗2(cl)− ) + µ•2 + γ(c− µ•1))dx2 > 0
for all c ≥ cl. This then shows ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(cl)−  | c) > ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ∗2(cl)−  | cl) for any c > cl.
Having shown that ϕ¯s(µ2)(ω) ≥ δ for all µ2 ∈ [µ2, µ∗2(cl) − ] whenever C˜s(ω) ≥ cl, this
shows along any ω such that lim inf
t→∞ C˜t ≥ c
l, we also have lim infs→∞ infµ2∈[µ2,µ∗2(cl)−] ϕ¯s(µ2) ≥
δ, and thus
lim inf
t→∞ infµ2∈[µ2,µ∗2(cl)−]
zt(µ2)
t
= lim inf
t→∞ infµ2∈[µ2,µ∗2(cl)−]
1
t
[
t∑
s=1
ϕ¯s(µ2)
]
≥ δ.
From here, it is a standard exercise to establish that limt→∞ M˜t( [µ2, µ
∗
2(cl) − ) ) = 0
almost surely. Since the choice of  > 0 is arbitrary, this establishes the first part of the
lemma.
The proof of the second part of the statement is exactly symmetric, except we will show
that lim supt→∞ supµ2∈[µ∗2(ch)+,µ¯2]
zt(µ2)
t
≤ −δ where
−δ = max
(
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(ch) +  | ch),
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(ch) +  | C(µ•1, µ2; γ))
)
< 0.
Lemma A.20. For µ2 ≤ µl2 < µh2 ≤ µ¯2, if limt→∞ M˜t([µl2, µh2 ]) = 1 almost surely, then
lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥ C(µ•1, µl2; γ) and lim supt→∞ C˜t ≤ C(µ•1, µh2 ; γ) almost surely.
Proof. I show lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥ C(µ•1, µl2; γ) almost surely . The argument establishing
lim supt→∞ C˜t ≤ C(µ•1, µh2 ; γ) is symmetric.
Let cl = C(µ•1, µl2; γ), c = C(µ•1, µ2; γ), c¯ = C(µ
•
1, µ¯2; γ). Fix some  > 0. Since
c 7→ U(c;µ•1, µ2) is single peaked for every µ2, and since cl ≤ C(µ•1, µ2; γ) for all µ2 ∈
[µl2, µh2 ], we get U(cl;µ•1, µ2) − U(cl − ;µ•1, µ2) > 0 for every µ2 ∈ [µl2, µh2 ]. As µ2 7→(
U(cl;µ•1, µ2)− U(cl − ;µ•1, µ2)
)
is continuous, there exists some κ∗ > 0 so that U(cl;µ•1, µ2)−
U(cl − ;µ•1, µ2) > κ∗ for all µ2 ∈ [µl2, µh2 ]. In particular, if ν ∈ ∆([µl2, µh2 ]) is a be-
lief over second-period fundamental supported on [µl2, µh2 ], then
∫
U(cl;µ•1, µ2) − U(cl −
;µ•1, µ2)dν(µ2) > κ∗.
Now , let κ¯ := supc∈[c,c¯] supµ2∈[µ2,µ¯2] U(c;µ
•
1, µ2), κ := infc∈[c,c¯] infµ2∈[µ2,µ¯2] U(c;µ
•
1, µ2).
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Find p ∈ (0, 1) so that pκ∗ − (1 − p)(κ¯ − κ) = 0. At any belief νˆ ∈ ∆([µ2, µ¯2]) that assigns
more than probability p to the subinterval [µl2, µh2 ], the optimal cutoff is larger than cl−. To
see this, take any cˆ ≤ cl− and I will show cˆ is suboptimal. If cˆ < c, then it is suboptimal after
any belief on [µ2, µ¯2]. If c ≤ cˆ ≤ cl − , I show that
∫
U(cl;µ•1, µ2)− U(cˆ;µ•1, µ2)dνˆ(µ2) > 0.
To see this, we may decompose νˆ as the mixture of a probability measure ν on [µl2, µh2 ]
and another probability measure νc on [µ2, µ¯2]\[µl2, µh2 ]. Let pˆ > p be the probability that ν
assigns to [µl2, µh2 ]. The above integral is equal to:
pˆ
∫
µ2∈[µl2,µh2 ]
U(cl;µ•1, µ2)− U(cˆ;µ•1, µ2)dν(µ2) + (1− pˆ)
∫
µ2∈[µ2,µ¯2]\[µl2,µh2 ].
U(cl;µ•1, µ2)− U(cˆ;µ•1, µ2)dνc(µ2)
Since cl is to the left of the optimal cutoff for all µ2 ∈ [µl2, µh2 ] and cˆ ≤ cl − , then
U(cˆ;µ•1, µ2) ≤ U(cl − ;µ•1, µ2) for all µ2 ∈ [µl2, µh2 ]. The first summand is no less than
pˆ
∫
µ2∈[µl2,µh2 ]
U(cl;µ•1, µ2)− U(cl − ;µ•1, µ2)dν(µ2) ≥ pˆκ∗.
Also, the integrand in the second summand is no smaller than−(κ¯−κ), therefore ∫ U(cl;µ•1, µ2)−
U(cˆ;µ•1, µ2)dνˆ(µ2) ≥ pˆκ∗ − (1 − pˆ)(κ¯ − κ). Since pˆ > p, we get pˆκ∗ − (1 − pˆ)(κ¯ − κ) > 0 as
desired.
Along any sample path ω where limt→∞ M˜t([µl2, µh2 ])(ω) = 1, eventually M˜t([µl2, µh2 ])(ω) >
p for all large enough t, meaning lim inft→∞ C˜t(ω) ≥ cl − . This shows lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥
C(µ•1, µl2; γ) −  almost surely. Since the choice of  > 0 was arbitrary, we in fact conclude
lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥ C(µ•1, µl2; γ) almost surely.
A.9.5 The Contraction Map
I now combine the results established so far to prove Theorem 1′.
Proof. Let µl2,[1] := µ2, µ
h
2,[1] := µ¯2. For k = 2, 3, ..., iteratively define µl2,[k] := I(µl2,[k−1]; γ)
and µh2,[k] := I(µh2,[k−1]; γ).
From Lemma A.20, if limt→∞ M˜t([µl2,[k], µh2,[k]]) = 1 almost surely, then lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥
C(µ•1, µl2,[k]; γ) and lim supt→∞ C˜t ≤ C(µ•1, µh2,[k]; γ) almost surely. But using these conclusions
in Lemma A.19, we further deduce that limt→∞ M˜t([µ∗2(C(µ•1, µl2,[k]; γ)), µ∗2(C(µ•1, µh2,[k]; γ))]) =
1 almost surely, that is to say limt→∞ M˜t([µl2,[k+1], µh2,[k+1]]) = 1 almost surely.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 4, under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, µ2 7→ I(µ2; γ) is
a contraction mapping. Since µ2 < µ
∞
2 and µ¯2 > µ∞2 , (µl2,[k])k≥1 is a sequence whose limit is
µ∞2 , and (µh2,[k])k≥1 is a sequence whose limit is µ∞2 . Thus, agent’s posterior converges in L1
to µ∞2 almost surely (since the support of the prior is bounded).
In addition, µ2 7→ C(µ•1, µ2; γ) is continuous, so the sequences of bounds on asymptotic
cutoffs also converge, limk→∞C(µ•1, µl2,[k]; γ) = c∞ and limk→∞C(µ•1, µh2,[k]; γ) = c∞. This
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means limt→∞ C˜t = c∞ almost surely.
A.10 Proof of Theorem 2
I require a lemma that shows beliefs and cutoffs are monotonic in the auxiliary environment.
Lemma A.21. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Starting from any initial condition and
any m0, cutoffs (cA[t])t≥1 and beliefs (µA2,[t])t≥1 in the auxiliary environment form monotonic
sequences across generations. Also, limt→∞ µA2,[t] = µ∞2 where µ∞2 is the unique fixed point of
I(·; γ) and limt→∞ cA[t] = C(µ•1, µ∞2 ; γ).
Now I turn to the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. For the first step of the proof, suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
Step 1: If c[1] > c[0], then (µ2,[t])t≥1 and (c[t])t≥0 are two increasing sequence, whereas
c[1] ≤ c[0] implies (µ2,[t])t≥1 and (c[t])t≥0 are two decreasing sequences.
By simple algebra, the problem of generation t + 1 amounts to maximizing the sum of
L¯(· | c[0]), ..., L¯(· | c[t]). For c0, ..., ct ∈ R, denote µ∗2(c0, ..., ct) := arg min
µ2∈R
∑t
s=0 L¯(µ2 | cs).
Suppose c[1] > c[0]. Then µ2,[1] = µ∗2(c[0]), but by Lemma A.11, ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ2,[1] | c[1]) > 0.
Then, since L¯(· | c[0]) + L¯(· | c[1]) is strictly concave and since ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ2,[1] | c[0]) + ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ2,[1] |
c[1]) = ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ2,[1] | c[1]) > 0, we must have µ2,[2] = µ∗2(c[0], c[1]) > µ2,[1]. This also shows that,
since C is strictly increasing, c[2] > c[1].
Assume we have established that c[0] < c[1] < ... < c[t] and µ2,[1] < ... < µ2,[t] for
some t ≥ 2. By FOC of inference in generation t, ∑t−1s=0 ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ2,[t] | c[s]) = 0. If we had
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ2,[t] | c[t−1]) < 0, then by single-peaked nature of L(· | c[t−1]), µ2,[t] > µ∗2(c[t−1]). Since
c[0] < c[1] < ... < c[t−1] implies µ∗2(c[0]) < ... < µ∗2(c[t−1]) by Proposition 2, we must also have
µ2,[t] > µ
∗
2(c[s]) for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t− 2, that is to say ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ2,[t] | c[s]) < 0 for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t− 1.
This contradicts the FOC. So, ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ2,[t] | c[t−1]) ≥ 0, which implies ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ2,[t] | c[t]) > 0
as c[t] > c[t−1] from the inductive hypothesis. Hence we see that
∑t
s=0
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ2,[t] | c[s]) > 0.
This shows µ2,[t+1] = µ∗2(c[0], ..., c[t]) > µ2,[t] by the strict concavity of generation t’s objective.
Also, c[t+1] > c[t] follows.
So by induction, we have shown Step 1. (The other case of c[1] < c[0] is symmetric.)
For the rest of this proof, suppose Assumption 3 also holds.
Step 2: (µ2,[t])t≥1 is bounded and converges.
I first show that for every t, µ2,[t] is bounded between µ2,[1] and µ∞2 . Combined with the
fact that (µ2,[t])t≥1 is monotonic from Step 1, the sequence must then converge.
Consider the case of c[1] > c[0] (so µ2,[2] > µ2,[1]), Step 1 implies that (µ2,[t])t≥1 forms an
increasing sequence. We have µA2,[1] = µ2,[1] = µ∗2(c[0]), so also cA[1] = c[1]. We have µA2,[2] =
µ∗2(c[1]), but ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ
A
2,[2] | c[0]) + ∂∂µ2 L¯(µA2,[2] | c[1]) = ∂∂µ2 L¯(µA2,[2] | c[0]) < 0, using the FOC
that ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µA2,[2] | c[1]) = 0 and c[1] > c[0]. This shows µ2,[2] < µA2,[2], hence c[2] < cA[2]. By
induction, suppose we have shown that µ2,[2] < µA2,[2] and c[t] < cA[t] for some t ≥ 2. Then, the
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arguments from Step 1 establish that ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ2,[t+1] | c[t]) ≥ 0, which implies ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ2,[t+1] |
cA[t]) > 0 given that cA[t] > c[t]. By strict concavity of L¯(· | cA[t]) from Lemma A.7, this shows
µA2,[t+1] = µ∗2(cA[t]) > µ2,[t+1], hence also cA[t+1] > c[t+1]. So we have established that µ2,[t] ≤ µA2,[t]
by induction. But from the proof of Lemma A.21, (µA2,[t]) converge upwards to µ∞2 in this
case (given that they are iterates of I, which is a contraction map by Proposition 4 when
Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold), meaning µ2,[t] is bounded between µ2,[1] and µ∞2 .
The case of c[1] < c[0] is symmetric (and if c[1] = c[0] then µ2,[1] = µ∞2 ). We have proven
Step 2. Denote µ˜2 = limt→∞ µ2,[t] and observe that since C is continuous in its second
argument, c[t] → c˜ = C(µ•1, µ˜2; γ).
Step 3: µ˜2 is a fixed point of I(·; γ), so in particular µ˜2 = µ∞2 and c˜ = c∞ since I(·; γ)
has a unique fixed point by Proposition 4.
Consider the case of c[1] > c[0], for the other case is symmetric. From the proof of Step
2, µ2,[t] is bounded above by µ˜∞2 , so if µ˜2 6= µ∞2 by way of contradiction, then µ˜2 < µ∞2 .
Since the iterates of I(·; γ) are monotonic, this implies I(µ˜2; γ) > µ˜2, that is µ∗2(c˜) > µ˜2.
As L¯(· | c˜) is strictly concave, this implies ∫ c˜−∞ ∂∂µ2L(µ˜2 | x1)dx1 > 0. Using the fact that
∂
∂µ2
L(· | x1) is decreasing, there must exist  > 0 so that ∫ c−∞ ∂∂µ2L(µ2 | x1)dx1 ≥  whenever
c ∈ [c˜ − , c˜] and µ2 ≤ µ˜2. Since c[t] ↗ c˜, find large enough T so that c[t] ≥ c˜ −  whenever
t ≥ T. Also, let B = maxµ2∈[µ[2],1,µ˜2] maxc∈[c[0],c˜]
∣∣∣∫ c−∞ ∂∂µ2L(µ2 | x1)dx1∣∣∣ . So for t ≥ T + 1,∑t−1
s=0
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ2,[t] | c[s]) ≥ −TB + (t − T ). This quantity must be strictly positive for large
enough t, a contradiction that says FOC is not satisfied for large t. Thus, we must have
µ˜2 = µ∞2 , hence c˜ = C(µ•1, µ∞2 ; γ).
A.11 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Suppose c[1] ≥ c[0]. Since µ∗2(c) is increasing, we have µ2,[2] = µ∗2(c[1], c[0]) ≥ µ∗2(c[0]) =
µ2,[1]. So we get c[2] ≥ c[1]. By Theorem 2, we deduce (c[t])t≥0 is an increasing sequence, so
in particular c∞ ≥ c•. But again by 2, c∞ is the same as the steady-state cutoff in Theorem
1. This is a contradiction because Theorem 1 implies c∞ < c•.
This shows c[1] < c[0] and similar arguments show (c[t])t≥0 is a strictly decreasing sequence.
Since c• is the objectively optimal cutoff threshold under the true model Ψ•, and since
expected payoff under the true model is a single-peaked function in acceptance threshold by
Lemma A.2, this shows expected payoff is strictly decreasing across generations.
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OA 1 Proofs of Results in Section 5 and the Appendix
OA 1.1 Proof of Lemma A.2
Proof. Step 1: D is strictly increasing.
Suppose x′1 > x¯1. Then,
EΨ[u2(x¯1, X2)|X1 = x¯1] = EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x¯1−µ1))[u2(x¯1, X˜2)],
while
EΨ[u2(x¯1, X2)|X1 = x′1] = E ˜˜X2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x′1−µ1))[u2(x¯1,
˜˜X2)]
= EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x¯1−µ1))[u2(x¯1, X˜2 − γ(x
′
1 − x¯1))].
Since u2 is strictly increasing in its second argument by Assumption 1(a), we get
EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x¯1−µ1))[u2(x¯1, X˜2 − γ(x
′
1 − x¯1))] ≤ EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x¯1−µ1))[u2(x¯1, X˜2)]
seeing that γ(x′1 − x¯1) ≥ 0. Also, at any x2 ∈ R, by Assumption 1(b) we know that
u1(x
′
1)− u1(x¯1) > u2(x
′
1, x2)− u2(x¯1, x2).
⇒ u1(x′1)− u2(x
′
1, x2) > u1(x¯1)− u2(x¯1, x2).
This then shows
u1(x
′
1)− EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x¯1−µ1))[u2(x
′
1, X˜2 − γ(x
′
1 − x¯1))]
> u1(x¯1)− EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x¯1−µ1))[u2(x¯1, X˜2 − γ(x
′
1 − x¯1))]
≥ u1(x¯1)− EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x¯1−µ1))[u2(x¯1, X˜2)]
that is D(x′1) > D(x¯1).
Step 2: D is continuous.
1
Fixing some x¯1 ∈ R, I show D is continuous at x¯1. Since u1 is continuous, find δ > 0 so
that whenever |x1− x¯1| < 1, |u(x1)−u(x¯1)| < δ. Consider the function w : R→ R≥0 defined
by w(x2) := |u2(x¯1, x2 + γ)|+ |u2(x¯1, x2 − γ)|+ δ.
Claim OA.1. Whenever |x1 − x¯1| < 1, |u2(x1, x2 + γ(x¯1 − x1))| ≤ w(x2) for every x2 ∈ R.
Proof. Since u2 is increasing its second argument by Assumption 1(a), if u2(x1, x2 + γ(x¯1 −
x1)) ≥ 0, then |u2(x1, x2 + γ(x¯1 − x1))| ≤ |u2(x1, x2 + γ)| since |x1 − x¯1| < 1. Otherwise, if
u2(x1, x2 + γ(x¯1 − x1)) < 0, then |u2(x1, x2 + γ(x¯1 − x1))| ≤ |u2(x1, x2 − γ)|. But we have
|u2(x1, x2 + γ)| ≤ |u2(x¯1, x2 + γ)|+ |u2(x1, x2 + γ)− u2(x¯1, x2 + γ)|
for every x2. By Assumption 1(b), |u2(x1, x2 + γ) − u2(x¯1, x2 + γ)| ≤ |u1(x1) − u1(x¯1)| < δ
whenever |x1 − x¯1| < 1. Similarly,
|u2(x1, x2 − γ)| ≤ |u2(x¯1, x2 − γ)|+ |u2(x1, x2 − γ)− u2(x¯1, x2 − γ)| ≤ |u2(x¯1, x2 − γ)|+ δ.
Claim OA.2. The function w is absolutely integrable with respect to the distribution f2(· |
µ2 − γ(x¯1 − µ1)).
Proof. This is because both x2 7→ u2(x¯1, x2 +µ2− γ(x¯1−µ1) + γ) and x2 7→ u2(x¯1, x2 +µ2−
γ(x¯1 − µ1) + γ) are absolutely integrable with respect to f2(· | 0), by Assumption 2.
Together, these two claims show that for the family of functions x2 7→ u2(x1, x2 + γ(x¯1−
x1)) for |x1− x¯1| < 1, w is an integrable dominating function with respect to the distribution
f2(· | µ2 − γ(x¯1 − µ1)). Consider a sequence (x(n)1 )n∈N with x(n)1 → x¯1. By continuity,
u1(x(n)1 )→ u1(x¯1). For all large enough n, the functions
x2 7→ u2(x(n)1 , x2 + γ(x¯1 − x(n)1 ))
falls within the family mentioned before. Since these functions converge pointwise in x2 to
x2 7→ u2(x¯1, x2), the existence of the dominating function f implies the convergence of the
integrals by dominated convergence theorem,
EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x¯1−µ1))[u2(x
(n)
1 , X˜2 + γ(x¯1 − x(n)1 )]→ EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x¯1−µ1))[u2(x¯1, X˜2)].
But
EΨ[u2(x(n)1 , X2) | X1 = x(n)1 ] = E ˜˜X2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x(n)1 −µ1))[u2(x
(n)
1 ,
˜˜X2]
= EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x¯1−µ1))[u2(x
(n)
1 , X˜2 + γ(x¯1 − x(n)1 )],
2
which shows
lim
n→∞EΨ[u2(x
(n)
1 , X2)|X1 = x(n)1 ] = EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x¯1−µ1))[u2(x¯1, X˜2)]
= EΨ[u2(x¯1, X2)|X1 = x¯1].
This establishes that D(x(n)1 )→ D(x¯1), so D is continuous at x¯1.
Step 3: If γ > 0, then there are x′1 < x
′′
1 so that D(x
′
1) < 0 < D(x
′′
1).
I show D is not always negative; the other statement is symmetric.
From u1(xg1)− u2(xg1, xb2) > κ > 0, we get that for any x′1 ≥ xg1, x′2 ≤ xb2,
u1(x
′
1)− u2(x
′
1, x
′
2) ≥ u1(xg1)− u2(xg1, x
′
2)
≥ u1(xg1)− u2(xg1, xb2) > κ
where the first inequality comes from Assumption 1(b) and the second one comes from
Assumption 1(a). We have for any x1,
D(x1) =u1(x1)− EΨ[u2(x1, X2)|X1 = x1]
=PΨ[X2 ≤ xb2|X1 = x1] · (u1(x1)− EΨ[u2(x1, X2)|X1 = x1, X2 ≤ xb2])
+ PΨ[X2 > xb2|X1 = x1] · (u1(x1)− EΨ[u2(x1, X2)|X1 = x1, X2 > xb2]).
When x1 ≥ xg1, u1(x1)− EΨ[u2(x1, X2)|X1 = x1, X2 ≤ xb2] > κ. Also, for x1 ≥ xg1,
u1(x1)− EΨ[u2(x1, X2)|X1 = x1, X2 > xb2] ≤ u1(xg1)− EΨ[u2(xg1, X2)|X1 = x1, X2 > xb2].
But
PΨ[X2 > xb2|X1 = x1] · EΨ[u2(xg1, X2)|X1 = x1, X2 > xb2]
=EΨ[1{X2 > xb2} · u2(xg1, X2)|X1 = x1]
=E ˜˜X2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x1−µ1))[1{
˜˜X2 > xb2} · u2(xg1, ˜˜X2)]
=EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2)[1{X˜2 − γ(x1 − µ1) > xb2} · u2(xg1, X˜2 − γ(x1 − µ1))]
≤EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2)[1{X˜2 − γ(x1 − µ1) > xb2} · |u2(xg1, X˜2)|]
when x1 > µ1. Since EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2)[|u2(xg1, X˜2)|] = EX˜2∼f2(·|0)[|u2(xg1, X˜2 + µ2)|] exists and is
finite by Assumption 2, as x1 →∞ we must have
EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2)[1{X˜2 − γ(x1 − µ1) > xb2} · |u2(xg1, X˜2)|]→ 0
as the indicator converges to 0 everywhere, given that γ > 0. So this shows for all large
enough x1, D(x1) ≥ κ/2 > 0.
3
OA 1.2 Proof of Lemma A.5
Proof. The LHS, up to a constant not depending on µ1, µ2, can be written as:
−
∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) ln(f1(x1 | µ1))dx1
−
∫ c
−∞
{∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) · f2(x2 | µ•2) ln [f2(x2 | µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1))] dx2
}
dx1
Replacing (µ1, µ2) with (µ•1, µ2 − γ(µ•1 − µ1)), the above expression becomes:
−
∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1)) ln(f1(x1 | µ•1))dx1
−
∫ c
−∞
{∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) · f2(x2 | µ•2) ln [f2(x2 | µ2 − γ(µ•1 − µ1)− γ(x1 − µ•1))] dx2
}
dx1
which simplifies to
−
∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) ln(f1(x1 | µ•1))dx1
−
∫ c
−∞
{∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) · f2(x2 | µ•2) ln [f2(x2 | µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1))] dx2
}
dx1
So we see
DKL(H•(c)‖H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); c))−DKL(H•(c)‖H(Ψ(µ•1, µ2 − γ(µ•1 − µ1); γ); c))
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) ln(f1(x1 | µ•1))dx1 −
∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) ln(f1(x1 | µ1))dx1.
Since {f1(· | µ1) : µ1 ∈ R} is a family of shifted densities,
µ1 7→
∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) ln(f1(x1 | µ1))dx1
is maximized at µ1 = µ•1 and attains a strictly smaller value for any µ1 6= µ•1. Thus the
difference is strictly positive.
OA 1.3 Proof of Lemma A.7
Proof. I first show that ∂2
∂τ2 ln[f2(x2 | τ)] < 0 for any x2, τ ∈ R. To see this, f2(x2 | τ) =
f2(x2 − τ | 0), so ∂2∂τ2 ln[f2(x2 | τ)] =
[
∂2
∂y2 ln(f2(y | 0))
]
y=x2−τ
. By Assumption 2, f2(· | 0) is
strictly log-concave, therefore ∂2
∂y2 ln(f2(y | 0)) < 0 for all y ∈ R.
We have from the definition of L(µ2 | x1),
∂2
∂µ22
L(µ2 | x1) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f2(x2 | µ•2)
[
∂2
∂τ 2
ln[f2(x2 | τ)]
]
τ=µ2−γ(x1−µ•1)
dx2 < 0
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using ∂2
∂τ2 ln[f2(x2 | τ)] < 0. Also, for the same reason,
∂2
∂x21
L(µ2 | x1) = (−γ)2 ·
∫ ∞
−∞
f2(x2 | µ•2)
[
∂2
∂τ 2
ln[f2(x2 | τ)]
]
τ=µ2−γ(x1−µ•1)
dx2 < 0.
Now, replacing L(µ2 | x1) in the definition of L¯(µ2 | c) with L(µ•2 | x1− 1γ (µ2−µ•2)) using
Lemma A.6, we have for any c ∈ R ∪ {∞},
∂2
∂µ22
L¯(µ2 | c) = ∂
2
∂µ22
∫ c
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) · L(µ•2 | x1 −
1
γ
(µ2 − µ•2))dx1
=(−1
γ
)2 ·
∫ c
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1) ·
[
∂2
∂τ 2
L(µ•2 | τ)
]
τ=x1− 1γ (µ2−µ•2)
dx1.
As just established, ∂2
∂τ2L(µ
•
2 | τ) < 0 for all τ ∈ R, therefore ∂
2
∂µ22
L¯(µ2 | c) < 0.
Finally, using Lemma A.6 we get
∂2
∂x1∂µ2
L(µ2 | x1) = −1
γ
∂2
∂x21
L(µ•2 | x1 −
1
γ
(µ2 − µ•2)).
But ∂2
∂x21
L(µ•2 | x1− 1γ (µ2−µ•2)) < 0 by the strict concavity of L(µ2 | ·) just derived, therefore
∂2
∂x1∂µ2
L(µ2 | x1) > 0.
OA 1.4 Proof of Lemma A.8
Proof. We have
d
dx
(
f(x+K)
f(x)
)
= f
′(x+K)f(x)− f(x+K)f ′(x)
f(x)2 .
Since d2
dx2 ln(f(x)) < 0, we get
d
dx
[
f
′ (x)
f(x)
]
< 0, so f
′ (x+K)
f(x+K) <
f
′ (x)
f(x) for all x. Rearranging this
shows f ′(x+K)f(x)− f(x+K)f ′(x) < 0.
OA 1.5 Proof of Lemma A.10
Proof. Using Lemma A.9’s conclusion that ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ•2 | ∞) = 0, we get
∫ ∞
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂L
∂x1
(µ•2 | x1)dx1 = 0.
5
Using the fact that ∂L
∂x1
(µ•2 | ·) is strictly decreasing by Lemma A.7, we conclude
∫ c
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂L
∂x1
(µ•2 | x1)dx1 > 0
for any c ∈ R, therefore ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ•2 | c) < 0.
If we can find some µl2 ∈ R where ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ2 | c¯) ≥ 0, then a solution to the FOC exists
between µl2 and µ•2 by intermediate value theorem. We show such µl2 can always be found.
We have ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ•2 − 1 | ∞) > 0, since µ2 7→ ∂∂µ2L(µ2 | x1) is decreasing by Lemma A.7.
By continuity, we may find large enough ch ∈ R so that ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ•2 − 1 | ch) > 0 continues to
hold.
If ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ•2 − 1 | c) > 0 for every c ∈ R, we are done by taking µl2 = µ•2 − 1. Else, by
intermediate value theorem there exists cˆ ∈ R so that ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ•2 − 1 | cˆ) = 0. Using the final
fact from A.7 that ∂L
∂µ2
(µ•2 − 1 | ·) is strictly increasing, if c¯ ≥ cˆ then we are done by taking
µl2 = µ•2 − 1, as ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ•2 − 1 | cˆ) = 0 implies ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ•2 − 1 | c¯) ≥ 0.
Now consider the case of cl = cˆ − K for K > 0. I show that µl2 may be taken to be
µ•2 − 1− γK to get ∂∂µ2 L¯(µl2 | cl) > 0.
We have
L¯(µ2 | cˆ) =
∫ cˆ
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1)L(0 | x1 −
1
γ
µ2)dx1,
and so
L¯(µ2 − γK | cˆ−K) =
∫ cˆ−K
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1)L(0 | (x1 +K)−
1
γ
µ2)dx1
=
∫ cˆ
−∞
f1(x1 −K | µ•1)L(0 | x1 −
1
γ
µ2)dx1.
This implies
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ2 − γK | cˆ−K) = −1
γ
∫ cˆ
−∞
f1(x1 −K | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
µ2)dx1.
For µ2 = µ•2 − 1, we rewrite ∂∂µ2 L¯(µ2 − γK | cˆ−K) as
−1
γ
∫ cˆ
−∞
(
f1(x1 −K | µ•1)
f1(x1 | µ•1)
)
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
(µ•2 − 1))dx1.
By the construction of cˆ, ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ•2 − 1 | cˆ) = 0, that is to say
∫ cˆ
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
(µ•2 − 1))dx1 = 0.
Since ∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1− 1γ (µ•2− 1)) is strictly decreasing in x1 by Lemma A.7, it must be positive
6
for some low values of x1 and negative for some high values of x1 not exceeding cˆ. Let r < cˆ
be such that ∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1γ (µ•2 − 1)) = 0. Then we have
∫ cˆ
−∞
(
f1(x1 −K | µ•1)
f1(x1 | µ•1)
)
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
(µ•2 − 1))dx1
<
∫ r
−∞
(
f1(r −K | µ•1)
f1(r | µ•1)
)
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
(µ•2 − 1))dx1
+
∫ cˆ
r
(
f1(r −K | µ•1))
f1(r | µ•1))
)
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
(µ•2 − 1))dx1.
To see this, first observe that x 7→ f1(x|µ•1)
f1(x−K|µ•1) is strictly decreasing by Lemma A.8, therefore
x 7→ f1(x−K|µ•1)
f1(x|µ•1) is strictly increasing. So replacing
f1(x1−K|µ•1)
f1(x1|µ•1) with
f1(r−K|µ•1)
f1(r|µ•1) over-weighs the
integrand on the interval (−∞, r), while the same weight under-weighs the integrand on
(r, cˆ). This amounts to an over-weighting of the positive part of the integrand and an under-
weighting of the negative part, thus over-estimating the integral value.
Multiplying both sides by − 1
γ
and reversing the inequality,
∂
∂µ2
L¯(µl2 | cˆ−K)
>− 1
γ
·
∫ r
−∞
(
f1(r −K | µ•1)
f1(r | µ•1)
)
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
(µ•2 − 1))dx1
− 1
γ
∫ cˆ
r
(
f1(r −K | µ•1))
f1(r | µ•1))
)
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
(µ•2 − 1))dx1.
The RHS is
−1
γ
· f1(r −K | µ
•
1))
f1(r | µ•1))
·
∫ cˆ
−∞
f1(x1 | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(0 | x1 − 1
γ
(µ•2 − 1))dx1 = 0,
hence we have ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µl2 | c¯) > 0 as desired.
OA 1.6 Proof of Lemma A.12
Proof. First-order condition implies ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(c) | c) = 0. Using the second statement of
Lemma A.6 in the FOC gives
−1
γ
∫ c
−∞
f1(· | µ•1)
∂
∂x1
L(µ•2 | x1 −
1
γ
(µ∗2(c)− µ•2)) = 0.
By strict concavity of L(µ•2 | ·) from Lemma A.7, this requires that ∂∂x1L(µ•2 | ·) takes on
a strictly negative value at the rightmost point of the domain of integration, ∂
∂x1
L(µ•2 |
c− 1
γ
(µ∗2(c)− µ•2)) < 0.
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From its definition, x1 7→ L(µ•2 | x1) is maximized when x1 = µ•1, for we have L(µ•2 |
µ•1) =
∫∞
−∞ f2(x2 | µ•2) ln[f2(x2 | µ•2)]dx2. Since L(µ•2 | ·) is strictly concave, this means
∂
∂x1
L(µ•2 | τ) < 0 if and only if τ > µ•1.
Combining with the previous inequality, c− 1
γ
(µ∗2(c)− µ•2) > µ•1, which rearranges to say
µ∗2(c)− γ(c− µ•1) < µ•2 as desired.
OA 1.7 Proof of Lemma A.13
Proof. Consider the payoff difference between accepting x1 and continuing under belief ν,
D(x1; ν) := u1(x1)−
∫
EX2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x1−µ•1),σ2)[u2(x1, X2)]dν(µ2).
Note that D(x1, ν) =
∫
D(x1;µ•1, µ2, γ)dν(µ2). Lemma A.2 shows that for every µ2 ∈ R,
D(x1;µ•1, µ2, γ) is strictly increasing in x1. Hence the same must hold for D(x1, ν).
Also, Lemma A.2 implies there exists some x′1 ∈ R so that D(x′1;µ•1, µ2, γ) < 0, and that
there exists some x′′1 ∈ R satisfying D(x′1;µ•1, µ2, γ) > 0. Since u2 increases in its second
argument, we also get D(x′1;µ•1, µ2, γ) < 0 and D(x
′′
1 ;µ•1, µ2, γ) > 0 for all µ2 ∈ [µ2, µ¯2]. This
implies D(x′1; ν) < 0 and D(x
′′
1 ; ν) > 0, as ν is supported on (a subset of) [µ2, µ¯2].
Finally, I show D(x1; ν) is continuous in x1. Fix x¯1 ∈ R. Since u1 is continuous, find δ > 0
so that whenever |x1 − x¯1| < 1, |u1(x1) − u1(x¯1)| < δ. Consider the function φ : R2 → R≥0
defined by φ(x2, µ2) := |u2(x¯1, x2 − γ + µ2)|+ |u2(x¯1, x2 + γ + µ2)|+ δ.
Claim OA.3. Whenever |x1 − x¯1| < 1, |u2(x1, x2 + γ(x¯1 − x1) + µ2)| ≤ φ(x2, µ2) for every
x2, µ2 ∈ R.
Proof. This is the same as the proof of Claim OA.1.
Claim OA.4.
∫ µ¯2
µ2
(∫∞
−∞ |φ(x2, µ2)| · f2(x2 | −γ(x¯1 − µ•1))dx2
)
dν(µ2) <∞.
Proof. We may write
φ(x2, µ2) := u+γ2,+(x2, µ2) + u+γ2,−(x2, µ2) + u−γ2,+(x2, µ2) + u−γ2,−(x2, µ2) + δ
where u+γ2,+ and u+γ2,− are the positive and negative parts of (x2, µ2) 7→ u2(x¯1, x2 + γ + µ2),
and u−γ2,+ and u−γ2,− are the positive and negative parts of (x2, µ2) 7→ u2(x¯1, x2− γ+µ2). From
Assumption 2, for every µ2 ∈ [µ2, µ¯2], each of u
+γ
2,+(·, µ2), u+γ2,−(·, µ2),u−γ2,+(·, µ2),and u−γ2,−(·, µ2)
is integrable over R with respect to the density f2(· | −γ(x¯1 − µ•1)). These integrals are
maximized at µ2 = µ¯2 for u+γ2,+(·, µ2) and u−γ2,+(·, µ2), and maximized at µ2 = µ2 for u
+γ
2,−(·, µ2)
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and u−γ2,−(·, µ2). In other words, for every µ2 ∈ [µ2, µ¯2],∫ ∞
−∞
|φ(x2, µ2)| · f2(x2 | −γ(x¯1 − µ•1))dx2
≤
∫ ∞
−∞
(
u+γ2,+(x2, µ¯2) + u−γ2,+(x2, µ¯2)
)
· f2(x2 | −γ(x¯1 − µ•1))dx2
+
∫ ∞
−∞
(
u+γ2,−(x2, µ2) + u
−γ
2,−(x2, µ2)
)
· f2(x2 | −γ(x¯1 − µ•1))dx2.
This bound is finite and does not depend on µ2, so the overall integral over dν(µ2) is also
finite.
Consider a sequence x(n)1 → x¯1. We have
D(x(n)1 ; ν) = u1(x
(n)
1 )−
∫
E ˜˜X2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(x(n)1 −µ•1))[u2(x
(n)
1 ,
˜˜X)]dν(µ2)
= u1(x(n)1 )−
∫
EX˜2∼f2(·|−γ(x¯1−µ•1))[u2(x
(n)
1 , X˜2 + γ(x¯1 − x(n)1 ) + µ2)]dν(µ2)
= u1(x(n)1 )−
∫ µ¯2
µ2
∫ ∞
−∞
u2(x(n)1 , x2 + γ(x¯1 − x(n)1 ) + µ2) · f2(x2 | −γ(x¯1 − µ•1))dx2dν(µ2).
The sequence of functions (x2, µ2) 7→ u2(x(n)1 , x2 + γ(x¯1 − x(n)1 ) + µ2) pointwise converge
to u2(x¯1, x2 + µ2) as n → ∞. From the two claims, for all large enough n, this sequence
of functions are pointwise dominated by f, an absolutely integrable function on the same
domain. Therefore continuity follows from dominated convergence theorem, as in the proof
of Lemma A.2.
This means there exists a unique c∗ so that D(c∗) = 0. The cutoff strategy Sc∗ is optimal,
because it stops at every x1 whose stopping payoff exceeds expected continuation payoff, and
continues at every x1 where expected continuation payoff is higher than stopping payoff.
For any c′ = c∗ + δ for some δ > 0, the difference in expected payoffs of Sc∗ and Sc′
is
∫ c∗+δ
c∗ D(x1; ν) > 0 since D(x1; ν) is strictly positive on the interval (c∗, c∗ + δ]. So every
strictly higher cutoff than c∗ is strictly suboptimal. A similar argument shows every strictly
lower cutoff than c∗ is also strictly suboptimal.
OA 1.8 Proof of Lemma A.15
Proof. Note that ϕ¯t(µ2) is measurable with respect to Ft−1. Also, ϕt(µ2)|Ft−1 = ϕt(µ2)|C˜t,
because by independence of Xt from (Xs)t−1s=1, the only information that Ft−1 contains about
ϕt(µ2) is in determining the cutoff threshold C˜t.
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At a sample path ω so that C˜t(ω) = c ∈ R,
E[ϕt(µ2)|Ft−1](ω) = E[−λ(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ•1)) · 1{X1,s ≤ c}]
= ∂
∂µ2
∫ c
−∞
g1(x1) ·
∫ ∞
−∞
g2(x2) · ln(f2(X2,s | µ2 − γ(X1,s − µ•1)))dx2dx1
= ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ2 | c).
This shows that E[ϕt(µ2)|Ft−1](ω) = ϕ¯t(µ2)(ω). Since this holds regardless of c, we get that
E[ϕt(µ2)|Ft−1] = ϕ¯t(µ2) for all ω, that is to say
E[ξ2t (µ2)|Ft−1] = Var[ϕt(µ2)|Ft−1]
≤ E[ϕ2t (µ2)|Ft−1]
≤ E[(λ(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ•1)))2]
It suffices now to show E
[
(λ(X2 − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1 − µ•1)))2
]
exists for all µ2 ∈ R and is
continuous in µ2, for then the (finite) maximum value this expectation takes on the compact
interval [µ2, µ¯2] can be taken as κξ.
Continuity is clear.
By assumption on g2, there exists some κg2 <∞ so that for all z ∈ R, −κg2 < λ′(z) < 0.
So, λ(z) is Lipschitz continuous with constant κg2 . Let b0 := λ(−µ2 + µ•2 − γµ•1).
For any x1, x2 ∈ R,
(λ(x2 − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(x1 − µ•1)))2 =b20 + (λ(x2 − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(x1 − µ•1)))2 − (λ(−µ2 + µ•2 − γµ•1))2
≤b20 + |λ(x2 − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(x1 − µ•1))− λ(−µ2 + µ•2 − γµ•1)| ·
× |λ(x2 − µ2 + γ(x1 + µ•2 − µ•1)) + λ(−µ2 + µ•2 − γµ•1)|
≤b20 + (κg2 · (|x2|+ γ|x1|)) · (2b0 + (κg2 · (|x2|+ γ|x1|))).
Note the bound is a second-order polynomial in |x1| and |x2|. We have
E
[
(λ(X2 − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1 − µ•1)))2
]
≤ E
[
b20 + (κg2 · (|X2|+ γ|X1|)) · (2b0 + (κg2 · (|X2|+ γ|X1|)))
]
<∞,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that X1, X2 have finite second moments.
OA 1.9 Proof of Lemma A.21
Proof. Suppose µA2,[2] ≥ µA2,[1]. From Lemma 1, C is strictly increasing in its second argument.
This shows cA[2] = C(µ•1, µA2,[2]; γ) ≥ C(µ•1, µA2,[1]; γ) = cA[1]. But by Proposition 2, µ∗2(c) increases
in c, so µA2,[3] = µ∗2(cA[2]) ≥ µ∗2(cA[1]) = µA2,[2]. Continuing this argument shows that (µA2,[t])t≥1 is
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a monotonically increasing sequence. Since C is strictly increasing in its second argument,
(cA[t])t≥1 must also form a monotonically increasing sequence.
Conversely if µA2,[2] < µA2,[1], then the analogous arguments show that (µA2,[t])t≥1 and (cA[t])t≥1
are monotonically decreasing sequences.
It is clear that µA2,[t] are iterates of I(·; γ), so they must converge to its fixed point as I(·; γ)
is a contraction mapping by Proposition 4. We have limt→∞ cA[t] = limt→∞C(µ•1, µA2,[t]; γ). We
may take the limit inside the C function since it is continuous, finding that limt→∞ cA[t] =
C(µ•1, µ∞2 ; γ).
OA 1.10 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Indifference condition cL = Cu1,uL2 (µ1, µ2; γ) implies that
u1(cL) = EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(cL−µ1))[u
L
2 (cL, X˜2)].
Since uH2 (cL, x2) ≥ uL2 (cL, x2) for all x2 ∈ R, with strict inequality on a positive-measure set,
this shows
u1(cL) < EX˜2∼f2(·|µ2−γ(cL−µ1))[u
H
2 (cL, X˜2)].
Because (u1, uL2 ) satisfy Assumptions 1, the best stopping strategy in the feasible model
Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) has a cutoff form by Proposition 1. This shows Cu1,uH2 (µ1, µ2; γ) is strictly above
cL.
OA 1.11 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, each of (u1, uH2 ) and (u1, uL2 ) has a unique steady state,
(µ•1, µ∞2,H , c∞H ), (µ•1, µ∞2,L, c∞L ) respectively. Let IH , IL be the iteration maps corresponding to
these two stage games, that is to say
IH(µ2) := µ∗2(Cu1,uH2 (µ•1, µ2; γ))
IL(µ2) := µ∗2(Cu1,uL2 (µ•1, µ2; γ)).
From Proposition 4, both IH and IL are contraction mappings. Consider their iterates
with a starting value of 0. That is, put µ[0]2,H = 0, µ
[0]
2,L = 0 and let µ
[t]
2,H = IH(µ[t−1]2,H ),
µ
[t]
2,L = IL(µ[t−1]2,L ) for t ≥ 1. By property of contraction mappings and since the fixed points
of the iteration maps are the steady state beliefs, µ[t]2,H → µ∞2,H and µ[t]2,L → µ∞2,L.
By induction, I will show µ[t]2,L ≤ µ[t]2,H for every t ≥ 0. The base case of t = 0 is true by
definition. If µ[T ]2,L ≤ µ[T ]2,H , then
Cu1,uL2 (µ
•
1, µ
[T ]
2,L; γ) ≤ Cu1,uL2 (µ•1, µ
[T ]
2,H ; γ) < Cu1,uH2 (µ
•
1, µ
[T ]
2,H ; γ).
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The first inequality comes from C being increasing in the second argument and the inductive
hypothesis, while the second inequality is due to Lemma 3. Therefore, IL(µ[T ]2,L) ≤ IH(µ[T ]2,H)
using the fact that µ∗2 is increasing by Proposition 2, so µ
[T+1]
2,L ≤ µ[T+1]2,H .
Since weak inequalities are preserved by limits, we have µ∞2,H ≥ µ∞2,L. It is impossible to
have µ∞2,H = µ∞2,L, because this would lead to c∞H > c∞L by Lemma 3, which in turn implies
µ∞2,H = µ∗2(c∞H ) > µ∗2(c∞L ) = µ∞2,L. This inequality contradicts µ∞2,H = µ∞2,L. Therefore, we in
fact have µ∞2,H > µ∞2,L. The conclusion that c∞H > c∞L follows from Lemma 3 and the fact that
C is increases in its second argument.
OA 1.12 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Rewrite Equation (2) as
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, (σ•)2) · ln
(
φ(x1;µ•1, (σ•)2)
φ(x1;µ1, σ21)
)
dx1
+
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, (σ•)2) ·
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x2;µ•2, (σ•)2) ln
[
φ(x2;µ•2, (σ•)2)
φ(x2;µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1), σ22)
]
dx2dx1.
The KL divergence betweenN (µtrue, σ2true) andN (µmodel, σ2model) is ln σmodelσtrue +
σ2true+(µtrue−µmodel)2
2σ2model
−
1
2 , so we may simplify the first term and the inner integral of the second term.
ln σ1
σ•
+ (µ1 − µ
•
1)2
2σ21
+ (σ
•)2
2σ21
− 12
+
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ•) ·
[
ln σ2
σ•
+ (σ
•)2 + (µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)2
2σ22
− 12
]
dx1.
Dropping terms not dependent on any of the four variables gives a simplified version of the
objective,
ξ(µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2) := ln
σ1
σ•
+ (µ1 − µ
•
1)2
2σ21
+ (σ
•)2
2σ21
+
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, (σ•)2) ·
[
ln σ2
σ•
+ (σ
•)2 + (µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)2
2σ22
]
dx1.
Differentiating under the integral sign,
∂ξ
∂µ2
=
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, (σ•)2) ·
[
(µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)
σ22
]
dx1
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∂ξ
∂µ1
= (µ1 − µ
•
1)
σ21
+ γ
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, (σ•)2) ·
[
(µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)
σ22
]
dx1
= (µ1 − µ
•
1)
σ21
+ γ ∂ξ
∂µ2
.
At FOC (µ∗1, µ∗2, σ∗1, σ∗2), we have ∂ξ∂µ2 (µ
∗
1, µ
∗
2, σ
∗
1, σ
∗
2) = 0, hence µ∗1 = µ•1. Similar arguments
as before then establish µ∗2 = µ•2− γ (µ•1 − E [X1 | X1 ≤ c]) , where expectation is taken with
respect to the true distribution of X1 (with the true variance (σ•)2). Then,
∂ξ
∂σ1
(µ∗1, µ∗2, σ∗1, σ∗2) =
1
(σ∗1)
− (σ
•)2
(σ∗1)3
= 0,
this gives σ∗1 = σ• (since σ∗1 ≥ 0).
Finally, from the FOC for σ2,
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, (σ•)2) ·
[
1
σ∗2
− (σ
•)2 + (µ∗2 − γ(x1 − µ∗1)− µ•2)2
(σ∗2)3
]
dx1 = 0.
Substituting in values of µ∗1, µ∗2 already solved for,
(σ∗2)2 = (σ•)2 + E[(µ∗2 − γ(X1 − µ•1)− µ•2)2|X1 ≤ c]
= (σ•)2 + E[(µ•2 − γ (µ•1 − E [X1 | X1 ≤ c])− γ(X1 − µ•1)− µ•2)2|X1 ≤ c]
= (σ•)2 + γ2E
[
[(X1 − µ•1)− (E [X1 | X1 ≤ c]− µ•1)]2 |X1 ≤ c
]
= (σ•)2 + γ2Var[X1 − µ•1|X1 ≤ c]
= (σ•)2 + γ2Var[X1|X1 ≤ c]
as desired.
OA 1.13 Proof of Proposition 8
I start with a lemma that says, depending on the convexity of the decision problem, a
stronger belief in fictitious variation either increases or decreases the subjectively optimal
cutoff threshold.
Lemma OA.1. Suppose that under the feasible model Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21, σ22; γ), the agent is in-
different between stopping at c and continuing. Suppose σˆ22 > σ22. Then: (i) if x2 7→ u2(c, x2)
is convex with strict convexity for x2 in a positive-measure set, then under the feasible model
Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21, σˆ22; γ) the agent strictly prefers continuing at c; (ii) if x2 7→ u2(c, x2) is con-
cave with strict concavity for x2 in a positive-measure set, then under the feasible model
Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21, σˆ22; γ) the agent strictly prefers stopping at c.
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Proof. Indifference at x1 = c under the model Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21, σ22; γ) implies that
u1(c) = EX2∼N (µ2−γ(x1−µ1),σ22)[u2(c,X2)].
When hypothesis in (i) is satisfied,
EX2∼N (µ2−γ(x1−µ1),σ22)[u2(c,X2)] < EX2∼N (µ2−γ(x1−µ1),σˆ22)[u2(c,X2)]
since σˆ22 > σ22 implies thatN (µ2−γ(x1−µ1), σˆ22) is a strict mean-preserving spread ofN (µ2−
γ(x1−µ1), σ22). The RHS is the expected continuation payoff under model Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ21, σˆ22; γ),
so the agent strictly prefers continuing when X1 = c. The argument establishing (ii) is
analogous.
Now I give the proof of Proposition 8.
Proof. The result that µ1,[t] = µ•1, (σ1,[t])2 = (σ•)2 for all t follows from Proposition 7.
Suppose c[1] ≤ c[0]. From Proposition 7, µ2,[2] ≤ µ2,[1] and (σ2,[2])2 ≤ (σ2,[1])2. Let c′[2]
be the indifference threshold under the model Ψ(µ•1, µ2,[2], (σ•)2, (σ2,[1])2). By Lemma 1,
c
′
[2] ≤ c[1]. Also, from Lemma OA.1, c[2] ≤ c
′
[2] as generation 2 actually believes in the feasible
model Ψ(µ•1, µ2,[2], (σ•)2, (σ2,[2])2) where (σ2,[2])2 ≤ (σ2,[1])2. This shows c[2] ≤ c[1]. Continuing
this argument shows that (c[t])t≥1 forms a monotonically decreasing sequence. Since the
pseudo-true parameters µ∗2 and (σ∗2)2 are monotonic functions of the censoring threshold c,
we have established the proposition in the case where c[1] ≤ c[0].
The argument for the case where c[1] ≥ c[0] is exactly analogous and therefore omitted.
OA 1.14 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. In the first generation, both societies A and B observe large datasets of histories with
distribution H•(c[0]). So, by Proposition 7, two societies make the same inferences about the
fundamentals.
Suppose the optimal-stopping problem is convex. Then due to fictitious variation in
generation 1 and the convexity of u2, it follows from Lemma OA.1 that c[B,1] > c[A,1]. In
the second generation, µ2,[B,2] > µ2,[A,2] because the pseudo-true second-period fundamental
increases in the censoring cutoff. Together again with the existence of fictitious variation,
we conclude c[B,2] > c[A,2]. Continuing this argument establishes the proposition for the
case where the optimal-stopping problem is convex. The case of concave optimal-stopping
problems is analogous.
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OA 1.15 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. In the true model, X2|(X1 = x1) ∼ N (µ•2−γ•(x1−µ•1), σ2), while the agents’ feasible
model Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) has X2|(X1 = x1) ∼ N (µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1), σ2). So, we can write
DKL(H(Ψ(µ•1, µ•2; γ•); c) ‖ H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); c))
as the following:
∫ ∞
c
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · ln
(
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2)
φ(x1;µ1, σ2)
)
dx1
+
∫ c
−∞

∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · φ(x2;µ•2 − γ•(x1 − µ•1), σ2)·
ln
[
φ(x1;µ•1,σ2)·φ(x2;µ•2−γ•(x1−µ•1),σ2)
φ(x1;µ1,σ2)·φ(x2;µ2−γ(x1−µ1),σ2)
] dx2
 dx1.
Performing rearrangements similar to those in the proof of Proposition 2 and using the
closed-form expression of KL divergence between two Gaussian distributions, the above can
be rewritten as
(µ1 − µ•1)2
2σ2 +
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ·
(µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2 + γ•(x1 − µ•1))2
2σ2 dx1.
Multiplying through byσ2 and dropping terms not depending on µ1, µ2, γ, we get a simplified
objective with the same minimizers:
ξ(µ1, µ2, γ) =
(µ1 − µ•1)2
2 +
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ·
1
2 · [µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ
•
2 + γ•(x1 − µ•1)]2dx1.
We have the partial derivatives by differentiating under the integral sign,
∂ξ
∂µ2
=
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · [µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2 + γ•(x1 − µ•1)]dx1,
∂ξ
∂µ1
= (µ1 − µ•1) + γ
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · [µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2 + γ•(x1 − µ•1)]dx1
= (µ1 − µ•1) + γ
∂ξ
∂µ2
,
∂ξ
∂γ
= −
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · [x1 − µ1] · [µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2 + γ•(x1 − µ•1)]dx1.
Suppose (µ∗1, µ∗2, γ∗) is the minimum. By the first-order conditions for µ1 and µ2, we have:
∂ξ
∂µ1
(µ∗1, µ∗2, γ∗) =
∂ξ
∂µ2
(µ∗1, µ∗2, γ∗) = 0⇒ µ∗1 = µ•1.
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Substituting this into the first-order condition for µ2,
∂ξ
∂µ2
(µ•1, µ∗2, γ∗) = 0⇒ µ∗2 = µ•2 + (γ• − γ∗) · (µ•1 − E[X1|X1 ≤ c]) .
It remains to show γ∗ = γ˜. We have
∂ξ
∂γ
(µ∗1, µ∗2, γ∗) = −P[X1 ≤ c] · E[(X1 − µ∗1) · (µ∗2 − γ∗(X1 − µ∗1)− µ•2 + γ•(X1 − µ•1))|X1 ≤ c].
We rearrange the expectation term as:
E[(X1 − µ∗1) · (µ∗2 − γ∗(X1 − µ∗1)− µ•2 + γ•(X1 − µ•1))|X1 ≤ c]
=E[(X1 − µ∗1)|X1 ≤ c] · E[(µ∗2 − γ∗(X1 − µ∗1)− µ•2 + γ•(X1 − µ•1))|X1 ≤ c]
+ Cov(X1 − µ∗1, µ∗2 − γ∗(X1 − µ∗1)− µ•2 + γ•(X1 − µ•1)|X1 ≤ c].
The first-order condition for µ2 implies E[(µ∗2−γ∗(X1−µ∗1)−µ•2+γ•(X1−µ•1))|X1 ≤ c] = 0 at
the optimum (µ∗1, µ∗2, γ∗). Also, we may drop terms without X1 in the conditional covariance
operator, and we get:
∂ξ
∂γ
(µ∗1, µ∗2, γ∗) = P[X1 ≤ c] · (γ∗ − γ•) · Cov(X1, X1|X1 ≤ c).
We have P[X1 ≤ c] > 0 and Cov(X1, X1|X1 ≤ c) > 0, hence we conclude
∂ξ
∂γ
(µ∗1, µ∗2, γ∗)

> 0 for γ∗ > γ•
= 0 for γ∗ = γ•
< 0 for γ∗ < γ•
.
In case that γ > γ•, at the optimum we must have ∂ξ
∂γ
(µ∗1, µ∗2, γ∗) > 0. By Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker condition, this means the minimizer is γ∗ = γ. Conversely, when γ¯ < γ•, at the
optimum we must have ∂ξ
∂γ
(µ∗1, µ∗2, γ∗) < 0. In that case, the minimizer is γ∗ = γ¯. So in both
cases, γ∗ = γ˜ as desired.
OA 1.16 Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. I start with the expression for the KL divergence from H•(c) to H(Ψ(µ, µ; γ); c). As
in the proof of Proposition 2, this expression can be written as
(µ− µ•)2
2 +
∫ c
−∞
φ(x;µ•, σ2) ·
[
σ2 + (µ− γ(x1 − µ)− µ•)2
2 −
1
2
]
dx1.
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Dropping constant terms not depending on µ, we get a simplified expression of the objective,
ξ(µ) := (µ− µ
•)2
2 +
∫ c
−∞
φ(x;µ•, σ2) ·
[
(µ− γ(x1 − µ)− µ•)2
2
]
dx1.
Taking the first-order condition, ξ′(µ) = (µ − µ•) + (1 + γ) · ∫ c−∞ φ(x1;µ•, σ2) · ((1 + γ)µ −
γx1 − µ•)dx1.
The term
∫ c
−∞ φ(x1;µ•, σ2) · ((1 + γ)µ − γx1 − µ•)dx1 may be rewritten as P[X1 ≤ c] ·
E [(1 + γ)µ− γX1 − µ•|X1 ≤ c].
Setting the first-order condition to 0 and using straightforward algebra,
µ∗M(c) =
1
1 + P[X1 ≤ c] · (1 + γ)2µ
• + P[X1 ≤ c] · (1 + γ)
2
1 + P[X1 ≤ c] · (1 + γ)2µ
◦
2(c).
OA 2 Optimal-Stopping Problems with L Periods
OA 2.1 An L-Periods Model of the Gambler’s Fallacy
In an optimal-stopping problem with L periods, the agent observes a draw x` ∈ R in each
period 1 ≤ ` ≤ L. At the end of period `, the agent must decide between stopping and
receiving a payoff u`(x1, ..., x`) that depends on the profile of draws (xi)`i=1 observed so far,
or continuing into the next period. If the agent continues into period L without stopping,
then payoff will be uL(x1, ..., xL).
I first introduce notation for a class of joint distributions of the L possible draws (Xi)Li=1,
which extends the Gaussian case from Example 2 to multiple periods.
Definition OA.1. Let σ2 > 0 be fixed. For every vector µ = (µi)Li=1 and triangular array
γ = (γi,j)2≤i≤L,1≤j≤i−1 with each γi,j ∈ R, let Ψ(µ;γ) denote the joint distribution of (Xi)Li=1
where X1 ∼ N (µ1, σ2) and, for all i ≥ 2 and (xj)i−1j=1 ∈ Ri−1,
Xi | (X1 = x1, ..., Xi−1 = xi−1) ∼ N
µi − i−1∑
j=1
γi,j · (xj − µj), σ2
 .
Under Ψ(µ;γ), (Xi)Li=1 are jointly Gaussian,20 such that the conditional mean of Xi given
the previous draws X1 = x1, ..., Xi−1 = xi−1 depends linearly on these realizations. I consider
agents who entertain a set of feasible models, {Ψ(µ;γ) : µ ∈ RL} for a fixed array γ where
each γi,j > 0. The positive γi,j capture the gambler’s fallacy, as higher realizations of
20An equivalent description of the model Ψ(µ;γ) is to consider a set of L independent Gaussian random
variables Zi ∼ N (µi, σ2) for 1 ≤ i ≤ L. Let X1 = Z1 and iteratively define Xi = Zi −
∑i−1
j=1 γi,j(Xj − µj).
Using induction, one can show that every Xi is a linear function of the Zi’s, so they are jointly Gaussian.
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earlier draws lead agents to predict lower means for future draws, fixing the ex-ante means.
The greater the magnitude of γi,j, the more that the agent’s prediction of Xi depends on
realization of Xj. Agents hold a dogmatic belief in the correlation structure between (Xi)Li=1,
but can flexibly estimate (µi)Li=1, the fundamentals of the environment. Objectively, (Xi)Li=1
are independent, so the true joint distribution is Ψ• = Ψ(µ•;0) for some (µ•i )Li=1.
A useful functional form to keep in mind is γi,j = α · δi−j−1 for α > 0, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, which
corresponds to Rabin and Vayanos (2010)’s specification of gambler’s fallacy in multiple
periods. Here, α relates to the severity of the bias and δ captures how quickly the influence
of past observations decay in predicting future draws.
OA 2.2 Inference from Censored Datasets in L Periods
In general, a stopping strategy in an optimal-stopping problem over L periods is a set of
functions Si : Ri → {Stop,Continue} for 1 ≤ i ≤ L − 1, where Si(x1, ..., xi) maps the
realizations of the first i draws to a stopping decision. I consider stopping strategies where
Si is a cutoff rule in xi after each partial history (x1, ..., xi−1), that is there exist (ci)L−1i=1 with
c1 ∈ R and for i ≥ 2, ci(x1, ..., xi−1) ∈ R for every (x1, ..., xi−1) ∈ Ri−1, so that the agent
stops after (x1, ...xi) if and only if xi ≥ ci(x1, ..., xi−1). A stopping strategy with stopping
regions characterized by a profile of cutoff rules c = (ci)L−1i−1 will be abbreviated as Sc.
For feasible model Ψ and cutoff rule Sc, let H(Ψ;Sc) represent the distribution of his-
tories when applying rule Sc to draws (Xi) ∼ Ψ. More precisely, consider a procedure
where X1, X2, ..., XL is drawn according to Ψ and revealed one at a time. At the earliest
1 ≤ i¯ ≤ L − 1 such that Xi¯ ≥ ci¯(X1, ..., Xi¯−1), the process stops and the history records
(X1, ..., Xi¯,∅, ...,∅), with L − i¯ instances of the censoring indicator ∅ replacing the unob-
served subvector (Xi¯+1, ..., XL). If no such i¯ exists, then history records the entire profile of
draws, (X1, ..., XL). The distribution of histories generated this way is denoted H(Ψ;Sc).
Definition OA.2. For cutoff strategy Sc and fundamentals µˆ, the KL divergence between
objective distribution of histories and the predicted distribution under censoring is the sum
of L integrals,
DKL( H(Ψ•;Sc) || H(Ψ(µ;γ);Sc) ) :=
L∑
i=1
Ii,
where
I1 =
∫ ∞
c1
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ln
(
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2)
φ(x1;µ1, σ2)
)
dx1,
and for 2 ≤ i ≤ L− 1, integral Ii is
∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ ci−1(x1,...,xi−2)
−∞
∫ ∞
ci(x1,...,xi−1)
i∏
k=1
φ(xk;µ•k, σ2) ln
( ∏i
k=1 φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)∏i
k=1 φ(xk;µk −
∑k−1
j=1 γk,j · (xj − µj), σ2)
)
dxi...dx1.
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Finally, IL is given by
∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ cL−1(x1,...,xL−2)
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
i∏
k=1
φ(xk;µ•k, σ2) ln
( ∏i
k=1 φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)∏i
k=1 φ(xk;µk −
∑k−1
j=1 γk,j · (xj − µj), σ2)
)
dxi...dx1.
To interpret, consider a history h = (x1, ..., xi,∅, ...,∅) where xk < ck(x1, ..., xk−1) for all
k ≤ i−1 and xi ≥ ci(x1, ..., xi−1). This history is possible under the stopping strategy Sc. It
has a likelihood of Πik=1φ(xk;µ•k, σ2) under Ψ• and a likelihood of Πik=1φ(xk;µk −
∑k−1
j=1 γk,j ·
(xj − µj), σ2) under Ψ(µ;γ). So, the integral Ii calculates the contribution of all possible
histories of length i to the KL divergence from H(Ψ(µ;γ);Sc) to H(Ψ•;Sc). In the case of
L = 2, this definition reduces to the Gaussian case of Definition 5, the KL divergence in the
two-periods baseline model, with γ = γ2,1 and c1 ∈ R as the censoring threshold.
The KL-divergence minimizers
min
µ∈RL
DKL( H(Ψ•;Sc) || H(Ψ(µ;γ);Sc) )
are the pseudo-true fundamentals with respect to stopping strategy Sc. The next proposition
gives an explicit characterization of them.
Proposition OA.1. Let stopping strategy Sc be given. For each i ≥ 1, let Ri represent the
region
{(x1, ..., xi) : x1 < c1, x2 < c2(x1), ..., xi < ci(x1, .., xi−1)} ⊆ Ri.
The pseudo-true fundamentals with respect to Sc are µ∗1 = µ•1 and, iteratively,
µˆ∗i = µ•i −
i−1∑
j=1
γi,j · (µ∗j − EΨ• [Xj | (Xk)i−1k=1 ∈ Ri−1]).
The expression for µ∗i in the general L-periods setting resembles the expression for µ∗2
in the two-period setting. Relative to the truth µ•i , the estimate µ∗i is distorted by the fact
that Xi is only observed when previous draws (X1, ..., Xi−1) fall into the continuation re-
gion Ri−1 ⊆ Ri−1 associated with Sc. The agent uses this censored empirical distribution of
(X1, ..., Xi−1, Xi) to infer the period-i fundamental, under a dogmatic belief about the corre-
lation structure between the draws given by γ. Importantly, whether a certain realization Xj
for j < i should be judged as below-average (and thus predict a higher Xi) or above-average
(and thus predict a lower Xi) depends on agent’s belief about the period j fundamental, µ∗j ,
which gives the iterative structure of the expression for µˆ∗i .
The proof of this result follows two steps. First, recall thatDKL(H(Ψ•;Sc)||H(Ψ(µ;γ);Sc))
is defined as the sum ∑Li=1 Ii, where Ii is the KL-divergence contribution from histories with
length i. I rewrite this expression as the sum of L different integrals, ∑Li=1 Ji, where Ji is the
KL-divergence contributions from histories containing Xi. So, Ji is a function of µ1, ..., µi.
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The second step is similar to deriving the explicit expressions of pseudo-true fundamentals
for Example 2, where I show ∂Ji
∂µj
is a linear multiple of ∂Ji
∂µi
whenever j < i. First-order
condition at µ∗ allows for a telescoping rearrangement, yielding ∂Ji
∂µi
(µ∗) = 0 for every i. The
proposition readily follows.
Let
J1 =
(µ•1 − µ1)2
2σ2
and for i ≥ 2, let Ji be
∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ ci−1(x1,...,xi−2)
−∞
i−1∏
j=1
φ(xj;µ•j , σ2) ·
[
(µ•i − µi +
∑i−1
j=1 γi,j · (xj − µj))2
2σ2
]
dxi−1...dx1.
The expression in square brackets is the KL divergence from the agent’s feasible model for
Xi|(X1 = x1, ..., Xi−1 = xi−1) to the true distribution of Xi, under fundamentals µ1, ..., µi.
So, the integral Ji is a weighted average of this divergence, taken across different realizations
of previous draws (x1, ..., xi−i) with weights given by the true likelihood of observing such a
sequence of draws in periods 1 through i− 1 under the stopping strategy Sc. Note that for
each i, Ji (and Ii) depends on µ1, ..., µi.
I first develop an alternative expression of DKL(H(Ψ•;Sc)||H(Ψ(µ;γ);Sc)) as the sum
of Ji.
Lemma OA.2. ∑Li=1 Ii = ∑Li=1 Ji.
Proof. Let I˜i be a slightly modified version of Ii, where the inner-most integral over xi has
the range (−∞,∞), so I˜i is
∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ ci−1(x1,...,xi−2)
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
i∏
k=1
φ(xk;µ•k, σ2) ln
(
Πik=1φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)
Πik=1φ(xk;µk −
∑k−1
j=1 γk,j · (xj − µj), σ2)
)
dxi...dx1.
Observe that I˜L = IL. Inductively I will show I˜L′ +
∑L′−1
i=1 Ii =
∑L′
i=1 Ji for every 1 ≤
L
′ ≤ L. When L′ = 1, this just says I˜1 = J1, which is true by definition. Now suppose the
statement holds for some L′ = S ≤ L− 1. I show it also holds when L′ = S + 1.
We have
I˜S+1 +
S∑
i=1
Ii = I˜S+1 + (IS − I˜S) +
(
I˜S +
S−1∑
i=1
Ii
)
= I˜S+1 + (IS − I˜S) +
S∑
i=1
Ji
where the last equality comes from the inductive hypothesis. Since IS and I˜S simply differ
in terms of the bounds of the inner-most integral, IS − I˜S is
−
∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ cS(x1,...,xS−1)
−∞
S∏
k=1
φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)·ln
(
ΠSk=1φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)
ΠSk=1φ(xk;µk −
∑k−1
j=1 γk,j · (xj − µj), σ2)
)
dxS...dx1.
20
Now, decompose the ln
(
ΠS+1
k=1φ(xk;µ
•
k,σ
2)
ΠS+1
k=1φ(xk;µk−
∑k−1
j=1 γk,j ·(xj−µj),σ2)
)
term in the integrand of I˜S+1 into
the sum
ln
(
ΠSk=1φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)
ΠSk=1φ(xk;µk −
∑k−1
j=1 γk,j · (xj − µj), σ2)
)
+ln
(
φ(xS+1;µS+1,•, σ2)
φ(xS+1;µS+1 −∑Sj=1 γS+1,j · (xj − µj), σ2)
)
.
We know that∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ cS(..)
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
S+1∏
k=1
φ(xk;µ•k, σ2) ln
(
ΠSk=1φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)
ΠSk=1φ(xk;µk −
∑k−1
j=1 γk,j · (xj − µj), σ2)
)
dxS+1...dx1
=
∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ cS(..)
−∞
S∏
k=1
φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(xS+1;µ•S+1, σ2) · ln
(
ΠSk=1φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)
ΠSk=1φ(xk;µk −
∑k−1
j=1 γk,j · (xj − µj), σ2)
)
dxS+1...dx1
=
∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ cS(..)
−∞
S∏
k=1
φ(xk;µ•k, σ2) · ln
(
ΠSk=1φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)
ΠSk=1φ(xk;µk −
∑k−1
j=1 γk,j · (xj − µj), σ2)
)
dxS ...dx1
=− (IS − I˜S)
where cS(..) abbreviates the bound of integration cS(x1, ..., xS−1). At the same time,∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ cS(..)
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
S+1∏
k=1
φ(xk;µ•k, σ2) ln
(
φ(xS+1;µ•S+1, σ2)
φ(xS+1;µS+1 −
∑S
j=1 γS+1,j · (xj − µj), σ2)
)
dxS+1...dx1
=
∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ cS(..)
−∞
S∏
k=1
φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(xS+1;µ•S+1, σ2) ln
(
φ(xS+1;µ•S+1, σ2)
φ(xS+1;µS+1 −
∑S
j=1 γS+1,j · (xj − µj), σ2)
)
dxS+1...dx1
=
∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ cS(..)
−∞
S∏
k=1
φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)DKL[N (µ•S+1, σ2),N (µS+1 −
S∑
j=1
γS+1,j · (xj − µj), σ2)]dxS ...dx1
=
∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ cS(..)
−∞
S∏
k=1
φ(xk;µ•k, σ2)
(µ•S+1 − µS+1 +
∑S
j=1 γS+1,j · (xj − µj))2
2σ2 dxS ...dx1
=JS+1
where we used the closed-form expression of the KL divergence between two Gaussian dis-
tributions,
DKL
N (µ•S+1, σ2)||N (µS+1 − S∑
j=1
γS+1,j · (xj − µj), σ2)
 = (µ•S+1 − µS+1 +∑Sj=1 γS+1,j · (xj − µj))22σ2 .
So by induction, I˜L +
∑L−1
i=1 Ii =
∑L
i=1 Ji. As I˜L = IL, we are done.
Using Lemma OA.2, I can now give the proof of Proposition OA.1.
Proof. AbbreviateDKL(H(Ψ•;Sc)||H(Ψ(µ;γ);Sc)) as ξ(µ1, ..., µL). By Lemma OA.2, ξ(µ1, ..., µL) =∑L
i=1 Ji(µ1, ..., µi). We show that the recursively defined parameters are the only ones satis-
fying the first-order condition, ∂ξ
∂µi
(µˆ1, ..., µˆL) = 0 for each i.
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In the integrand for Ji, each µj where 1 ≤ j ≤ i appears once in the term (µ
•
i−µi+
∑i−1
j=1 γi,j ·(xj−µj))2
2σ2 .
For any (x1, ..., xi−1), the partial derivative of this term with respect to µj for j < i is γi,j
times its partial derivative with respect to µi. That is, at any values of µˆ1, ..., µˆi, we get
∂Ji
∂µj
(µˆ1, ..., µˆi) = γi,j
∂Ji
∂µi
(µˆ1, ..., µˆi)
for each 1 ≤ j < i.
At any (µ∗1, ..., µ∗L) satisfying the first-order condition for µL, we must have
∂ξ
∂µL
(µ∗1, ..., µ∗L) =
∂JL
∂µL
(µ∗1, ..., µ∗L) = 0.
By above, this also implies for each 1 ≤ j < L, either ∂JL
∂µj
(µ∗1, ..., µ∗L) = 0, or γL,k = 0 (in
which case JL is not actually a function of µj and ∂JL∂µj = 0 everywhere). Either way, this
shows for the case of j = L− 1,
∂ξ
∂µL−1
(µ∗1, ..., µ∗L) =
∂JL
∂µL−1
(µ∗1, ..., µ∗L) +
∂JL−1
∂µL−1
(µ∗1, ..., µ∗L−1)
= ∂JL−1
∂µL−1
(µ∗1, ..., µ∗L−1).
If (µ∗1, ..., µ∗L) also satisfies the first-order condition for µL−1, then
∂JL−1
∂µL−1
(µ∗1, ..., µ∗L−1) = 0.
Continuing this telescoping argument, we conclude if (µ∗1, ..., µ∗L) satisfies the first-order con-
dition for all µi, 1 ≤ i ≤ L, then ∂Ji∂µi (µ∗1, ..., µ∗i ) = 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ L.
Given the form of J1, it is clear that ∂J1∂µ1 (µ
∗
1) = 0 implies µ∗1 = µ•1. Also,
∂Ji
∂µi
(µ∗1, ..., µ∗i ) = −
∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ ci−1(x1,...,xi−2)
−∞
i−1∏
j=1
φ(xj;µ•j , σ2)
[
(µ•i − µ∗i +
∑
γi,j · (xj − µ∗j))
σ2
]
dxi−1...dx1.
Using the fact that ∂Ji
∂µi
(µ∗1, ..., µ∗i ) = 0, we multiply the integrand by the constant
−σ2 · (
∫ c1
−∞
...
∫ ci−1(x1,...,xi−2)
−∞
i−1∏
j=1
φ(xj;µ•j , σ2)dxi−1...dx1)−1
and get
EΨ•
µ•i − µ∗i + i−1∑
j=1
γi,j · (Xj − µ∗j) | (Xk)i−1k=1 ∈ Ri−1
 = 0.
Rearranging, we have µ∗i = µ•i −
∑i−1
j=1 γi,j · (µ∗j − EΨ• [Xj|(Xk)i−1k=1 ∈ Ri−1]) as desired. This
means the only (µ∗1, ..., µ∗L) satisfying the first-order condition for minimizing KL divergence
is the one iteratively given in this proposition.
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Now I turn to a special class of cutoff-based stopping rules where ck is independent of
history. So, a stopping rule of this kind Sc can be viewed simply as a list of L constants,
c1, ..., cL ∈ R, such that the agent stops after the draw X` = x` if and only if x` < c`. I
show that the expression for the pseudo-true fundamentals greatly simplifies and admits a
path-counting interpretation.
Definition OA.3. For 1 ≤ j < i ≤ L, a path p from i to j is a sequence of pairs p =
((i0, i1), ..., (iM−1, iM)) with M ≥ 1, i0 = i, iM = j, and im+1 < im for all m = 0, 1, ...,M −1.
The length of p is #(p) := M . The weight of p is W (p) := Π0≤m≤M−1(−γi`,i`+1). Denote the
set of all paths from i to j as P [i→ j].
That is, we may imagine a network with L nodes, one per period of the optimal-stopping
problem. There is a directed edge with weight −γi,j for all pairs i > j. A path from i to j is
a concatenation of edges, starting with i and ending with j. Its weight is the product of the
weights of all the edges used.
The next proposition differs from Proposition OA.1 in that the expression for the pseudo-
true fundamental µ∗i does not involve other pseudo-true fundamentals µ∗j . It shows that the
distortion of µ∗i from the true value µ•i depends on terms µ•j −EΨ• [Xj|Xj ≤ cj] and the total
number of paths from i to j in the network that γ defines.
Proposition OA.2. For stopping strategy Sc = (c1, ..., cL) ∈ RL, the pseudo-true funda-
mentals are given by
µ∗i = µ•i +
i−1∑
j=1
 ∑
p∈P [i→j]
W (p)
 · (µ•j − E[Xj|Xj ≤ cj]) .
Proof. This clearly holds for i = 1. By induction assume this holds for all i ≤ K for some
K ≤ L− 1. I show that this also holds for i = K + 1.
From Proposition OA.1,
µ∗i = µ•i −
i−1∑
j=1
γi,j · (µ∗j − EΨ• [Xj|(Xk)i−1k=1 ∈ Ri−1]).
The continuation region Ri−1 is the rectangle (−∞, c1) × ... × (−∞, ci−1) ∈ Ri−1. As
(X1, ..., Xi−1) are objectively independent, the events {Xk ≤ ck} for k 6= j are indepen-
dent of Xj, so the expression simplifies to
µ∗i = µ•i −
i−1∑
j=1
γi,j · (µ∗j − EΨ• [Xj|Xj ≤ cj]).
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Expanding each µ∗j for 1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1 using the inductive hypothesis,
µ∗K+1 =µ•K+1 −
K∑
j=1
γK+1,j · (µ•j − EΨ• [Xj|Xj ≤ cj])
+
K∑
j=1
−γK+1,j ·
j−1∑
k=1
 ∑
p∈P [j→k]
W (p)
 · (µ•k − EΨ• [Xk|Xk ≤ ck])

=µ•K+1 +
K∑
j=1
(−γK+1,j) + K∑
k=j+1
−γK+1,k ·
 ∑
p∈P [k→j]
W (p)
 · (µ•j − EΨ• [Xj|Xj ≤ cj]) .
Paths in P [K+ 1→ j] come in two types. The first type is the direct path consisting of just
one edge (K + 1, j), with weight −γK+1,j. The second type consists of the indirect paths
p = ((K + 1, k), p′) where p′ ∈ P [k → j]. We have W (p) = −γK+1,k ·W (p′). We therefore
see that the expression ∑Kj=1 [(−γK+1,j) +∑Kk=j+1−γK+1,k · (∑p∈P [k→j] W (p))] in fact gives
the sum of weights for all paths in P [K + 1 → j]. So, we have shown that the claim holds
also for i = K + 1. By induction it holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ L.
As a corollary, suppose L ≥ 3 and γ have the Rabin and Vayanos (2010) functional form
of γi,j = α · δi−j−1 for α > 0, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. I show that all pseudo-true fundamentals are
too pessimistic in every dataset censored with Sc = (c1, ..., cL) ∈ RL if and only if δ > α.
The idea is the influence of the gambler’s fallacy psychology must not decay “too quickly”
relative to the influence of the most recent observation. This condition is satisfied in all
the calibration exercises in Rabin and Vayanos (2010) and in the structural estimations of
Benjamin, Moore, and Rabin (2017). The result shows the over-pessimism from the 2-periods
model extends into the L periods model for history-independent stopping rules, provided the
regularity condition on the parametrization of the L-periods gambler’s fallacy holds.
Corollary OA.1. Suppose L ≥ 3 and γi,j = α · δi−j−1 for α > 0, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. If δ > α,
then for all stopping strategies Sc = (c1, ..., cL) ∈ RL, the pseudo-true fundamentals satisfy
µ∗i < µ
•
i for all i. If δ < α, then there exists a stopping strategy Sc = (c1, ..., cL) ∈ RL such
that µ∗i > µ•i for at least one i.
To understand the intuition, consider an example that violates the condition of the
corollary, α = 0.5, δ = 0, so that γ2,1 = 0.5, γ3,2 = 0.5, and γ3,1 = 0. The agent expects
reversals between the pairs (X1, X2) and (X2, X3), but his expectation forX3|(X1 = x1, X2 =
x2) does not vary with x1. By the same logic as the two-periods censoring effect, inference
about the second-period fundamental µ∗2 decreases as c1 decreases, with limc1→−∞ µ∗2(c1) =
−∞. This has an important indirect effect on µ∗3, since a very pessimistic µ∗2 leads the
agent to interpret objectively typical draws of X2 as greatly above average. Expecting low
values of X3 after these surprisingly high draws of X2, the agent infers the fundamental µ∗3
to be above the sample mean of X3 in the dataset, hence overestimating it as c1 → −∞.
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When δ is strictly positive, however, there is an opposite effect where lower sample mean of
X1 in observations containing uncensored X3 lead to more pessimistic inference about the
third-period fundamental. When δ > 0.5, overoptimistic inference never happens because
this second effect dominates.
Proof. First suppose δ > α. By Proposition OA.2, since µ•j −E[Xj|Xj ≤ cj] > 0 for any cj ∈
R, I only need to show that ∑p∈P [i→j] W (p) < 0 for every i > j pair. Due to the stationarity
of γ under the γi,j = α · δi−j−1 functional form, it suffices to prove ∑p∈P [i→1]W (p) < 0 for
every 2 ≤ i ≤ L.
When i = 2, P [2 → 1] consists of a single path with weight −α < 0. By induction
suppose ∑p∈P [i→1]W (p) < 0 for all i ≤ S for 2 ≤ S ≤ L− 1. We can exhaustively enumerate
p ∈ P [S + 1 → 1] by relating each path in P [S → 1] to a pair of paths in P [S + 1 → 1].
Relate p = ((S, i1), ..., (iM−1, 1)) ∈ P [S → 1] to the pair p′ = ((S + 1, i1), ..., (iM−1, 1)) and
p
′′ = ((S + 1, S), (S, i1), ..., (iM−1, 1)). That is, p
′ modifies the first edge in p from (S, i1) to
(S + 1, i1), while p
′′ simply concatenates the extra edge (S + 1, S) in front of p. We have
W (p′) = δ ·W (p), because the weight of (S, i1) is −αδS−i1−1 while the weight of (S + 1, i1)
is −αδS−i1 , and the two paths are otherwise identical. We have W (p′′) = −α ·W (p), since
the newly concatenated edge has weight −α. This argument shows ∑p∈P [S+1→1]W (p) =
(δ−α)·∑p∈P [S→1]W (p). Since δ−α > 0 and∑p∈P [S→1]W (p) < 0 by the inductive hypothesis,
we also have ∑p∈P [S+1→1]W (p) < 0. By induction, we have shown that ∑p∈P [i→1]W (p) < 0
for every 2 ≤ i ≤ L.
Next, suppose δ < α. By Proposition OA.2,
µ∗3 = µ•3 +
(
−αδ + α2
)
· (µ•1 − E[X1|X1 ≤ c1]) + (−α) (µ•2 − E[X2|X2 ≤ c2]) .
The coefficient in front of µ•1 − E[X1|X1 ≤ c1] comes from the fact that there are two paths
from 3 to 1, with weights −γ3,1 = −αδ and (−γ3,2) · (−γ2,1) = (−α) · (−α) = α2. We have
(−αδ + α2) = α(α − δ) > 0 since α > 0 and δ < α. So, fixing c2, as c1 → −∞ we get
µ•1 − E[X1|X1 ≤ c1]→∞ and therefore µ∗3 →∞.
OA 3 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section I prove the almost-sure convergence of beliefs and behavior when biased agents
act one at a time and entertain uncertainty over both µ1 and µ2.
For µ1 < µ¯1, µ2 < µ¯2, let ♦([µ1, µ¯1], [µ2, µ¯2]) refer to the parallelogram in R
2 with the
vertices:
• (µ1, µ¯2 + γ2 (µ¯1 − µ1))
• (µ1, µ2 + γ2 (µ¯1 − µ1))
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• (µ¯1, µ¯2 − γ2 (µ¯1 − µ1))
• (µ¯1, µ2 − γ2 (µ¯1 − µ1))
In other words, ♦([µ1, µ¯1], [µ2, µ¯2]) is the parallelogram constructed by starting with the
rectangle [µ1, µ¯1] × [µ2, µ¯2], then replacing the top and bottom edges with lines with slope
−γ (and adjusting the left and right edges accordingly to connect with the new top and
bottom edges.)
Consider a sequence of short-lived agents playing the stage game in rounds t = 1, 2, 3, ...
They are uncertain about both µ1 and µ2, with prior density of the first round agent
m0(µ1, µ2) supported on feasible fundamentalsM = ♦([µ1, µ¯1], [µ2, µ¯2]) as in Remark 1(b).
I abbreviate this support as ♦ when no confusion arises. Each agent t choose the the opti-
mal cutoff C˜t maximizing expected payoff based on the final belief M˜t−1 of the immediate
predecessor.21 I show the almost sure convergence of stochastic processes (C˜t) and (M˜t) to
the unique steady state under the hypotheses of Theorem 1.
OA 3.1 Preliminary Results
First, I consider how the predicted second-period payoff after X1 = x1 depends on the
parameters of the feasible model Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ).
Lemma OA.3. For every µ1, µ2, x1 ∈ R, the conditional distribution X2|X1 = x1 is the
same under Ψ(µ•1, µ2 + γ(µ1 − µ•1); γ) and Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ). So in particular, C(µ1, µ2; γ) =
C(µ•1, µ2 + γ(µ1 − µ•1); γ).
Proof. Under the feasible model Ψ(µ•1, µ2 +γ(µ1−µ•1); γ), the conditional density of X2 given
X1 = x1 is f2(· | µ2 +γ(µ1−µ•1)−γ(x1−µ•1)), which simplifies to f2(· | µ2−γ(x1−µ1)). It is
easy to see that this is also the expression for the same conditional density under Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ).
Suppose C(µ1, µ2; γ) = c. This implies the indifference condition,
u1(c) = EΨ(µ1,µ2;γ)[u2(c,X2) | X1 = c].
But by the equivalence of conditional distribution given above,
u1(c) = EΨ(µ•1,µ2+γ(µ1−µ•1);γ)[u2(c,X2) | X1 = c].
This means c is also the indifference threshold for the model Ψ(µ•1, µ2 + γ(µ1 − µ•1); γ).
As a corollary, this lemma shows the restriction to cutoff strategies is without loss, and
that C˜t is well defined. That is, for any belief given by a density onM, there exists a cutoff
strategy that is weakly optimal among the class of all stopping strategies, and further this
21I assume that agents do not update beliefs within the stage game.
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cutoff strategy is strictly optimal among the class of cutoff strategies. This is because for
any x1 ∈ R and any density m˜ onM,∫
M
EΨ(µ1,µ2;γ)[u2(x1, X2) | X1 = x1]·m˜(µ1, µ2)d(µ1, µ2) =
∫ µ¯◦2
µ◦2
EΨ(µ•1,µ2;γ)[u2(x1, X2) | X1 = x1]·m˜V (µ2)dµ2
where µ¯◦2 := max{µ2 : (µ•1, µ2) ∈ ♦} and µ◦2 := min{µ2 : (µ•1, µ2) ∈ ♦}, and m˜V (µ2) is
the integral of m˜(µ1, µ2) over the line in ♦ with slope −γ that passes through (µ•1, µ2).
This equality holds because by Lemma OA.3, all fundamentals on that line imply the same
continuation payoff after X1 = x1 as the fundamentals (µ•1, µ2). The proof of Lemma A.13
shows that
x1 7→ u1(x1)−
∫ µ¯◦2
µ◦2
EΨ(µ•1,µ2;γ)[u2(x1, X2) | X1 = x1]m˜V (µ2)dµ2
is a strictly increasing, continuous function that crosses 0.
Now, the key step is to separate the two-dimensional inference problem into a pair of
one-dimensional problems.
OA 3.2 Learning µ•1
I define the stochastic process of data log-likelihood (for a given fundamental). For each
µ1, µ2 ∈ supp(m0), let `t(µ1, µ2)(ω) be the log likelihood that the fundamentals are (µ1, µ2)
and histories (H˜s)s≤t(ω) are generated by the end of round t. It is given by
`t(µ1, µ2)(ω) := ln(m0(µ1, µ2)) +
t∑
s=1
ln(lik(H˜s(ω);µ1, µ2))
where lik(x1,∅;µ1, µ2) := f1(x1 | µ1) and lik(x1, x2;µ1, µ2) := f1(x1 | µ1) · f2(x2 | µ2 −
γ(x1 − µ1)). We have f1(x1 | µ1) = g1(x1 − µ1 + µ•1) and f2(x2 | µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)) =
g2(x1 − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(x1 − µ1)). By simple algebra, we may expand
`t(µ1, µ2)(ω) = ln(m0(µ1, µ2)) +
t∑
s=1
ln[g1(X1,s(ω)− µ1 + µ•1)]
+
t∑
s=1
1{X1,s(ω) ≤ C˜s(ω)} · ln [g2(X2,s(ω)− µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s(ω)− µ1))]
I first establish that, without knowing anything about the process (Ct), we can conclude
agents learn µ•1 arbitrarily well.
Lemma OA.4. For every  > 0, almost surely limt→∞ M˜t(♦ ∩ ([µ•1 − , µ•1 + ]× R)) = 1.
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Proof. I first calculate the directional derivative
∇v 1
t
`t(µ1, µ2),
where v =
(
1/
√
1 + γ2
−γ/√1 + γ2
)
is the unit vector with slope −γ. We have
∂(`t/t)
∂µ1
(µ1, µ2) =
1
t
D1m0(µ1, µ2)
m0(µ1, µ2)
− 1
t
t∑
s=1
g
′
1(X1,s − µ1 + µ•1)
g1(X1,s − µ1 + µ•1)
− γ
t
t∑
s=1
1{X1,s ≤ C˜s} · λ(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ1))
∂(`t/t)
∂µ2
(µ1, µ2) =
1
t
D2m0(µ1, µ2)
m0(µ1, µ2)
− 1
t
t∑
s=1
1{X1,s ≤ C˜s} · λ(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ1)),
where D1m0 and D2m0 are the two partial derivatives of m0. At every ω and every (µ1, µ2),
note the last summand in ∂(`t/t)
∂µ1
is γ times the last summand in ∂(`t/t)
∂µ2
. Therefore,
∇v 1
t
`t(µ1, µ2) =
−1
σ2
√
1 + γ2
(
1
t
t∑
s=1
g
′
1(X1,s − µ1 + µ•1)
g1(X1,s − µ1 + µ•1)
)
+ 1
t
√
1 + γ2
1
t
D1m0(µ1, µ2)
m0(µ1, µ2)
− γ
t
√
1 + γ2
D2m0(µ1, µ2)
m0(µ1, µ2)
.
Since m0, D1m0, D2m0 are continuous on the compact set ♦, there exists some 0 < B < ∞
so that |D1m0(µ1,µ2)
m0(µ1,µ2) | < B and |
D2m0(µ1,µ2)
m0(µ1,µ2) | < B for all (µ1, µ2) ∈ ♦. This means for every ω,
inf
(µ1,µ2)∈♦L
[(
∇v 1
t
`t(µ1, µ2)
)
+ 1
σ2
√
1 + γ2
(
1
t
t∑
s=1
g
′
1(X1,s − µ1 + µ•1)
g1(X1,s − µ1 + µ•1)
)]
≥ −1
t
(1 + γ)√
1 + γ2
B,
where ♦L := ♦ ∩ ([µ1, µ•1 − ] × R) is the sub-parallelogram to the left of µ•1 − . By law of
large numbers applied to the i.i.d. sequence (g
′
1(X1,s−(µ•1−)+µ•1)
g1(X1,s−(µ•1−)+µ•1))s≥1, almost surely
1
t
t∑
s=1
g
′
1(X1,s − (µ•1 − ) + µ•1)
g1(X1,s − (µ•1 − ) + µ•1)
→ EX∼g1
[
g
′
1(X1 + )
g1(X1 + )
]
.
Since EX∼g1
[
g
′
1(X1)
g1(X1)
]
= 0 and since z 7→ g
′
1(z)
g1(z) =
d
dz
(ln(g1(z)) is strictly decreasing by log-
concavity, there is some δ > 0 so that EX∼g1
[
g
′
1(X1+)
g1(X1+)
]
= −δ. Furthermore, for any µ1 ≥
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µ•1 − , then for any x1 ∈ R,
g
′
1(x1 − µ1 + µ•1)
g1(x1 − µ1 + µ•1)
≤ g
′
1(x1 + )
g1(x1 − ) .
Along any ω where 1
t
∑t
s=1
g
′
1(X1,s−(µ•1−)+µ•1)
g1(X1,s−(µ•1−)+µ•1) → −δ, we therefore also have
lim sup
t→∞
sup
µ≥µ•1−
1
t
t∑
s=1
g
′
1(X1,s − µ1 + µ•1)
g1(X1,s − µ1 + µ•1)
≤ −δ.
Therefore almost surely
lim inf
t→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦L
(
∇v 1
t
`t(µ1, µ2)
)
≥ δ
σ2
√
1 + γ2
.
We may divide ♦L further divide into two halves:
♦L,1 := ♦ ∩ ([µ1, µ1 + d/2]× R)
♦L,2 := ♦ ∩ ([µ1 + d/2, µ•1 − ]× R)
where d := µ•1 −  − µ1. I will show that limt→∞ M˜t(♦L,1) = 0 almost surely. The idea is
we can map every point in ♦L,1 to another point in ♦L,2 in the direction of v. For every
point, its image under the map will have much higher posterior probability, since we have a
uniform, strictly positive lowerbound on the directional derivative of log-likelihood `t in the
direction of v.
M˜t(♦L,1) =
∫
♦L,1
m˜t(µ1, µ2)dµ
=
∫
♦L,2
m˜t(µ1, µ2) · m˜t(µ1 − d, µ2 − γd)
m˜t(µ1, µ2)
dµ
=
∫
♦L,2
m˜t(µ1, µ2) exp(`t(µ1 − d, µ2 − γd)− `t(µ1, µ2))dµ
=
∫
♦L,2
m˜t(µ1, µ2) exp(−
∫ d
0
∇v`t(µ1 − d+ z, µ2 − γd+ γz)dz)dµ
Almost surely,
lim inf
t→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦L,2,z∈[0,d]
(∇v`t(µ1 − d+ z, µ2 − γd+ γz)) ≥ tδ
σ2
√
1 + γ2
,
so almost surely
lim sup
t→∞
M˜t(♦L,1) ≤ lim sup
t→∞
∫
♦L,2
m˜t(µ1, µ2) exp(− dtδ
σ2
√
1 + γ2
)dµ.
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But for every ω and t, the RHS is bounded above by exp(− dtδ
σ2
√
1+γ2
), which tends to 0 as
t→∞ since d, δ > 0. So in fact M˜t(♦L,1)→ 0 almost surely.
Now by dividing ♦L,2 into two equal halves and iterating this argument, we eventually
show limt→∞ M˜t(♦∩([µ•1−,∞)×R)) = 1. A symmetric argument also shows limt→∞ M˜t(♦∩
((−∞, µ•1 + ]× R)) = 1.
OA 3.3 Decomposing Partial Derivative of Log-Likelihood With
Respect to µ2
I record a decomposition of ∂`
∂µ2
(µ1, µ2), the partial derivative of the log-likelihood process
with respect to its second argument.
Define two stochastic processes:
ϕs(µ1, µ2) := −λ(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ1)) · 1{X1,s ≤ C˜s}
ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2) :=
∂
∂µ2
L(µ2 + γ(µ1 − µ•1) | C˜s).
Note that ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2) is measurable with respect to Fs−1, since (C˜t) is a predictable pro-
cess. Write ξs(µ1, µ2) := ϕs(µ1, µ2) − ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2) and yt(µ1, µ2) := ∑ts=1 ξs(µ1, µ2). Write
zt(µ1, µ2) :=
∑t
s=1 ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2).
Lemma OA.5. ∂`t
∂µ2
(µ1, µ2) = D2m0(µ1,µ2)m0(µ1,µ2) + yt(µ1, µ2) + zt(µ1, µ2)
Proof. This comes from expanding `t(µ1, µ2) and taking its derivative as in the proof of
Lemma OA.4.
Now I derive two results about the ξt(µ1, µ2) processes for different pairs (µ1, µ2).
Lemma OA.6. There exists κξ < ∞ so that for every (µ1, µ2) ∈ ♦ and for every t ≥ 1,
ω ∈ Ω, E[ξ2t (µ1, µ2)|Ft−1](ω) ≤ κξ.
Proof. Note that ϕ¯t(µ1, µ2) is measurable with respect to Ft−1. Also, ϕt(µ1, µ2)|Ft−1 =
ϕt(µ1, µ2)|C˜t, because by independence of Xt from (Xs)t−1s=1, the only information that Ft−1
contains about ϕt(µ1, µ2) is in determining the cutoff threshold C˜t.
At a sample path ω so that C˜t(ω) = c ∈ R,
E[ϕs(µ1, µ2)|Ft−1](ω) = E[−λ(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ1)) · 1{X1 ≤ c}]
= ∂
∂µ2
∫ c
−∞
g1(x1) ·
∫ ∞
−∞
g2(x2) · ln(f2(X2,s | µ2 − γ(X1,s − µ1)))dx2dx1
= ∂
∂µ2
∫ c
−∞
g1(x1) ·
∫ ∞
−∞
g2(x2) · ln(f2(X2,s | [µ2 + γ(µ1 − µ•1)]− γ(X1,s − µ•1)))dx2dx1
= ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ2 + γ(µ1 − µ•1) | c).
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This shows that E[ϕs(µ1, µ2)|Ft−1](ω) = ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2)(ω). Since this holds regardless of c, we
get that E[ϕs(µ1, µ2)|Ft−1] = ϕ¯t(µ1, µ2) for all ω, that is to say
E[ξ2t (µ1, µ2)|Ft−1] = Var[ϕt(µ1, µ2)|Ft−1]
≤ E[ϕ2t (µ1, µ2)|Ft−1]
≤ E[(λ(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ1)))2].
By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma A.15,
E
[
(λ(X2 − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1 − µ1)))2
]
exists for all µ1, µ2 ∈ R. The (finite) maximum value this expectation takes on the compact
set ♦ can be taken as κξ.
OA 3.4 Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018)’s Law of Large Num-
bers
I use a statistical result from Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018) to show that the yt/t term
in the decomposition of 1
t
∂`t
∂µ2
almost surely converges to 0 in the long run, and furthermore
this convergence is uniform on ♦. This lets me focus on terms of the form ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2), which
can be interpreted as the expected contribution to the log likelihood derivative from round
s data. This lends tractability to the problem as ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2) only depends on C˜s, but not on
X1,s or X2,s.
Lemma OA.7. For every (µ1, µ2) ∈ ♦, limt→∞ |yt(µ1,µ2)t | = 0 almost surely.
Proof. Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018)’s Proposition 10 shows that if (yt) is a martin-
gale such that there exists some constant v ≥ 0 satisfying [y]t ≤ vt almost surely, where [y]t
is the quadratic variation of (yt), then almost surely limt→∞ ytt = 0.
Consider the process yt(µ1, µ2) for a fixed (µ1, µ2) ∈ ♦. By definition yt = ∑ts=1 ϕs(µ1, µ2)−
ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2). As established in the proof of Lemma OA.6, for every s, ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2) = E[ϕs(µ1, µ2)|Fs−1].
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So for t′ < t,
E[yt(µ1, µ2)|Ft′ ] =
t
′∑
s=1
ϕs(µ1, µ2)− ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2) + E
 t∑
s=t′+1
ϕs(µ1, µ2)− ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2)|Ft′

=
t
′∑
s=1
ϕs(µ1, µ2)− ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2) +
t∑
s=t′+1
E[E[ϕs(µ1, µ2)− ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2)|Fs−1] | Ft′ ]
=
t
′∑
s=1
ϕs(µ1, µ2)− ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2) + 0
= yt′ (µ1, µ2).
This shows (yt(µ1, µ2))t is a martingale. Also,
[y(µ1, µ2)]t =
t−1∑
s=1
E[(ys(µ1, µ2)− ys−1(µ1, µ2))2|Fs−1]
=
t−1∑
s=1
E[ξ2s (µ1, µ2)|Fs−1]
≤ κξ · t
by Lemma OA.6. Therefore Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018) Proposition 10 applies.
Lemma OA.8. limt→∞ sup(µ1,µ2)∈♦ |yt(µ1,µ2)t | = 0 almost surely.
Proof. This argument is similar to Lemma 11 in Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018). I
apply Lemma 2 of Andrews (1992), which says to prove this result I just need to check
conditions BD, P-SSLN, and S-LIP from Andrews (1992). BD holds because ♦ is a bounded
subset of R2. P-SLLN holds because by Lemma OA.7, which shows for all (µ1, µ2) ∈ ♦,
limt→∞ |yt(µ1,µ2)t | = 0 almost surely.
Condition S-LIP is essentially a Lipschitz continuity condition. It requires finding se-
quence of random variables Bt such that |ξt(µ1, µ2)− ξt(µ′1, µ′2)| ≤ Bt · (|µ1−µ′1|+ |µ2−µ′2|)
almost surely, such that these random variables satisfy
supt≥1 1t
∑t
s=1 E[Bs] <∞, and limt→∞ 1t
∑t
s=1(Bs − E[Bs]) = 0 almost surely.
But for every ω, ϕs(µ1, µ2) := −λ(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ1)) · 1{X1,s ≤ C˜s}
|ϕs(µ1, µ2)− ϕs(µ′1, µ
′
2)| ≤|λ(X2,s − µ2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ1))− λ(X2,s − µ
′
2 + µ•2 + γ(X1,s − µ
′
1))|.
Since ln(g2(·)) has a bounded second derivative, the RHS is bounded by κg2·
(
|µ2 − µ′2|+ γ · |µ1 − µ′1|
)
.
Now that we know |ϕs(µ1, µ2) − ϕs(µ′1, µ′2)|(ω) ≤ κg2 ·
(
|µ2 − µ′2|+ γ · |µ1 − µ′1|
)
for all
ω, we must also have |ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2)− ϕ¯s(µ′1, µ′2)|(ω) ≤ κg2 ·
(
|µ2 − µ′2|+ γ · |µ1 − µ′1|
)
for all ω
since ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2) = E[ϕs(µ1, µ2) | Fs−1].
Setting Bs as the constant 2κg2 for every s satisfies S-LIP.
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OA 3.5 Bounds on Asymptotic Beliefs and Asymptotic Cutoffs
Recall that Lemma OA.3 implies that if we draw the line with slope −γ through the point
(µ•1, µ2), all pairs of fundamentals on this line have the same optimal cutoff threshold. Then
against any feasible model Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) with (µ1, µ2) ∈ ♦, the best cutoff strategy is between
c◦ := C(µ•1, µ◦2; γ) and c¯
◦ := C(µ•1, µ¯◦2; γ).
For µl2 ≤ µh2 in the interval [µ◦2, µ¯◦2], let ♦[µl2,µh2 ] ⊆ ♦ be constructed from ♦ by translating
its top and bottom edges towards the center, so that they pass through (µ•1, µl2) and (µ•1, µh2)
respectively. For (µ•1, µ2) ∈ ♦, let li(µ2) ⊆ ♦ be the line segment in supp(m0) with slope −γ
that contains the point (µ•1, µ2). So, ♦[µl2,µh2 ] = ∪µ2∈[µl2,µh2 ]li(µ2).
Lemma OA.9. For c ≥ c◦, if lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥ c almost surely, then limt→∞ M˜t( ♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)) ) =
0 almost surely. Also, for c¯ ≤ c¯◦, if lim supt→∞ C˜t ≤ c¯ almost surely, then limt→∞ M˜t( ♦(µ∗2(c¯),µ¯◦2] ) =
0 almost surely.
Proof. I first show that for all  > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that almost surely,
lim inf
t→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−]]
1
t
∂`t
∂µ2
(µ1, µ2) ≥ δ.
From Lemma OA.5, we may rewrite LHS as
lim inf
t→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−]]
[
1
t
D2m0(µ1, µ2)
m0(µ1, µ2)
+ yt(µ1, µ2)
t
+ zt(µ1, µ2)
t
]
,
which is no smaller than taking the inf separately across the three terms in the bracket,
lim inf
t→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−]]
1
t
D2m0(µ1, µ2)
m0(µ1, µ2)
+ lim inf
t→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−]]
yt(µ1, µ2)
t
+ lim inf
t→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−]]
zt(µ1, µ2)
t
.
Since D2g/g is bounded on ♦ as D2m0 is continuous and m0 is continuous and strictly
positive on the compact set ♦, the first term is 0 for every ω. To deal with the second term,
lim inf
t→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−]]
yt(µ1, µ2)
t
≥ lim inf
t→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦
−|yt(µ1, µ2)
t
| = lim inf
t→∞
{
−1 · sup
(µ1,µ2)∈♦
|yt(µ1, µ2)
t
|
}
.
Lemma OA.8 gives limt→∞ sup(µ1,µ2)∈♦ |yt(µ1,µ2)t | = 0 almost surely. Hence, we conclude
lim inf
t→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−]]
yt(µ1, µ2)
t
≥ 0
almost surely.
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It suffices then to find δ > 0 and show lim inft→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−]
zt(µ1,µ2)
t
≥ δ almost
surely. The proof of Lemma A.19 establishes that, if we put δ = ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ∗2(c) −  | c), then
δ > 0 and ∂
∂µ2
L¯(µ2 | c) ≥ δ whenever c ≥ c and µ2 ≤ µ∗2(c) − . For every (µ1, µ2) ∈ li(µˆ2),
µ2+γ(µ1−µ•1) = µˆ2. So, ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2)(ω) ≥ δ for all (µ1, µ2) ∈ ♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−], whenever C˜s(ω) ≥ c.
Along any ω where lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥ c, we therefore have
lim inf
s→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−]
ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2) ≥ δ
and thus
lim inf
t→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−]]
zt(µ1, µ2)
t
= lim inf
t→∞ inf(µ1,µ2)∈♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−]]
1
t
[
t∑
s=1
ϕ¯s(µ1, µ2)
]
≥ δ.
From here, the same argument as in the proof of Lemma OA.4 showslimt→∞ M˜t( ♦[µ◦2,µ∗2(c)−] ) =
0 almost surely. Since the choice of  > 0 is arbitrary, this establishes the first part of the
lemma.
The proof of the second part of the statement is exactly symmetric.
Now, I use a bound on agents’ asymptotic beliefs about µ2 to deduce asymptotic restric-
tions on their cutoffs.
Lemma OA.10. Suppose that there are µ◦2 ≤ µl2 < µh2 ≤ µ¯◦2 such that limt→∞ M˜t(♦[µl2,µh2 ]) =
1 almost surely. Then lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥ C(µ•1, µl2; γ) and lim supt→∞ C˜t ≤ C(µ•1, µh2 ; γ) almost
surely.
Proof. I show lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥ C(µ•1, µl2; γ) almost surely. The argument establishing lim supt→∞ C˜t ≤
C(µ•1, µh2 ; γ) is symmetric.
Let cl = C(µ•1, µl2; γ), and recall before we defined c◦ := C(µ•1, µ◦2; γ) and c¯
◦ := C(µ•1, µ¯◦2; γ).
By Lemma OA.3, C(µ′1, µ
′
2; γ) = C(µ•1, µ2; γ) for all (µ
′
1, µ
′
2) ∈ li(µ2). Since c 7→
U(c;µ1, µ2) is single peaked for every (µ1, µ2), and since cl ≤ C(µ•1, µ2; γ) for all µ2 ∈ [µl2, µh2 ],
we also get cl ≤ C(µ′1, µ′2; γ) for every (µ′1, µ′2) ∈ ♦[µl2,µh2 ], since ♦[µl2,µh2 ] is the union of the line
segments, ♦[µl2,µh2 ] = ∪µ2∈[µl2,µh2 ]li(µ2).
Fix some  > 0.We get U(cl;µ1, µ2)−U(cl−;µ1, µ2) > 0 for every (µ1, µ2) ∈ ♦[µl2,µh2 ]. As
(µ1, µ2) 7→
(
U(cl;µ1, µ2)− U(cl − ;µ1, µ2)
)
is continuous, there exists some κ∗ > 0 so that
U(cl;µ1, µ2)−U(cl− ;µ1, µ2) > κ∗ for all (µ1, µ2) ∈ ♦[µl2,µh2 ]. In particular, if ν ∈ ∆(♦[µl2,µh2 ])
is a belief about fundamentals, then
∫
U(cl;µ1, µ2)− U(cl − ;µ1, µ2) > dν(µ) > κ∗.
Now , let
κ¯ := sup
c∈[c◦,c¯◦]
sup
(µ1,µ2)∈♦
U(c;µ1, µ2),
κ := inf
c∈[c◦,c¯◦]
inf
(µ1,µ2)∈♦
U(c;µ1, µ2).
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Find p ∈ (0, 1) so that pκ∗ − (1− p)(κ¯− κ) = 0. At any belief νˆ ∈ ∆(♦) that assigns more
than probability p to the sub-parallelogram ♦[µl2,µh2 ], the optimal cutoff is larger than c
l − .
To see this, take any cˆ ≤ cl− and I will show cˆ is suboptimal. If cˆ < c, then it is suboptimal
after any belief on ♦. If c ≤ cˆ ≤ cl − , I show that∫
U(cl;µ1, µ2)− U(cˆ;µ1, µ2)dνˆ(µ) > 0.
To see this, we may decompose νˆ as the mixture of a probability measure ν on ♦[µl2,µh2 ] and
another probability measure νc on ♦\♦[µl2,µh2 ]. Let pˆ > p be the probability that ν assigns to
♦[µl2,µh2 ]. The above integral is equal to:
pˆ
∫
♦[µl2,µh2 ]
U(cl;µ1, µ2)− U(cˆ;µ1, µ2)dν(µ) + (1− pˆ)
∫
♦\♦[µl2,µh2 ]
U(cl;µ1, µ2)− U(cˆ;µ1, µ2)dνc(µ)
Since cl is to the left of the optimal cutoff for all (µ1, µ2) ∈ ♦[µl2,µh2 ] and cˆ ≤ cl − , then
U(cˆ;µ1, µ2) ≤ U(cl − ;µ1, µ2) for all (µ1, µ2) ∈ ♦[µl2,µh2 ]. The first summand is no less than
pˆ
∫
♦[µl2,µh2 ]
U(cl;µ1, µ2)− U(cl − ;µ1, µ2)dν(µ) ≥ pˆκ∗.
Also, the integrand in the second summand is no smaller than−(κ¯−κ), therefore ∫ U(cl;µ1, µ2)−
U(cˆ;µ1, µ2)dνˆ(µ) ≥ pˆκ∗ − (1 − pˆ)(κ¯ − κ). Since pˆ > p, we get pˆκ∗ − (1 − pˆ)(κ¯ − κ) > 0 as
desired.
Along any sample path ω where limt→∞ M˜t(♦[µl2,µh2 ])(ω) = 1, eventually M˜t(♦[µl2,µh2 ])(ω) >
p for all large enough t, meaning lim inft→∞ C˜t(ω) ≥ cl − . Since limt→∞ M˜t(♦[µl2,µh2 ]) = 1
almost surely, this shows lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥ C(µ•1, µl2; γ)−  almost surely. Since the choice of
 > 0 was arbitrary, we in fact conclude lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥ C(µ•1, µl2; γ) almost surely.
OA 3.6 The Contraction Map
I now combine the results established so far to prove the convergence statement in Theorem
1.
Proof. Let µl2,[1] := µ◦2, µ
h
2,[1] := µ¯◦2. For k = 2, 3, ..., iteratively define µl2,[k] := I(µl2,[k−1]; γ)
and µh2,[k] := I(µh2,[k−1]; γ).
From Lemma OA.10, if limt→∞ M˜t(♦[µl2,[k],µh2,[k]]) = 1 almost surely, then lim inft→∞ C˜t ≥
C(µ•1, µl2,[k]; γ) and lim supt→∞ C˜t ≤ C(µ•1, µh2,[k]; γ) almost surely. But using these conclusions
in Lemma OA.9, we further deduce that
lim
t→∞ M˜t(♦[µ∗2(C(µ•1,µl2,[k];γ)),µ∗2(C(µ•1,µh2,[k];γ))]) = 1
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almost surely, that is to say limt→∞ M˜t(♦[µl2,[k+1],µh2,[k+1]]) = 1 almost surely.
The iterates (µl2,[k])k≥1 and (µh2,[k])k≥1 are the iterates of a contraction map, so limk→∞ µl2,[k] =
µ•2 = limk→∞ µh2,[k]. Thus, agent’s posterior converges in L1 to the line segment with slope
−γ containing µ∞2 almost surely (since the support of the prior is bounded).
In addition, the sequences of bounds on asymptotic actions also converge by continuity,
limk→∞C(µ•1, µl2,[k]; γ) = c∞ = limk→∞C(µ•1, µh2,[k]; γ). This implies limt→∞ C˜t = c∞ almost
surely.
Finally, combining the asymptotic belief result with Lemma OA.4, we see that in fact M˜t
converges in L1 to the point (µ•1, µ∞2 ) almost surely.
OA 4 Foundation for Inference and Behavior in the
Large-Generation Environment
In Section 4, I introduced the large-generations social-learning environment with a continuum
of agents in each generation. When agents in generations τ = 0, 1, ..., t − 1 choose cutoff
thresholds c[0], c[1], ..., c[t−1], each generation t agent observes an infinite sample of histories
(hτ,n)n∈[0,1] drawn from the history distribution H•(cτ ) for each 0 ≤ τ ≤ t− 1. Agents infer
the large-generations pseudo-true fundamentals µ∗1(c[0], ..., c[t−1]), µ∗2(c[0], ..., c[t−1]) and choose
the stopping strategy that best responds to the feasible model with these parameters.
In this section, I provide a finite-population foundation for inference and behavior in the
large-generations environment for the Gaussian case. For K ≥ 1, let c† = (c(k)† )Kk=1 ∈ RK be
a list of cutoff thresholds. I show that when an agent starts with a full-support prior on the
space of fundamentals R2 and observes N < ∞ histories drawn i.i.d. from each of H•(c(k)† )
for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, her posterior belief almost surely converges to the dogmatic belief on the
large-generations pseudo-true fundamentals µ∗1(c†), µ∗2(c†) as N → ∞. Also, if she chooses
the cutoff strategy Sc maximizing her posterior expected payoffs, then as N → ∞ and
provided the stage-game payoff functions u1, u2 are Lipschitz continuous, her cutoff choice
almost surely converges to C(µ∗1(c†), µ∗2(c†); γ).
OA 4.1 Setting up the Probability Space
Suppose an agent has a full-support prior density m0 : R2 → R>0 over fundamentals (µ1, µ2).
To formally define the problem, consider the R2K-valued stochastic process (Xn)n≥1 =
(X(k)1,n, X
(k)
2,n)1≤k≤K,n≥1, where Xs and Xs′ are independent for s 6= s′ . Here, Xn are i.i.d. R2K-
valued random variables with independent components, distributed as X(k)1,n ∼ N (µ•1, σ2),
X
(k)
2,n ∼ N (µ•2, σ2) for each 1 ≤ k ≤ K. The interpretation is that there are K different pop-
ulations, who play the stage game using different cutoff thresholds. The random variables
(X(k)1,n, X
(k)
2,n) are the potential draws in the n-th iteration of the stage game in population k,
(but X(k)2,n may not be observed if X
(k)
1,n is sufficiently large). Clearly, there is a probability
36
space (Ω,A,P), with sample space Ω = (R2K)∞ interpreted as paths of the process just de-
scribed, A the Borel σ-algebra on Ω, and P the measure on sample paths so that the process
Xn(ω) = ωn has the desired distribution. The term “almost surely” means “with probability
1 with respect to the realization of infinite sequence of all (potential) draws”, i.e. P-almost
surely.
For each n ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ k ≤ K, letH(k)n be the (random) history given byH(k)n = (X(k)1,n,∅)
if X(k)1,t ≥ c(k)† , H(k)n = (X(k)1,n, X(k)2,n) if X(k)1,n < c(k)† . Let Hn = (H(1)n , ..., H(K)n ). After each finite
N, the agent Bayesian updates prior density m0 about the fundamentals, based on the finite
dataset of histories (Hn)n≤N . She ends up with a random, non-degenerate posterior density
m˜N = m0(·|(Hn)n≤N), whose randomness comes from the randomness of the 2K ·N potential
draws.
OA 4.2 Inference after Observing Large Samples
Proposition OA.3 shows that as N → ∞, the random posterior m˜N converges to the large-
generations pseudo-true fundamentals in L1.
Proposition OA.3. Suppose m0 : R2 → R>0 is integrable and has bounded magnitude.
Almost surely,
lim
N→∞
E(µ1,µ2)∼m˜N (|µ1 − µ•1|+ |µ2 − µ∗2(c†)|) = 0.
Belief convergence in L1 is required to later establish convergence of behavior in Propo-
sition OA.5. This convergence does not follow from Berk (1966), because his result only
establishes convergence in a weaker mode: for any open set containing the pseudo-true fun-
damentals, the mass that the posterior belief assigns to the open set almost surely converges
to 1. Crucially, the prior distribution in this setting has full support on an unbounded do-
main of feasible fundamentals, (µ1, µ2) ∈ M = R2. Indeed, one of the implications of my
central inference result, Proposition 2, is that the pseudo-true parameter becomes unbound-
edly pessimistic as censoring threshold decreases. So, the weak mode of convergence in Berk
(1966)’s conclusion leaves open the possibility that posterior beliefs for increasing N put
decreasing mass on increasingly extreme values of µ2. If the magnitudes of these extreme
values grow more quickly in N than the speed with which probability concentrates on the
open set around the pseudo-true fundamentals, then there can be a positive-probability event
where the agent’s behavior is bounded away from C(µ•1, µ∗2(c†); γ) for every N .
Instead, I apply Bunke and Milhaud (1998)’s results to derive the stronger convergence
in L1 that subsequently allows for convergence of payoffs and behavior as the agent’s sample
grows large. One technical challenge is that the results of Bunke and Milhaud (1998) only
apply in environments where observables are valued in some Euclidean space and given by
densities, but censored histories are valued in H and their distributions have a probability
mass on the missing data indicator ∅. So, I first consider a noise-added observation structure
37
where each history H(k)n is replaced by the R2-valued pair (X
(k)
n,1, Y
(k)
n ), where Y (k)n = X
(k)
n,2 if
X
(k)
n,1 ≤ c(k)† . But if X(k)n,1 > c(k)† , then Y (k)n ∼ N (0, 1) is a white noise term that is independent
of the draws of any decision problem. The idea is that a censored draw is replaced by noise
that is uninformative about the fundamentals, so the distribution of each (X(k)n,1, Y (k)n ) pair
is given by a density function on R2. After establishing the analogous belief convergence
result in the auxiliary environment, I map the result back into the environment of observing
censored histories. This translation is possible because in every finite dataset, the realiza-
tions of the white noise terms do not change the relative likelihoods of data under different
parameters (µ1, µ2), hence they do not affect the agent’s posterior belief over fundamentals.
I now formally define this noise-added observation structure that replaces censored X2’s
with white noise. Let PZ∞ be the measure on (R∞)K corresponding to product of K i.i.d.
sequence of N (0, 1) random variables. Consider the expanded probability space (Ω¯, A¯, P¯)
where Ω¯ = Ω× (R∞)K , A¯ is the product σ-algebra on Ω¯ where (R∞)K is endowed with the
usual product Borel σ-algebra, and P¯ is the product measure P ⊗ PZ∞ on Ω¯. To interpret,
each element ω¯ = (ω, z) ∈ Ω¯ consists of the sample path of a sequence of potential draws
(Xn)∞n=1 as well as the sample path of a sequence of white noise realizations (Zn)∞n=1, where
each Zn is an RK-valued random variable.
On the expanded probability space, we can define two kinds of observations. The his-
tory dataset of size N is (Hn(ω¯))n≤N = (Hn(ωn))n≤N , as the K round n histories only
depends on ωn (and not on the white noise zn). The noise-added dataset of size T is
(X1,n(ω), Yn(ω, z))n≤N = (X1,n(ωn), Yn(ωn, zn))n≤N . Write m˜HN as the posterior density from
history dataset of size N, m˜XYN as the posterior density from noise-added dataset of size N .
The next lemma formalizes the idea that replacing censored observations with white noise
does not affect posterior beliefs.
Lemma OA.11. For every ω¯ ∈ Ω¯ and N ∈ N, m˜HN(ω¯) = m˜XYN (ω¯).
Proof. Suppose ω¯ = ((x1,n, x2,n)∞n=1, (zn)∞n=1) ∈ Ω× (R∞)K . The noise-added dataset of size
N is (x1,n, yn)Nn=1 where y(k)n = z(k)n for each n, k where x
(k)
1,n ≥ c(k)† , and y(k)n = x(k)2,n for each
n, k where x(k)1,n < c
(k)
† . The history dataset of size N is (hn)Nn=1, where h(k)n = (x
(k)
1,n,∅) for
each n, k where x(k)1,n ≥ c(k)† , and h(k)n = (x(k)1,n, x(k)2,n) for each n, k where x(k)1,n < c(k)† .
The likelihood of the noise-added dataset under parameters µ1, µ2 is:
K∏
k=1

(
N∏
n=1
φ(x(k)1,n;µ1, σ2)
)
·
 ∏
n:x(k)n ≤c(k)†
φ(y(k)n ;µ2 − γ(x(k)1,n − µ1), σ2)
 ·
 ∏
n:x(k)n ≥c(k)†
φ(y(k)n ; 1, 0)


The likelihood of the history dataset under parameters µ1, µ2 is:
K∏
k=1

(
N∏
n=1
φ(x(k)1,n;µ1, σ2)
)
·
 ∏
n:x(k)n ≤c(k)†
φ(y(k)n ;µ2 − γ(x(k)1,n − µ1), σ2)


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So, these likelihoods are equal up to a multiple of ∏Kk=1 (∏n:x(k)n ≥c(k)† φ(y(k)n ; 1, 0)
)
, which is
common across all parameters (µ1, µ2). So the posterior likelihood of parameters µ1, µ2 must
be the same under both m˜HN and m˜XYN , that is m˜HN(ω¯) = m˜XYN (ω¯).
On the expanded probability space, inference from history dataset and inference from
noise-added dataset give the same posterior beliefs everywhere. If m˜XYN converges in L1 to
dogmatic belief on (µ•1, µ∗2(c†)) P¯-a.s., then m˜HN also converges in L1 to the same belief P¯-a.s.
Further, by relationship between the expanded probability space and the original probability
space, this would also show that m˜N converges in L1 to dogmatic belief on (µ•1, µ∗2(c†)) P-a.s.,
which proves Proposition OA.3. Therefore, to prove Proposition OA.3 one just needs the
following on the expanded probability space.
Lemma OA.12. m˜XYN converges in L1 to the dogmatic belief on (µ•1, µ∗2(c†)) P¯-a.s.
Proof. First, I write down the KL divergence objective in the noise-added observation struc-
ture and show its minimizers are exactly the large-generations pseudo-true fundamentals.
Each observation (X(k)1,n, Y (k)n )Kk=1 is an element of R(2K), whose distribution is given by a
K densities over K copies of R2. For 1 ≤ k ≤ K, the k-th such density is
f •,(k)(x, y) =
φ(x;µ
•
1, σ
2) · φ(y;µ•2, σ2) if x < c(k)†
φ(x;µ•1, σ2) · φ(y; 0, 1) if x ≥ c(k)† .
Under the fundamentals (µ1, µ2) ∈ R2, the agent thinks the observations are distributed
according to the product of K densities where the k-th density is
f
(k)
µˆ1,µˆ2(x, y) =
φ(x; µˆ1, σ
2) · φ(y; µˆ2 − γ · (x− µˆ1), σ2) if x < c(k)†
φ(x; µˆ1, σ2) · φ(y; 0, 1) if x ≥ c(k)† .
The log likelihood ratio of an observation (x, y) = (x(k)1 , y(k))Kk=1 ∈ R2K is
ln
 K∏
k=1
f •,(k)(x(k)1 , y(k))
f
(k)
µˆ1,µˆ2(x
(k)
1 , y
(k))
 = K∑
k=1
ln
 f •,(k)(x(k)1 , y(k))
f
(k)
µˆ1,µˆ2(x
(k)
1 , y
(k))
 .
So KL divergence is defined as
∫
R2K
 K∑
k=1
ln
 f •,(k)(x(k)1 , y(k))
f
(k)
µˆ1,µˆ2(x
(k)
1 , y
(k))
 · ( K∏
k=1
f •,(k)(x(k)1 , y(k))
)
d(x, y)
=
K∑
k=1
∫
R2K
ln
 f •,(k)(x(k)1 , y(k))
f
(k)
µˆ1,µˆ2(x
(k)
1 , y
(k))
 ·
 K∏
j=1
f •,(j)(x(j)1 , y(j))
 d(x, y).
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But for each k, the integrand f
•,(k)(x(k)1 ,y(k))
f
(k)
µˆ1,µˆ2
(x(k)1 ,y(k))
only depends on (x, y) ∈ R2K through two of its
coordinates, x(k)1 and y(k). In addition, the density
∏K
j=1 f
•,(j)(x(j)1 , y(j)) is a product density,
so in fact the k-th summand is just
∫
R2
ln
 f •,(k)(x(k)1 , y(k))
f
(k)
µˆ1,µˆ2(x
(k)
1 , y
(k))
 · f •,(k)(x(k)1 , y(k))d(x(k)1 , y(k)).
This expression is, up to a constant not depending on µˆ1, µˆ2 (due to the white noise term),
equal to the KL divergence between H•(c(k)† ) and H(Ψ(µˆ1, µˆ2; γ); c(k)† ). Therefore the overall
KL divergence is off by a constant from
K∑
k=1
DKL( H•(c(k)† ) || H(Ψ(µˆ1, µˆ2; γ); c(k)† ) ),
the objective defining large-generations pseudo-true fundamentals in Equation (1).
To finish the proof, Bunke and Milhaud (1998) show that provided the true density f •
and the family of subjective densities {fµˆ1,µˆ2 : µˆ1, µˆ2 ∈ R} satisfy a number of conditions,
then m˜XYN P¯-a.s. converges to its KL-divergence minimizers in L1, which I have shown to be
exactly (µ•1, µ∗2(c†)). I now check the conditions of Bunke and Milhaud (1998) for the case of
K = 1, so both f • and fµˆ1,µˆ2 are densities on R2. Checking the conditions for larger K is
exactly analogous, because both f • and fµˆ1,µˆ2 can be separated as the product of K densities
on R2.
From the hypothesis on m0’s magnitude being bounded, there is some B < ∞ so that
0 < m0(µ1, µ2) < B for all µ1, µ2 ∈ R. The parameter space is Θ = R2. The data-generating
density of observation (x, y) is:
f •(x, y) =
φ(x;µ
•
1, σ
2) · φ(y;µ•2, σ2) if x < c†
φ(x;µ•1, σ2) · φ(y; 0, 1) if x ≥ c†
where φ(·;µ, σ2) is the Gaussian density with mean µ and variance σ2. Under the feasible
model Ψ(µˆ1, µˆ2; γ), the same observation has density:
fµˆ1,µˆ2(x, y) =
φ(x; µˆ1, σ
2) · φ(y; µˆ2 − γ · (x− µˆ1), σ2) if x < c†
φ(x; µˆ1, σ2) · φ(y; 0, 1) if x ≥ c†.
A1. Parameter space is a closed, convex set in R2 with nonempty interior. The density
fµˆ1,µˆ2(x, y) is bounded over (µˆ1, µˆ2, x, y) and its carrier, {(x, y) : fµˆ1,µˆ2(x, y) > 0} is the same
for all µˆ1, µˆ2.
Evidently R2 is closed in itself. The density fµˆ1,µˆ2(x, y) is bounded by the product of
the modes of Gaussian densities with variance σ2 and variance 1. The density fµˆ1,µˆ2(x, y) is
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strictly positive on R2 for any parameter values µˆ1, µˆ2.
A2. For all µˆ1, µˆ2, there is a sphere S[(µˆ1, µˆ2), η] of center (µˆ1, µˆ2) and radius η > 0 such
that:
Ef•
 sup
(µ′1,µ
′
2)∈S[(µˆ1,µˆ2),η]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln f
•(X, Y )
fµ′1,µ
′
2
(X, Y )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 <∞.
Pick say η = 1. Consider the rectangle R[(µˆ1, µˆ2), η] consisting of points (µ
′
1, µ
′
2) such that
|µ′1− µˆ1| < η and |µ′2− µˆ2| < η. Since the the Gaussian distribution is single-peaked, for any
(x, y) ∈ R2 the absolute value of the log likelihood ratio
∣∣∣∣∣ln f•(X,Y )fµ′1,µ′2 (X,Y )
∣∣∣∣∣ on all of R[(µˆ1, µˆ2), η]
must be bounded by its value at the 4 corners. That is to say,
sup
(µ′1,µ
′
2)∈S[(µˆ1,µˆ2),η]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln f
•(X, Y )
fµ′1,µ
′
2
(X, Y )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
(µ′1,µ
′
2)∈R[(µˆ1,µˆ2),η]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln f
•(X, Y )
fµ′1,µ
′
2
(X, Y )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣ln f •(X, Y )fµˆ1−η,µˆ2−η(X, Y )
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ln f •(X, Y )fµˆ1−η,µˆ2+η(X, Y )
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ln f •(X, Y )fµˆ1+η,µˆ2−η(X, Y )
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ln f •(X, Y )fµˆ1+η,µˆ2+η(X, Y )
∣∣∣∣∣ .
It is easy to see that for any fixed parameter Ef•
[∣∣∣∣∣ln f•(X,Y )fµ′1,µ′2 (X,Y )
∣∣∣∣∣
]
is finite, so the sum of these
4 terms gives a finite upper bound.
A3. For all fixed (x0, y0) ∈ R2, the map from parameters to density (µ1, µ2) 7→ fµ1,µ2(x0, y0)
has continuous derivatives with respect to parameters (µ1, µ2) 7→ ∂f∂µ1 (x0, y0;µ1, µ2), (µ1, µ2) 7→
∂f
∂µ2
(x, y;µ1, µ2). There exist positive constants κ0 and b0 with
∫ ∫ ∥∥∥∥∥∥[fµ1,µ2(x, y)]−1 ·
 ∂f∂µ1 (x, y;µ1, µ2)
∂f
∂µ2
(x, y;µ1, µ2)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
12
· fµ1,µ2(x, y) · dydx < κ0(1 + ||(µ1, µ2)||b0)
satisfied for every (µ1, µ2) ∈ R2, where || · || is a norm on R2.
Let’s choose the max norm, ||v|| = max(|v1|, |v2|). For uncensored data (x0, y0) with
x0 < c†, we can compute
∂f
∂µ1
(x0, y0;µ1, µ2) = fµ1,µ2(x0, y0) ·
[
(1 + γ2)
σ2
· (x− µ1) + γ
σ2
· (y − µ2)
]
and
∂f
∂µ2
(x0, y0;µ1, µ2) = fµ1,µ2(x0, y0) ·
[
γ
σ2
· (x− µ1)− 1
σ2
· (y − µ2)
]
.
While for censored data (x0, y0) where x0 > c†, the likelihood of the data is unchanged
by parameter µ2 since it neither changes the distribution of the early draw quality nor the
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distribution of the white noise term, meaning ∂f
∂µ2
(x0, y0;µ1, µ2) = 0. Also, for the censored
case
∂f
∂µ1
(x0, y0;µ1, µ2) = fµ1,µ2(x0, y0) ·
1
σ2
(x− µ1).
This means the integral to be bounded is:
∫ x=c†
x=−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
∥∥∥∥∥∥
 (1+γ2)σ2 · (x− µ1) + γσ2 · (y − µ2)
γ
σ2 · (x− µ1)− 1σ2 · (y − µ2)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
12
· fµ1,µ2(x, y) · dy
 dx
+
∫ x=∞
x=c†
[∫ ∞
−∞
( 1
σ2
(x− µ1))12 · fµ1,µ2(x, y) · dy
]
dx.
Since the inner integrals are non-negative, this expression is smaller than the version where
the domains of the outer integrals are expanded and the densities fµ1,µ2(x, y) are simply
replaced with the joint density on R2 of the feasible model for Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ), which I denote
as f˜µ1,µ2(x, y).
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
∥∥∥∥∥∥
 (1+γ2)σ2 · (x− µ1) + γσ2 · (y − µ2)
γ
σ2 · (x− µ1)− 1σ2 · (y − µ2)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
12
· f˜µ1,µ2(x, y) · dy
 dx
+
∫ ∞
−∞
[∫ ∞
−∞
( 1
σ2
(x− µ1))12 · f˜µ1,µ2(x, y) · dy
]
dx.
The second summand is a 12th moment of the joint normal random variable with distribution
Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ), so for all µ1, µ2 it is given by some 12th order polynomial P2(µ1, µ2). Similarly
the first summand is also given by a 12th order polynomial P1(µ1, µ2). Therefore by choosing
b0 = 12 and choosing κ0 appropriately according to the coefficients in P1 and P2, we achieved
the desired bound.
A4. For some positive constants b1 and κ1, the affinity function
A(µ1, µ2) :=
∫ ∫
[fµ1,µ2(x, y) · f •(x, y)]1/2dydx
satisfies A(µ1, µ2) < κ1 · ||(µ1, µ2)||−b1 for all µ1, µ2.
We have A(µ1, µ2) ≤ [∫ ∫ [fµ1,µ2(x, y) · f •(x, y)]dydx]1/2, so it’s sufficient to find some κ1
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and b1 that works to bound
∫ ∫
[fµ1,µ2(x, y) · f •(x, y)]dydx. We have:∫ ∫
[fµ1,µ2(x, y) · f •(x, y)]dydx
=
∫ c†
x=−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x;µ1, σ2) · φ(x;µ•1, σ2) · φ(y;µ2 − γ(x− µ1), σ2) · φ(y;µ•2, σ2)dydx
+
∫ ∞
x=c†
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x;µ1, σ2) · φ(x;µ•1, σ2) · φ(y; 0, 1) · φ(y; 0, 1)dydx
≤
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x;µ1, σ2) · φ(x;µ•1, σ2) · φ(y;µ2 − γ(x− µ1), σ2) · φ(y;µ•2, σ2)dydx
+
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x;µ1, σ2) · φ(x;µ•1, σ2) · φ(y; 0, 1) · φ(y; 0, 1)dydx.
I show how to find κ1 and b1 to bound the first summand in the last expression above. It is
easy to similarly bound the second summand. By Bromiley (2018), the product of Gaussian
densities φ(y;µ20−γ(x−µ1), σ2)·φ(y;µ•2, σ2) is itself a Gaussian density in y, φ˜(y), multiplied
by a scaling factor equal to (4piσ2)−1/2 · exp
(
− γ24σ2 · [x− (µ1 − µ
•
2
γ
+ µ2
γ
)]2
)
. So we have
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x;µ1, σ2) · φ(x;µ•1, σ2) · φ(y;µ2 − γ(x− µ1), σ2) · φ(y;µ•2, σ2)dydx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x;µ1, σ2) · φ(x;µ•1, σ2) ·
(
4piσ2
)−1/2 · exp(− γ24σ2 · [x− (µ1 − µ
•
2
γ
+ µ2
γ
)]2
)
·
∫ ∞
−∞
·φ˜(y)dydx
=
(
4piσ2
)−1/2 · ∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x;µ1, σ2) · φ(x;µ•1, σ2) · exp
(
− γ
2
4σ2 · [x− (µ1 −
µ•2
γ
+ µ2
γ
)]2
)
· dx.
Again applying Bromiley (2018), product of the two Gaussian densities φ(x;µ1, σ2)·φ(x;µ•1, σ2)
is another Gaussian density with mean µ
•
1+µ1
2 , variance
σ2
2 , and multiplied to a scaling factor
of (4piσ2)−1/2 exp
(
− (µ1−µ•1)24σ2
)
. So above expression is:
K1 · exp
(
−(µ1 − µ
•
1)2
4σ2
)
·
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x; µ
•
1 + µ1
2 ,
σ2
2 ) · exp
(
− γ
2
4σ2 · [x− (µ1 −
µ•2
γ
+ µ2
γ
)]2
)
dx
where K1 is a constant not dependent on µ1, µ2. Also, we may write
exp
(
− γ
2
4σ2 · [x− (µ1 −
µ•2
γ
+ µ2
γ
)]2
)
= K2 · φ(x; (µ1 − µ
•
2
γ
+ µ2
γ
), σ2B)
where σ2B = 2σ
2
γ2 and K2 = (2piσ
2
B)1/2. Applying Bromiley (2018) one final time, the product
φ(x; µ
•
1+µ1
2 ,
σ2
2 ) · φ(x; (µ1 − µ
•
2
γ
+ µ2
γ
), σ2B) is a Gaussian density in x scaled by K4 exp(−K3 ·
(µ
•
1−µ1
2 − µ2−µ
•
2
γ
)2) where K3, K4 > 0 are constants not dependent on µ1, µ2. So altogether,
the second summand we are bounding is a constant multiple of exp
(
− (µ1−µ•1)24σ2
)
· exp(−K3 ·
(µ
•
1−µ1
2 − µ2−µ
•
2
γ
)2). For |µ1| ≥ |µ2|, the max norm ||(µ1, µ2)|| = |µ1| and exp
(
− (µ1−µ•1)24σ2
)
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decreases exponentially fast in the norm. For |µ1| < |µ2|, and |µ2|2 − |µ
•
1|
2 +
|µ•2|
γ
> 0,
exp(−K3 · (µ
•
1 − µ1
2 −
µ2 − µ•2
γ
)2) ≤ exp(−K3 · ( |µ2|2 −
|µ•1|
2 +
|µ•2|
γ
)2).
So for large enough |µ2|, exp(−K3 · (µ
•
1−µ1
2 − µ2−µ
•
2
γ
)2) will decrease exponentially fast in the
norm. These two facts imply that there is some K > 0 so that whenever ||(µ1, µ2)|| > K,∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x;µ1, σ2) · φ(x;µ•1, σ2) · φ(y;µ2 − γ(x− µ1), σ2) · φ(y;µ•2, σ2)dydx < ||(µ1, µ2)||−1.
Now put κ1 = K−1 and we can ensure for any value of ||(µ1, µ2)|| we will have∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x;µ1, σ2)·φ(x;µ•1, σ2)·φ(y;µ2−γ(x−µ1), σ2)·φ(y;µ•2, σ2)dydx < κ1 ·||(µ1, µ2)||−1.
A5. There are positive constants b2, b3 so that for all (µ
′
1, µ
′
2) and r > 0 it holds that
m0(S[(µ
′
1, µ
′
2), r]) ≤ crb2(1 + (||(µ′1, µ′2)|| + r)b3). Moreover, g assigns positive mass to every
sphere with positive radius.
Since we have assumed that density g is bounded by B, the prior mass assigned to the
sphere S[(µ′1, µ
′
2), r] is bounded by B2 times its Euclidean volume. So, take b2 = 2 and
c = piB2 and the first statement is satisfied. Since we have assumed that m0 is strictly
positive everywhere, the second statement is satisfied.
OA 4.3 Behavior after Observing Large Samples
Next, I turn to the convergence of expected payoffs for different cutoff strategies as sample
size grows large. For any c ∈ R and N ∈ N, let UN(c) := E(µ1,µ2)∼m˜N [U(c;µ1, µ2, γ)] where
U(c;µ1, µ2, γ) is the expected payoff of using the stopping strategy Sc when (X1, X2) ∼
Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ). Note that UN(c) is a real-valued random variable representing the agent’s sub-
jective expected payoff for the stopping strategy Sc, under the (random) non-degenerate
posterior belief after observing a sample of size N . Proposition OA.4 shows that UN(c)
converges almost surely to the subjective expected payoff of Sc with a dogmatic belief in
the pseudo-true fundamentals, provided the payoff functions u1, u2 of the optimal-stopping
problem are Lipschitz continuous. Furthermore, this convergence is uniform across all cutoff
thresholds.
Proposition OA.4. Suppose there are constants K1, K2 > 0 so that |u1(x′1) − u1(x′′1)| <
K1 ·|x′1−x′′1 | and |u2(x′1, x′2)−u2(x′′1 , x′′2)| < K2 ·(|x′1−x′′1 |+|x′2−x′′2 |) for all x′1, x′′1 , x′2, x′′2 ∈ R.
Then limN→∞ supc∈R |UN(c)− U(c;µ•1, µ∗2(c†))| = 0 almost surely.
The Lipschitz continuity conditions are satisfied in the search problem (Example 1) for
any q ∈ [0, 1). The Lipschitz condition implies the difference between expected payoffs of
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Sc under the posterior belief m˜N and the dogmatic belief on the pseudo-true fundamental
is bounded by a constant multiple of the L1 distance between m˜N and the pseudo-true
fundamentals, and furthermore this bound is uniform across all c. Proposition OA.4 then
follows from the L1 convergence in beliefs given by Proposition OA.3.
Towards a proof of Proposition OA.4, I start with a lemma that shows when the optimal-
stopping problem’s payoff functions u1, u2 are Lipschitz continuous, then (µ1, µ2) 7→ U(c;µ1, µ2),
the expected payoff of the stopping strategy Sc under the feasible model Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ), is lo-
cally Lipschitz continuous in (µ1, µ2).
Lemma OA.13. Suppose there are constants K1, K2 > 0 so that |u1(x′1) − u1(x′′1)| < K1 ·
|x′1 − x′′1 | and |u2(x′1, x′2)− u2(x′′1 , x′′2)| < K2 · (|x′1 − x′′1 |+ |x′2 − x′′2 |) for all x′1, x′′1 , x′2, x′′2 ∈ R.
For each center (µ◦1, µ◦2) ∈ R2, there corresponds a constant K > 0 so that for any µ1, µ2 ∈ R
and any c′ ∈ R, |U(c;µ1, µ2)− U(c;µ◦1, µ◦2)| < K · (|µ1 − µ◦1|+ |µ2 − µ◦2|).
Proof. Let (µ◦1, µ◦2) ∈ R2 be given. For any µ1, µ2, c ∈ R, we have
U(c;µ1, µ2) =
∫ ∞
c
u1(x1)φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1
+
∫ c
−∞
[∫ ∞
−∞
u2(x1, x2)φ(x2;µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1), σ2)dx2
]
· φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1.
We first bound | ∫∞c u1(x1)φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1 − ∫∞c u1(x1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1| by a multiple of
|µ1 − µ◦1|. Suppose first µ1 = µ◦1 + ∆ for some ∆ > 0. We have∫ ∞
c
u1(x1)φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1 =
∫ ∞
c−∆
u1(x1 + ∆)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1.
By Lipschitz continuity of u1, |u1(x1)−u1(x1 +∆)| ≤ K1∆ for all x1 ∈ R. Thus we conclude∣∣∣∣∫ ∞
c
u1(x1)φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1 −
∫ ∞
c
u1(x1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ K1∆ + ∣∣∣∣∫ c
c−∆
u1(x1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1
∣∣∣∣ .
Again by Lipschitz continuity of u1, for any x1 ∈ R,
|u1(x1)φ(x1;µ1, σ2)| ≤ (|u1(0)|+K1|x1|) · φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2).
Since the Gaussian density decreases to 0 exponentially fast as x1 → ±∞, the RHS is
uniformly bounded for all x1 ∈ R by some constant, say J1 > 0. (Note that the RHS is not
a function of c, so J1 does not depend on c.) This shows that∣∣∣∣∫ c
c−∆
u1(x1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ c
c−∆
|u1(x1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)|dx1 ≤
∫ c
c−∆
J1dx1 = J1∆.
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So altogether,
|
∫ ∞
c
u1(x1)φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1 −
∫ ∞
c
u1(x1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1| ≤ (K1 + J1)∆.
If instead µ1 = µ◦1 −∆, then a similar argument shows that
|
∫ ∞
c
u1(x1)φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1 −
∫ ∞
c
u1(x1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1| ≤ K1∆ + |
∫ c+∆
c
u1(x1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1|,
and again we may bound the second term by J1∆ as before.
We now turn to bounding the difference in the second summand making up U(c;µ1, µ2).
First consider the case where µ2 = µ◦2. For each x1 ∈ R, let I(x1;µ1) :=
∫∞
−∞ u2(x1, x2)φ(x2;µ◦2−
γ(x1 − µ1), σ2)dx2, the expected continuation utility after X1 = x1, in the feasible model
Ψ(µ1, µ◦2; γ). The second summand in U(c;µ1, µ2) is given by
∫ c
−∞ I(x1;µ1)φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1.
For x′′1 = x
′
1 + d1, µ
′′
1 = µ
′
1 + d2, we have
I(x′′1 ;µ
′′
1) =
∫ ∞
−∞
u2(x
′′
1 , x2)φ(x2;µ◦2 − γ(x
′′
1 − µ
′′
1), σ2)dx2
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u2(x
′
1 + d1, x2 − γ(d1 − d2))φ(x2;µ◦2 − γ(x
′
1 − µ
′
1), σ2)dx2.
Lipschitz continuity of u2 implies that
|u2(x′1 + d1, x2 − γ(d1 − d2))− u2(x
′
1, x2)| ≤ K2((1 + γ) · |d1|+ γ|d2|)
≤ K2(1 + γ) · (|d1|+ |d2|),
which shows |I(x′′1 ;µ′′1)−I(x′1;µ′1)| ≤ K2(1+γ) · (|x′1−x′′1 |+ |x′2−x′′2 |). That is, I is Lipschitz
continuous.
Suppose µ1 = µ◦1 + ∆ for some ∆ > 0. Similar to the above argument bounding the first
summand in (c;µ1, µ2), we have∫ c
−∞
I(x1;µ1)φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1 =
∫ c−∆
−∞
I(x1 + ∆;µ◦1 + ∆)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1.
By Lipschitz continuity of I, |I(x1;µ◦1)− I(x1 + ∆;µ◦1 + ∆)| ≤ 2K2(1 + γ)∆ for all x1 ∈ R.
Thus we conclude
|
∫ c
−∞
I(x1;µ1)φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1 −
∫ c
−∞
I(x1;µ◦1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1|
≤ 2K2(1 + γ)∆ + |
∫ c
c−∆
I(x1;µ◦1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1|.
Since x1 7→ I(x1;µ◦1) is Lipschitz continuous, there exists J2 > 0 so that |I(x1;µ◦1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)| ≤
J2 for all x1 ∈ R, which means | ∫ cc−∆ I(x1;µ◦1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1| ≤ J2∆. (Once again, J2 does
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not depend on c.) The case of µ1 = µ◦1 −∆ is symmetric and we have shown that
|
∫ c
−∞
I(x1;µ1)φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1 − I(x1;µ◦1)φ(x1;µ◦1, σ2)dx1| ≤ (2K2(1 + γ) + J2) · |µ1 − µ◦1|.
Finally, we investigate the difference in the second summand of U(c;µ1, µ2) between param-
eters (µ1, µ◦2) and (µ1, µ2) for µ1, µ2 ∈ R. This difference is bounded by∫ c
−∞
∣∣∣∣∫ ∞−∞ u2(x1, x2)φ(x2;µ◦2 − γ(x1 − µ1), σ2)dx2 −
∫ ∞
−∞
u2(x1, x2)φ(x2;µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1), σ2)dx2
∣∣∣∣φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1.
(3)
But for every x1 ∈ R,∫ ∞
−∞
u2(x1, x2)φ(x2;µ2−γ(x1−µ1), σ2)dx2 =
∫ ∞
−∞
u2(x1, x2+(µ2−µ◦2))φ(x2;µ◦2−γ(x1−µ1), σ2)dx2,
and |u2(x1, x2 + (µ2 − µ◦2)) − u2(x1, x2)| ≤ K2|µ2 − µ◦2| by Lipschitz continuity of u2. This
shows that, for all values µ1, µ2 ∈ R, (3) is bounded by K2|µ2 − µ◦2|.
Applying the triangle inequality to the second term, we conclude that
|U(c;µ1, µ2)−U(c;µ◦1, µ◦2)| ≤ (K1 +J1)|µ1−µ◦1|+ (2K2(1 + γ) +J2) · |µ1−µ◦1|+K2|µ2−µ◦2|.
So we see that setting K = K1 + J1 + (2K2(1 + γ) + J2 establishes the lemma.
Now I prove Proposition OA.4.
Proof. Let µ◦1 = µ•1, µ◦2 = µ∗2(c†). Lemma OA.13 implies there is a constant K > 0, indepen-
dent of c, so that |U(c;µ1, µ2)−U(c;µ◦1, µ◦2)| ≤ K · (|µ1−µ◦1|+ |µ2−µ◦2|) for all µ1, µ2, c ∈ R.
So for ν a joint distribution about the fundamentals (µ1, µ2), we get
|E(µ1,µ2)∼ν [U(c;µ1, µ2)− U(c;µ◦1, µ◦2)] | ≤ E(µ1,µ2)∼ν [|U(c;µ1, µ2)− U(c;µ◦1, µ◦2)|]
≤ K · E(µ1,µ2)∼ν [|µ1 − µ◦1|+ |µ2 − µ◦2|]
for every c ∈ R, therefore we also get the uniform bound,
sup
c∈R
|E(µ1,µ2)∼ν [U(c;µ1, µ2)]− U(c;µ◦1, µ◦2)| ≤ K · E(µ1,µ2)∼ν [|µ1 − µ◦1|+ |µ2 − µ◦2|].
By Proposition OA.3, almost surely
lim
T→∞
E(µ1,µ2)∼m˜T [|µ1 − µ◦1|+ |µ2 − µ◦2|] = 0.
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But along any ω ∈ Ω where the above limit holds,
lim
T→∞
sup
c∈R
|UT (c)− U(c;µ◦1, µ◦2)| ≤ lim
T→∞
K · E(µ1,µ2)∼m˜T [|µ1 − µ◦1|+ |µ2 − µ◦2|]
= 0.
This shows that P-a.s., UT (c) converges to U(c;µ∗1(c†), µ∗2(c†)) uniformly across all c as T →
∞.
To reach my main result on convergence of behavior, suppose the agent chooses a cutoff
threshold after observing N histories (hn)n≤N . The choices are given by the functions C˜N :
HN → R, so the cutoff after a sample of size N is a random variable CN that depends on
the first N pairs of potential draws (Xn)n≤N .
Definition OA.4. Cutoff choice functions (C˜N) are asymptotically myopic in N if
lim sup
N→∞
{
sup
c∈R
UN(c)− UN(C˜N)
}
= 0
almost surely.
A simple example is that C˜N chooses a cutoff whose expected payoff differs from supc∈R UN(c)
by no more than 1/N after every sample of size N .
Proposition OA.5. Let c∗ = C(µ•1, µ∗2(c†); γ). Suppose cutoffs CN are generated using
asymptotically myopic cutoff choice functions. Almost surely, CN → c∗ as N →∞.
The expected payoff of different cutoff strategies under the pseudo-true fundamentals,
c 7→ U(c;µ•1, µ∗2(c†)), is single peaked and maximized at c∗. Therefore cutoffs outside an
open ball around c∗ have expected payoffs bounded away from the subjectively optimal
payoff under the model Ψ(µ•1, µ∗2(c†); γ).
Lemma OA.14. For each µ1, µ2 ∈ R, let c∗ be the subjectively optimal cutoff threshold
under Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ). For every  > 0, there exists δ > 0 so that whenever |c− c∗| ≥ , we have
U(c;µ1, µ2) ≤ U(c∗;µ1, µ2)− δ.
Proof. First, I show c 7→ U(c;µ1, µ2) is single peaked: it is strictly increasing up to c = c∗,
then strictly decreasing afterwards. Recall the cutoff form of the best stopping strategy
comes from the fact that u1(x1) < EΨ(µ1,µ2;γ)[u2(x1, X2)|X1 = x1] for x1 < c∗, but u1(x1) <
EΨ(µ1,µ2;γ)[u2(x1, X2)|X1 = x1] for x1 > c∗. For two cutoffs c1 < c2 < c∗, the two stopping
strategies Sc1 , Sc2 only differ in how they treat first-period draws in the interval [c1, c2], so
we can write the difference in their expected payoffs as∫ c2
c1
(
EΨ(µ1,µ2;γ)[u2(x1, X2)|X1 = x1]− u1(x1)
)
φ(x1;µ1, σ2)dx1.
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The integrand is strictly positive on [c1, c2], therefore U(c1;µ1, µ2) < U(c2;µ1, µ2). This
shows U(·;µ1, µ2) is strictly increasing up until c∗; a symmetric argument shows it is strictly
decreasing after c∗.
For a given  > 0, let δ = U(c∗;µ1, µ2) −max(U(c∗ − ;µ1, µ2), U(c∗ + ;µ1, µ2)), where
δ > 0 as both cutoffs c∗ −  and c∗ +  must have a strictly positive loss relative to c∗. Since
U(·;µ1, µ2) is single peaked, every c more than  away from c∗ must have a loss relative to c∗
at least as much as the loss of either c∗ −  or c∗ + , so U(c∗;µ1, µ2)− U(c;µ1, µ2) ≥ δ.
This fact, combined with the uniform convergence UN(c) from Proposition OA.4, estab-
lishes Proposition OA.5.
Proof. Consider any sample path ω = (xn)∞n=1 where the conclusion of Proposition OA.4
holds and the cutoff choice functions are asymptotically myopic. For every  > 0, find
δ > 0 as in Lemma OA.14 with µ1 = µ•1, µ2 = µ∗2(c†), and find large enough N¯1 so that
supc∈R |UN(c)(ω)− U(c;µ•1, µ∗2(c†))| < δ/3 for all N ≥ N¯1. This means for N ≥ N¯1,
sup
c∈R
UN(c)(ω) ≥ UN(c∗)(ω) ≥ U(c∗;µ•1, µ∗2(c†))− δ/3,
while
UN(c
′)(ω) ≤ U(c∗;µ•1, µ∗2(c†))− (2δ)/3
for c′ /∈ [c∗ − , c∗ + ]. Find N¯2 so that for N ≥ N¯2, supc∈R UN(c)(ω) − UN(CN)(ω) < δ/3.
This shows for N ≥ max(N¯1, N¯2), CN(ω) ∈ [c∗ − , c∗ + ]. Since  > 0 was arbitrary, this
shows CN(ω)→ c∗.
Therefore, we conclude CN → c∗ along any sample path ω where the conclusion of
Proposition OA.4 holds and the cutoff choice functions are asymptotically myopic. Since
these two events both happen almost surely, CN → c∗ almost surely.
OA 5 Misspecified Inference under Method of Moments
In the analysis so far, I have modeled the learners as misspecified Bayesians. In this sec-
tion, I consider agents who use a method-of-moments (MOM) procedure as a simpler but
natural alternative to Bayesian inference. Proposition OA.7 and Corollary OA.2 show that
over-pessimism and the positive-feedback loop remain robust to this relaxation of Bayesian
inference.
OA 5.1 Feasible Models for (X1, X2)
Each agent starts with a set of feasible models {F (·; θ1, θ2) : θ1 ∈ Θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ2} for the
joint distribution of (X1, X2), indexed by feasible fundamentals Θ1 × Θ2 ⊆ R2. For each
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(θ1θ2), F (·; θ1, θ2) is a full-support measure on the rectangle I1 × I2, where each I1, I2 is a
possibly infinite interval of R. By “full-support” I mean that for every open ball B ⊆ I1×I2,
F (B; θ1, θ2) > 0.
For each joint distribution F (·; θ1, θ2), let F1(·; θ1, θ2) denote its marginal on I1, and let
F2|1(·|θ1, θ2;x1) denote its conditional distribution on I2 given X1 = x1. I will make the
following assumptions on the family of feasible models:
Assumption OA.1. The feasible models {F (·; θ1, θ2) : θ1 ∈ Θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ2} satisfy :
(a) F1(·; θ1, θ2) is only a function of θ1 and EF1(·;θ1,θ2)[X1] is strictly increasing in θ1.
(b) For each x1 ∈ I1 and θ1 ∈ Θ1, EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x1)[X2] strictly increases in θ2.
(c) For any θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2, EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x1)[X2] strictly decreases in x1.
In light of Assumption OA.1(a), the marginal distribution on X1 can be just written
as F1(·; θ1), omitting θ2. Assumption OA.1(c) is the substantive assumption capturing the
gambler’s fallacy psychology. Every subjective distribution in the family is such that the
agent predicts a lower mean for X2 after a higher realization of X1. The behavioral economics
literature has not settled on a general definition of the gambler’s fallacy that works under
all distributional assumptions, but Assumption OA.1(c) seems like a reasonable first step.
Note that this is a generalization of how I model the gambler’s fallacy in the main text using
a pair of symmetric, log-concave distributions.
Here are some examples satisfying these assumptions. The first example concerns the
Gaussian case from Example 2.
Example OA.1. Let I1 = I2 = R and let Θ1 = Θ2 = R. Fixing some σ2 > 0, γ > 0, let
F (·; θ1, θ2) be such that X1 ∼ N (θ1, σ2) and X2 | (X1 = x1) ∼ N (θ2 − γ(x1 − θ1), σ2). The
marginal distribution on X1 does not depend on θ2. Its mean is θ1 so it strictly increases in
θ1. The conditional mean of X2|X1 = x1 is is strictly increasing in θ2 and strictly decreasing
in x1 since γ > 0. So all conditions in Assumption OA.1 are satisfied.
The next example features bivariate exponential distributions supported on the half-line
[0,∞).
Example OA.2. Gumbel (1960) proposes the following family of bivariate exponential
distributions, parametrized by α ∈ [−1, 1] : consider a joint distribution with the density
function (x˜1, x˜2) 7→ e−x˜1−x˜2 · [1 + α(2e−x˜1 − 1) · (2e−x˜2 − 1)] for x˜1, x˜2 ≥ 0. If (X˜1, X˜2)
are random variables with this density, then they have full support on [0,∞) × [0,∞) and
each X˜j has the marginal distribution of an exponential random variable with mean 1. The
conditional distribution of X˜2 given a realization of X˜1 is E[X˜2|X˜1 = x˜1] = 1− 12α− αe−x˜1 .
The correlation between X˜1 and X˜2 is α/4.
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Let I1 = I2 = [0,∞) and let Θ1 = Θ2 = (0,∞). Fixing some −1 ≤ α < 0, let F (·; θ1, θ2)
be the joint distribution generated by X1 = θ1 · X˜1 and X2 = θ2 · X˜2 where (X˜1, X˜2) have
the Gumbel bivariate distribution with parameter α. Since (X˜1, X˜2) have full support on
I1 × I2, the same holds for (X1, X2) for any θ1, θ2 > 0. The marginal distribution of X1 is
exponential with a mean of θ1, so Assumption OA.1(a) is satisfied. The conditional mean of
X2|X1 = x1 is given by E[θ2X˜2|θ1X˜1 = x1] = θ2 ·E
[
X˜2|X˜1 = x1θ1
]
= θ2 ·
(
1− 12α− αe−(x1/θ1)
)
.
As α < 0, the term inside the bracket is strictly positive. So this conditional expectation is
strictly increasing in θ2, showing that Assumption OA.1(b) is satisfied. Also, since θ1, θ2 > 0,
x1 7→ −αθ2e−(x1/θ1) is strictly decreasing and so Assumption OA.1(c) is satisfied.
I give a third example where I1 = I2 = [0, 1] are bounded intervals.
Example OA.3. Let Θ1 = Θ2 = (0,∞) and consider the family of distribution F (·; θ1, θ2)
such that under parameters (θ1, θ2), X1 ∼ Beta(θ1, 1) and X2|X1 = x1 ∼ Beta((1−x1)θ2, 1).
For any values of θ1, θ2 > 0, X1 has full support on [0, 1]. Conditional on any x1 ∈ (0, 1), X2
has full support on [0, 1]. This shows the distribution F (·; θ1, θ2) has full-support on [0, 1]2
for every (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ1×Θ2. The mean of X1 is θ1θ1+1 , which only depends on θ1 and is strictly
increasing in it. So Assumption OA.1(a) is satisfied. The conditional mean of X2|X1 = x1
is (1−x1)θ2(1−x1)θ2+1 , which is strictly increasing in θ2 and strictly decreasing in x1. So, Assumptions
OA.1(b) and OA.1(c) are satisfied.
Finally, I give a general class of examples that allows any pair of given marginal distribu-
tions for X1 and X2 to be joined together using a copula as to induce negative dependence
for the joint distribution.
Example OA.4. Consider two families of distribution functions Q1(·; θ1) : I1 → [0, 1],
Q2(·; θ2) : I2 → [0, 1], such Q1 and Q2 are supported on I1, I2 respectively for all θ1 ∈ Θ1
and θ2 ∈ Θ2 . Suppose the mean of Q1 is increasing in θ1, and Q2 is increasing in stochastic
dominance order with respect to θ2. Fix a differentiable copula: that is, a differentiable
function W : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] so that W (u, 0) = W (0, v) = 0, W (u, 1) = u, W (1, v) = v for
all u, v ∈ [0, 1], and so that for u1 ≤ u2, v2 ≤ v2 ∈ [0, 1], we get W (u2, v2) −W (u2, v1) −
W (u1, v2) −W (u1, v1) ≥ 0. Consider the family of distribution functions Q(·; θ1, θ2) on R2
generated by joining together Q1(·; θ1) with Q2(·; θ2) using the copula W, namely
Q((−∞, x1]× (−∞, x2]; θ1, θ2) = W (Q−11 (x1|θ1), Q−12 (x2|θ2)).
Then Q(·; θ1, θ2) has marginal distributions on X1 and X2 given by distribution functions
Q1(·; θ1), Q2(·; θ2). The next lemma shows that when the copula W satisfies u 7→ ∂W∂u (u, v)
is increasing, the resulting joint distribution satisfies the conditions in Assumption OA.1.
Lemma OA.15. Suppose ∂W
∂u
(u, v) is an increasing function in u and that {Q1(·; θ1) : θ1 ∈
Θ1}, {Q2(·; θ2) : θ2 ∈ Θ2} satisfy the conditions of this example. Then, the conditions in
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Assumption OA.1 are satisfied for the family of distributions F (·; θ1, θ2) where F (·; θ1, θ2)
has the distribution function Q(·; θ1, θ2).
Proof. For Assumption OA.1(a), the marginal of F (·; θ1, θ2) on X1 is simply Q1(·; θ1), which
I assumed is strictly increasing in mean with respect to θ1.
For Assumptions OA.1(b), it is well-known that by the copula construction, for all u, v ∈
[0, 1] PF (·;θ1,θ2)[X2 ≤ Q−12 (v; θ1) | X1 = Q−11 (u; θ2)] = ∂W∂u (u, v). This means ∂W∂u (u, v) is
increasing in v. Fixing some x1 ∈ I1 and θ1 ∈ Θ1, put u = Q1(x1; θ1). Now for every θ2 and
x2 ∈ I2, we have PF (·;θ1,θ2)[X2 ≤ x2 | X1 = x1] = ∂W∂u (u,Q−12 (x2; θ2)). Since the family of
marginals Q2(·; θ2) increases in FOSD order as θ2 increases, Q−12 (x2; θ2) is decreasing in θ2.
Since ∂W
∂u
increases in its second argument, PF (·;θ1,θ2)[X2 ≤ x2 | X1 = x1] must then decrease
in θ2, that is to say the conditional distribution X2|X1 = x1 is increasing in FOSD order in
θ2. So in particular Assumption OA.1(b) is satisfied.
For Assumption OA.1(c), again start with the expression
PF (·;θ1,θ2)[X2 ≤ Q−12 (v; θ2) | X1 = Q−11 (u; θ1)] =
∂W
∂u
(u, v).
For x′′1 > x
′
1, put u
′′ = Q1(x
′′
1) > Q1(x
′
1) = u
′
. We have for every v ∈ [0, 1] that
PF (·;θ1,θ2)[X2 ≤ Q−12 (v; θ2) | X1 = x
′
1] =
∂W
∂u
(Q1(x
′
1; θ1), v)
while
PF (·;θ1,θ2)[X2 ≤ Q−12 (v; θ2) | X1 = x
′′
1 ] =
∂W
∂u
(Q1(x
′′
1 ; θ1), v).
Since the distribution function Q1(·; θ1) has full support, Q1(x′′1 ; θ1) > Q1(x′1; θ1). And since
we assumed ∂W
∂u
is increasing in its first argument, we see that PF (·;θ1,θ2)[X2 ≤ x2 | X1 = x1]
is increasing in x1. That is, the conditional distribution X2|X1 = x2 is decreasing in FOSD
order in x1. So Assumption OA.1(c) is satisfied.
Example OA.5. The condition that ∂W
∂u
(u, v) increases in u is satisfied by, for example,
the Gaussian copula with any negative correlation. The derivative of the Gaussian copula
is given by ∂W
∂u
(u, v) = P[X2 ≤ Φ−1(v)|X1 = Φ−1(u)] where Φ is the standard Gaussian
distribution function and (X1, X2) are jointly Gaussian with correlation −1 < ρ < 0 and
each with an unconditional variance of 1. As it is known that X2|X1 = x1 ∼ N (ρx1, 1− ρ2),
it is clear that X2|X1 = x1 decreases in FOSD order as x1 increases, so for any v we have
P[X2 ≤ Φ−1(v)|X1 = Φ−1(u)] increases in u.
OA 5.2 Method of Moments Inference
For a distribution of histories H ∈ ∆(H), let a1[H] represent the average first-period draw
under this distribution and let a2[H] represent the average second-period draw (when un-
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censored). More precisely, a1[H] := Eh∼H[h1], a2[H] := Eh∼H[h2 | h2 6= ∅]. Suppose that
objectively X1, X2 are independent with a joint distribution F •, and denote the true dis-
tribution of histories under censoring by cutoff stopping rule c ∈ R as H•(c). Then by
independence, a1[H•(c)] and a2[H•(c)] do not in fact depend on c.
Given the family of feasible models {F (·; θ1, θ2) : θ1 ∈ Θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ2} about the joint dis-
tribution of (X1, X2), let H(θ1, θ2; c) := H(F (·; θ1, θ2); c) denote the distribution on histories
under the model F (·; θ1, θ2) and censoring cutoff c. I now define the method of moments
estimator.
Definition OA.5. The method-of-moments estimator derived from an infinite dataset of
histories with the distribution H•(c) is any pair (θM1 , θM2 ) ∈ Θ1 ×Θ2 such that:
1. a1[H(θM1 , θM2 ; c)] = a1[H•(c)]
2. a2[H(θM1 , θM2 ; c)] = a2[H•(c)]
I will sometimes write θM1 (c), θM2 (c) to emphasize the dependence of the MOM estimators
on the censoring threshold c. It is easy to check that for the Gaussian case, the MOM
estimators and the pseudo-true fundamentals coincide.
The MOM estimator need not exist — for example, if all values of θ1 ∈ Θ1 generate a
marginal distribution on X1 that is smaller than a1[H•(c)]. However, when it exists, it is
unique under the assumptions I made.
Lemma OA.16. When the family of feasible models satisfies Assumption OA.1, the MOM
estimator is unique when it exists.
Proof. Suppose (θM1 , θM2 ) is an MOM estimator. I show any other MOM estimator (θˆ1, θˆ2)
must be equal to it.
We may rewrite the moments as: a1[H(θM1 , θM2 ; c)] = EF1(·;θ1)[X1], a2[H(θM1 , θM2 ; c)] =
EF (·;θ1,θ2)[X2 | X1 < c].
The unconditional mean of X1, namely EF1(·;θ1)[X1], is strictly increasing in θ1 by As-
sumption OA.1(a). So, at most one value of θ1 ∈ Θ1 can generate an unconditional mean
that matches a1[H•(c)], meaning we must have θˆ1 = θM1 .
Given this unique θM1 , Assumption OA.1(b) implies the conditional mean EF2|1(·;θM1 ,θ2|x1)[X2]
is strictly increasing in θ2 for every x1 < c. The conditional mean EF (·;θM1 ,θ2)[X2|X1 < c] is
given by an integral over EF2|1(·;θM1 ,θ2|x1)[X2] across the values x1 < c, therefore EF (·;θM1 ,θ2)[X2|X1 <
c] is also strictly increasing in θ2. So there is at most one value of θ2 such that a2[H(θM1 , θ2; c)] =
a2[H•(c)], which gives θˆ2 = θM2 .
Now I show the MOM estimators have properties similar to the pseudo-true fundamentals.
First, the estimators are monotonic in c, that is MOM agents end up with more pessimistic
beliefs about the second-period distribution when the dataset is more severely censored. This
a key ingredient for the monotonicity learning dynamics in Theorem 2.
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Proposition OA.6. Suppose Assumption OA.1 holds. Suppose c′ < c′′ are two different
interior values in I1 and that MOM estimators (θM1 (c
′), θM2 (c
′)) and (θM1 (c
′′), θM2 (c
′′)) exist.
Then θM1 (c
′) = θM1 (c
′′) and θM2 (c
′) < θM2 (c
′′).
Proof. Since the marginal distribution of X1 in F (·; θ1, θ2) only depends on θ1 and is strictly
increasing in it, and since a1[H•(c)] does not depend on c, we must have θM1 (c′) = θM1 (c′′). I
denote this common value by θM1 .
In seeking to match the moment a2[H•(c′′)], we may break down the conditioning event
{X1 < c′′} into the union {X1 < c′} ∪ {c′ ≤ X1 < c′′}, so
EF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′′ ))[X2|X1 < c
′′ ] =
PF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′′ ))[X1 < c
′ ]
PF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′′ ))[X1 < c
′′ ] · EF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′′ ))[X2|X1 < c
′ ]·
+
PF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′′ ))[c
′ ≤ X1 < c′′ ]
PF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′′ ))[X1 < c
′′ ] · EF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′′ ))[X2|c
′ ≤ X1 < c′′ ].
Suppose by way of contradiction that θM2 (c
′′) ≤ θM2 (c′). Then since EF2|1(·;θM1 ,θ2|x1)[X2] is
strictly increasing in θ2 for every x1 by Assumption OA.1(b), we get
EF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′′ ))[X2|X1 < c
′ ] ≤ EF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′ ))[X2|X1 < c
′ ] = a2[H•(c′)],
where the equality comes from the second moment condition of the MOM estimator (θM1 (c
′), θM2 (c
′)).
Similarly
EF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′′ ))[X2|c
′ ≤ X1 < c′′ ] ≤ EF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′ ))[X2|c
′ ≤ X1 < c′′ ].
Now EF2|1(·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′ )|x1)[X2] is strictly decreasing in x1 by Assumption OA.1(c), so for every
x1 ∈ [c′ , c′′) the expectation is smaller than for every x1 < c′ . This shows that
EF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′ ))[X2|c
′ ≤ X1 < c′′ ] < EF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′ ))[X2|X1 < c
′ ] = a2[H•(c′)].
Since F (·; θM1 , θM2 (c′′)) has full support on I1 × I2, the probability PF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′′ ))[c
′ ≤ X1 <
c
′′ ] is strictly positive since [c′ , c′′) is an interval in the interior of I1. So we see that
EF (·;θM1 ,θM2 (c′′ ))[X2|X1 < c
′′ ] is a convex combination between a term that is no larger than
a2[H•(c′)] and another term that is strictly smaller than a2[H•(c′)], with strictly positive
weight on the latter. Since a2[H•(c′)] = a2[H•(c′′)], we see that (θM1 (c′′), θM2 (c′′)) cannot
match the second moment condition of a2[H(θM1 (c′′), θM2 (c′′); c′′)] = a2[H•(c′′)], contradic-
tion. Hence we conclude θM2 (c
′′) > θM2 (c
′).
When (θ1, θ2) correspond to the unconditional means, the MOM estimators understate
the X2 mean of the objective distribution F •.
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Proposition OA.7. Suppose parameters (θ1, θ2) index the unconditional X1, X2 means in
all feasible models, that is EF (·;θ1,θ2)[X1] = θ1 and EF (·;θ1,θ2)[X2] = θ2. Suppose c ∈ R and the
MOM estimators θM1 (c), θM2 (c) exist. Let θ•1 = EF • [X1], θ•2 = EF • [X2] be the unconditional
means of the true distribution of draws. Then, θM1 (c) = θ•1, θM2 (c) < θ•2.
Proof. For any θ1 ∈ Θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ2, and c ∈ R, a1[H(θ1, θ2; c)] = θ1 since (θ1, θ2) are assumed to
parametrize means. Also, a2[H(θ1, θ2; c)] = EF (·;θ1,θ2)[X2 | X1 ≤ c] > θ2 = EF (·;θ1,θ2)[X2] due
to Assumption OA.1(c). Finally, and a1[H•(c)] = θ•1, a2[H•(c)] = θ•2 due to independence in
F •.
This means if θM1 , θM2 are the MOM estimators under censoring threshold c, then θM1 = θ•1.
Also, we must have a2[H(θM1 , θM2 ; c)] = θ•2. At the same time we have a2[H(θM1 , θM2 ; c)] > θM2 ,
so this means θM2 < θ•2.
These conclusions show that the ideas behind my main results do not depend on full
Bayesianism. Rather, the crucial assumption is the generalized notion of negative dependence
between X1 and X2, as articulated by Assumption OA.1(c) for arbitrary joint distributions.
As a corollary, I characterize the large-generations learning dynamics for MOM agents
using a general class of feasible models. The key idea is that the positive feedback between
distorted stopping rules and distorted beliefs continue to hold, with the parametric ver-
sion of gambler’s fallacy interpreted as γ > 0 replaced with the general notion of negative
dependence as in Assumption OA.1(c).
To define the MOM estimators for agents who observe several sub-datasets of histo-
ries with different censoring thresholds, we extend the moment functions a1, a2 to take as
argument multiple history distributions. That is, a1(H(1), ...,H(K)) := Eh∼⊕K
k=1H(k) [h1] and
a2(H(1), ...,H(K)) := Eh∼⊕K
k=1H(k) [h2 | h2 6= ∅], where ⊕Kk=1H(k) is the mixture distribution as-
signing 1
K
weight to each of the k history distributions, (H(k))Kk=1.AfterK sub-datasets of cen-
sored histories with distributions H•(c[0], ..., c[K−1]), the MOM estimators µM1 (c[0], ..., c[K−1]),
µM2 (c[0], ..., c[K−1]) are such that
a1(H•(c[0]), ...,H•(c[K−1])) = a1(H(θM1 , θM2 ; c[0]), ...,H(θM1 , θM2 ; c[K−1]))
a2(H•(c[0]), ...,H•(c[K−1])) = a2(H(θM1 , θM2 ; c[0]), ...,H(θM1 , θM2 ; c[K−1])).
One caveat: we must now ensure the MOM estimator exists in each generation when the
previous generation uses any cutoff stopping rule that has a positive probability of continuing
into the next period. To guarantee existence, I impose an additional assumption on how the
feasible models relates to the true distribution F •.
Assumption OA.2. (a) The supports of X1 and X2 under the true distribution F • are
I1 and I2, respectively.
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(b) The range of θ1 7→ EF1(·;θ1)[X1] is I1.
(c) For every θ1 ∈ Θ1 and x1 ∈ I1, θ2 7→ EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x1)[X2] is continuous with a range of
I2.
Assumption OA.2(a) is a consistency requirement, saying that the supports for the ob-
jective distributions of X1 and X2 match their supports under the agents’ feasible models.
Assumption OA.2(b) and Assumption OA.2(c) ensures the agents can always match the two
moment conditions. It is easily verified that Examples OA.1, OA.2, and OA.3 satisfy As-
sumption OA.2 when the true joint distribution of (X1, X2) is supported on R2, [0,∞)2, and
[0, 1]2 respectively.
Corollary OA.2. Fix some objective, independent distribution F • for (X1, X2) and suppose
agents’ feasible models {F (·; θ1, θ2) : θ1 ∈ Θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ2} satisfy Assumptions OA.1 and OA.2.
Suppose the payoff function u2(x1, x2) in the optimal-stopping problem is linear in x2. Initiate
the 0th generation at an arbitrary cutoff c[0] in the interior of I1. Then, beliefs and cutoff
thresholds (µM1,[t])t≥1, (µM2,[t])t≥1, and (cM[t] )t≥1 form monotonic sequences.
This corollary establishes the monotonicity of the beliefs and cutoffs for MOM agents,
analogous to the monotonicity result of Theorem 2.
Proof. I first show that under any of the models F (·; θ1, θ2), agent’s subjectively optimal
stopping rule is a cutoff rule (possibly involving never stopping or always stopping). It
suffices to show that
x1 7→ (u1(x1)− EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x1)[u2(x1, X2)])
is strictly increasing in x1. By linearity of u2 in its second argument, this expression is equal
to
x1 7→ (u1(x1)− u2(x1,EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x1))).
Suppose x′1 > x
′′
1 . By Assumption 1(b),
u1(x
′
1)− u2(x
′
1,EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x′1)) ≥ u1(x
′′
1)− u2(x
′′
1 ,EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x′1)).
By Assumption OA.1(c), EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x′1) < EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x′′1 ). Combined with Assumption 1(a), it
gives u2(x
′′
1 ,EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x′1)) < u2(x
′′
1 ,EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x′′1 )), hence showing
u1(x
′
1)− u2(x
′
1,EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x′1)) > u1(x
′′
1)− u2(x
′′
1 ,EF2|1(·;θ1,θ2|x′′1 )).
Also, suppose F (·; θ1, θ′′2 ) induces either a stopping threshold which is an interior point of
I1, or always stopping. Then F (·; θ1, θ′2) induces a higher stopping threshold or always
stopping whenever θ′2 ≥ θ′′2 . To see this, if there is an indifference point x¯1 in the interior
of I1 with u1(x¯1) = u2(x¯1,EF2|1(·;θ1,θ′′2 |x¯1)), then we have EF2|1(·;θ1,θ′2|x¯1) > EF2|1(·;θ1,θ′′2 |x¯1) due
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to Assumption OA.1(b), so u1(x¯1) < u2(x¯1,EF2|1(·;θ1,θ′2|x¯1)). This shows under F (·; θ1, θ
′
2)
the agent strictly prefers continuing at x¯1, so the acceptance threshold must be higher.
Similarly, if the agent prefers always stopping at every x1 ∈ I1 under F (·; θ1, θ′′2 ). then she
prefers strictly stopping at every x1 under F (·; θ1, θ′2).
I now show that µM1,[t], µM2,[t], and cM[t] are well defined for every t ≥ 1.MOM agents in gener-
ation t ≥ 1 face t sub-datasets of censored histories, with the distributionH•(c[0]), ...,H•(c[t−1])
where c[0] ∈ int(I1). The moments to match are
a1(H•(c[0]), ...,H•(c[K−1])) = EF • [X1],
a2(H•(c[0]), ...,H•(c[K−1])) = EF • [X2],
where the second-period moment is well defined because c[0] is interior, so a positive fraction
of histories in at least one sub-dataset contain uncensored X2. These moments are interior
values in I1, I2 respectively, since F • has full-support marginal distributions.
By Assumption OA.2(b), there exists θ¯1 ∈ Θ1, independent of K and (c[0], ..., c[K−1]), so
that EF1(·;θ¯1)[X1] = EF • [X1]. By combining Assumption OA.1(b) and OA.2(c), we get that
θ2 7→ a2(H(θ¯1, θ2; c[0]), ...,H(θ¯1, θ2; c[K−1]))
is increasing, continuous on Θ2 with a range of I2. (This uses the fact that c[0] is in the interior
of I1.) Since MOM agents are matching an interior value EF • [X2] ∈ int(I2), this shows that
for any K and (c[0], ..., c[K−1]) with c[0] ∈ int(I1), θM1 (c[0], ..., c[K−1]) and θM2 (c[0], ..., c[K−1])
exist, and furthermore θM1 (c[0], ..., c[K−1]) = θ¯1.
By uniqueness of MOM estimators in Lemma OA.16, µM1,[t], µM2,[t] are well defined for each
t ≥ 1. Also, cM[t] is also well defined for each t ≥ 1, given that we have shown the optimal
strategy in the model F (·;µM1,[t], µM2,[t]) is a cutoff strategy.
To prove monotonicity, first suppose that c[1] ≤ c[0]. I have argued that we must have
θM1,[2] = θM1,[1] = θ¯1, so now I rule out θM2,[2] > θM2,[1]. Note that
a2(H(θ¯1, θ2; c[0]),H(θ¯1, θ2; c[1])) = w0
w0 + w1
a2(H(θ¯1, θ2; c[0])) + w1
w0 + w1
a2(H(θ¯1, θ2; c[1]))
where w0 = PF • [X1 ≤ c[0]] > 0 and w1 = PF • [X1 ≤ c[1]] ≥ 0. The moment-matching
condition for generation 1 implies a2(H(θ¯1, θM2,[1]; c[0])) = EF • [X2]. For any θM2,[2] > θM2,[1], we
have
a2(H(θ¯1, θM2,[2]; c[0])) > EF • [X2]
from Assumption OA.2(b). If c[1] = inf(I1), we have found a contradiction since the weight
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w1 is 0. When c[1] > inf(I1), we get
a2(H(θ¯1, θM2,[2]; c[1])) ≥ a2(H(θ¯1, θM2,[2]; c[0])) > EF • [X2]
by combining Assumption OA.2(c) with the fact that c[1] ≤ c[0]. Both w0 and w1 are strictly
positive, and they are multiplied to terms both strictly larger than EF • [X2]. This shows
a2(H(θ¯1, θM2,[2]; c[0]),H(θ¯1, θM2,[2]; c[1])) > EF • [X2],
again contradicting the moment condition.
Hence we must have θM2,[2] ≤ θM2,[1], and thus cM[2] ≤ cM[1] by monotonicity of the cutoff
threshold in belief as discuss before. Similar argument establishes (µM1,[t])t≥1, (µM2,[t])t≥1, and
(cM[t] )t≥1 are decreasing sequences.
The case of c[1] > c[0] is symmetric.
OA 6 The Censoring Effect in a Finite-Urn Model
Rabin (2002) Section 7 discusses an example with endogenous observations. There is an
infinite population of financial analysts, each with quality θ ∈ {14 , 12 , 34}. Conditional on
quality θ, an analyst generates either a good (signal a) or a bad (signal b) return each
period, with probabilities θ and 1−θ and independently across periods. The agent, however,
believes successive returns from the same analyst are generated through a finite-urn model.
Consider an urn with N balls where N is a multiple of 4. For an analyst with quality
θ, initialize the urn with θN balls labeled “a” and (1 − θ)N balls labeled “b.” Successive
returns are successive draws without replacement from the urn. The urn is refreshed every
two draws. Rabin (2002) calls an agent with this finite-urn model an “N -Freddy”. Since
the urn is not refreshed between draws 2k − 1 and 2k for k = 1, 2, 3, ..., such pairs of draw
exhibit negative correlation in agent’s feasible model, generating the gambler’s fallacy.
Returning to Rabin (2002) Section 7’s example, objectively all financial analysts have
quality θ = 12 . The agent samples a financial analyst at random and observes his returns over
two periods. Depending on the realizations of these two returns, the agent either observes the
same analyst for two more periods before sampling a new analyst, or immediately samples
a new analyst. This procedure is infinitely repeated. Rabin (2002) investigates a 4-Freddy
agent’s long-run belief about the proportions of analysts with the three levels of quality in
the population.
The endogenous observation in the example is distinct from what I term the “censoring
effect” in this paper. The main mechanism behind my censoring effect is that some obser-
vations omit signals X2, which biased agents judge to be negatively correlated with signals
that are always observed, X1. This then leads to distorted inference. However, in Rabin
(2002)’s finite-urn model, the urn is refreshed every two periods. This means an N -Freddy
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4-Freddy θ = 14 θ =
1
2 θ =
3
4
aa 0 16
1
2
ab 14
1
3
1
4
ba 14
1
3
1
4
bb 12
1
6 0
b∅ 34
1
2
1
4
8-Freddy θ = 14 θ =
1
2 θ =
3
4
aa 128
6
28
15
28
ab 628
8
28
6
28
ba 628
8
28
6
28
bb 1528
6
28
1
28
b∅ 34
1
2
1
4
Table OA.1: The likelihoods of observations under different analyst qualities, for 4-Freddy
and 8-Freddy agents.
agent judges the part of the data that is sometimes censored (the analyst’s returns in periods
3 and 4) to be independent of the part of the data that is always observed (the analyst’s
returns in periods 1 and 2). Therefore the driving force behind Rabin (2002) Section 7’s ex-
ample is not the interaction between censoring and the gambler’s fallacy, but rather between
censoring and the “Bayesian aspect” of N -Freddy’s quasi-Bayesian inference.
In this section, I study a related problem where an N -Freddy agent observes each analyst
for either one or two periods, depending on whether the analyst generates a bad first-period
return. This setup features the censoring effect, because the finite-urn model generates
negative correlation between the first and second draws from each urn. I find that the
agent’s inference under this censoring structure tends to be too optimistic. This conclusion
is in line with predictions about the censoring effect in the baseline model of this paper,
for the basic inference result in Proposition 2 shows that when the dataset is censored in
the opposite way (i.e. censored when the first draw is good), the resulting inference is too
pessimistic22. That is, I demonstrate the robustness of my censoring effect to an alternative
model of the gambler’s fallacy in a binary-signals setting, showing that it is not an artifact
of the continuous-signals setup in my baseline model.
Table OA.1 displays the likelihood of all signals of length 2 for the 4-Freddy and 8-
Freddy agents, for different values of θ ∈ {14 , 12 , 34}. The last row of each table also shows the
likelihoods of simply observing the signal b in the first period, under the censoring rule that
stops observing an analyst if his first return is bad.
I first discuss inference without censoring. After aa, Freddy exaggerates the relative
likelihood of θ = 34 to θ =
1
2 compared to a Bayesian, whereas after ab Freddy’s relative
likelihoods of these two qualities are the same as a Bayesian’s. Overall, given a sample with
an equal number of aa and ab signals, Freddy exaggerates the relative likelihood of θ = 34 to
θ = 12 . This phenomenon is analogous to the continuous version of gambler’s fallacy where a
biased observer “partially forgives” a mediocre outcome following an outstanding outcome.
22Proposition OA.12 in the Online Appendix shows that when the dataset is censoring using a strategy
that stops when X1 ≤ c for some c ∈ R, inference about second-period fundamental is always too high.
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Here, even though the average outcome in the second period is mediocre, the fact that they
follow the best possible outcome a in the first period lead to an overly optimistic estimate
about the analyst’s ability. By the same logic, observing an equal number of ba and bb signals
would lead to exaggeration of the likelihood of θ = 14 relative to θ =
1
2 .
However, now suppose the second observation is censored when the first observation is
b. The otherwise symmetric situation becomes asymmetric. Following the observation of b∅
(where the second draw is censored), Freddy’s inference is the same as a Bayesian’s. So
we have turned off the channel leads to exaggerating the probability of θ = 14 but kept the
channel that leads to exaggerating the probability of θ = 34 . This is analogous to the censoring
effect in my model, where censoring second-period draw following unfavorable first-period
draws implies overly optimistic inferences.
In the long-run, the agent observes a distribution of returns across different analysts:
25% of the time aa is observed, 25% of the time ab is observed, and 50% of the time b∅
is observed. To calculate the agent’s long-run beliefs, first suppose Freddy’s prior specifies
either all analysts have θ = 14 or all analysts have θ =
3
4 . Then Freddy’s long-run inference
is given by the parameter maximizing expected log-likelihood of the data. For 4-Freddy, the
log-likelihood likelihood under θ = 14 is −∞ while the log-likelihood under θ = 34 is a finite
number. For 8-Freddy, The log-likelihood under θ = 14 is
1
4 ln(1/28) +
1
4 ln(6/28) +
1
2 ln(3/4) ≈ −1.362
and the log-likelihood under θ = 34 is
1
4 ln(
15
28) +
1
4 ln(
6
28) +
1
2 ln(1/4) ≈ −1.234.
So in both cases, Freddy will come to believe θ = 34 over θ =
1
4 for all analysts.
Now consider a 4-Freddy who dogmatically believes some 1 − κ ∈ (0, 1) fraction of the
analysts have θ = 12 , but the remaining analysts either have θ =
1
4 or θ =
3
4 . So, the agent
estimates qa ∈ [0, 1 − κ], the fraction of analysts who have θ = 34 . Straightforward algebra
shows that the q∗a maximizing expected log-likelihood of the data is q∗a = 718κ+
1
9 for κ ≥ 211 ,
q∗a = κ otherwise. Since 718κ +
1
9 >
1
2κ for all κ ∈ ( 211 , 1), we see that no matter what
fraction of analysts 4-Freddy believes to be average, he will end up believing there are more
above-average than below-average analysts in the population. That is, his overall belief will
be too optimistic.
OA 7 The Gambler’s Fallacy and Attentional Stability
Many papers on behavioral learning, including this one, can be thought of as studying agents
whose prior (or “misspecified theory”) over states of the world excludes the true, data-
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generating state. Agents in this paper start with a prior supported on the class of feasible
models {Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) : (µ1, µ2) ∈ M} for some fixed γ > 0, with different models viewed as
different states. But the true state is the objective distribution (X1, X2) ∼ Ψ(µ•1, µ•2; 0) that
lies outside the feasible set. This discrepancy is not an issue when agents move one at a time
and pass down their beliefs, since each agent only updates using one history — her own. But
in the large-generations environment, as an agent’s data set grows, her misspecified theory
can appear infinitely less likely in the limit than an alternative prior belief (or “light-bulb
theory”) that includes the true state in its support.
Gagnon-Bartsch, Rabin, and Schwartzstein (2018) offer an explanation for why such
misspecified theories persist with learning – attentional stability. Under a misspecified theory,
some coarsened information may be sufficient for decision-making. When agents only pay
attention to this coarsened information, the aspects of the data that they attend to may
be so coarse that their misspecified theory no longer appears infinitely less likely than the
light-bulb theory.
In this section, I investigate the attentional stability of the gambler’s fallacy bias in my
learning setting for the Gaussian case (so, Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) will stand for a correlated Gaus-
sian distribution). The main intuition is that when agents are dogmatic about γ, they are
dogmatic about the correlation between X1 and X2. Therefore, under their misspecified the-
ory, agents do not find it necessary to separately keep track of the conditional distributions
X2 | (X1 = x1) for different values of x1. Agents believe certain “statistics” of the dataset
are sufficient for decision-making, and this process of reducing the entire dataset into these
sufficient statistics removes features of the dataset that would otherwise have led the agents
to question the validity of their theory.
My setting differs in two ways from that of Gagnon-Bartsch, Rabin, and Schwartzstein
(2018). Each of my agents acts once (after observing a possibly large or even infinite dataset),
while their agents observe one signal each period over an infinite number of periods. Another
distinction is that data is endogenous in my setting, whereas Gagnon-Bartsch, Rabin, and
Schwartzstein (2018) almost entirely focus on an exogenous-data environment. So, I begin
by defining the key concepts surrounding attentional stability in my setting.
OA 7.1 A Definition of Attentional Stability in Large Datasets
In the learning environment where agents act in large generations, each agent in generation
t observes t sub-datasets of infinitely many histories. The overall distribution of histories
in the dataset is H•(c[0], ..., c[t−1]) = ⊕t−1k=0H•(c[k]), where the right-hand side refers to the
mixture between the t history distributions that assigns weight 1/t to each.
To develop a definition of attentional stability in large datasets, I consider an agent
who directly observes a distribution of histories (instead of a dataset with this distribution)
H•(c1, ..., cL) ∈ ∆(H). This represents the observations of agents in each generation t ≥ 1 of
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the large-generations environment.
Definition OA.6. Let pi, λ be beliefs over the joint distribution of (X1, X2). Say pi is inex-
plicable relative to λ, conditional on the true model Ψ• and censoring thresholds c1, ..., cL,
if H•(c1, ..., cL) = H(Ψ; c1, ..., cL) for some Ψ ∈ supp(λ), but H•(c1, ..., cL) 6= H(Ψ; c1, ..., cL)
for any Ψ ∈ supp(λ).
Each feasible model Ψ and list of censoring thresholds c1, ..., cL together induce a distri-
bution over histories. If the observed history distribution H•(c1, ..., cL) can be produced by
some feasible model of (X1, X2) in the support of the light-bulb theory λ, but not by any
distribution in the support of the misspecified theory pi, then I call pi inexplicable.
I now define a particular kind of limited attention. Given a distribution over histories,
the agent maps the entire distribution to finitely many real numbers. This is an extreme
form of data coarsening. If there is a strategy optimal under the misspecified theory pi that
only makes use of these finitely many statistics, then we have a sufficient-statistics strategy.
Definition OA.7. A sufficient-statistics strategy (SSS) for large generations consists of a
statistics map Λ : ∆(H)→ RK for some finite K <∞ and a cutoff map σ : Im(Λ)→ R, such
that agents in each generation t ≥ 1 of the large-generations environment find it optimal
(under the prior Ψ ∼ pi) to use the stopping strategy with cutoff σ(Λ(H)) whenever H is a
dataset of predecessors’ histories H = H•(c[0], ..., c[t−1]).
An agent following the strategy (Λ, σ) first extracts K statistics (i.e. K real numbers)
from the infinite dataset of predecessors’ histories. Then, she applies σ to choose a cutoff
threshold that only depends on the dataset through its K extracted statistics, Λ(H). The
idea is that the agent only pays attention to the finitely many statistics, a perhaps more
realistic behavior than paying full attention to the entire infinite dataset. If such a strategy
is optimal for an agent believing the true joint distribution of (X1, X2) is drawn according
to her (misspecified) prior Ψ ∼ pi, I call the pair (Λ, σ) an SSS.
A related definition of sufficiency works with finite datasets instead of infinite datasets.
This corresponds to limited attention in an alternative version of my Section 3 environment,
where agents act one at a time but observe all predecessors’ histories instead of adopting the
immediate predecessor’s posterior belief.
Definition OA.8. A sufficient-statistics strategy (SSS) in datasets of size N < ∞ con-
sists of a statistics map Λ(N) : HN → RK for some finite K < ∞ and a cutoff map
σ(N) : Im(Λ(N)) × N → R, such that the subjectively optimal cutoff threshold (under the
Bayesian posterior belief about the fundamentals after updating prior density m0(µ1, µ2)) is
σ(N)(Λ(N)((hn)Nn=1), N1) after observing a dataset (hn)Nn=1 with sizeN and containingN1 ≤ N
instances of second-period draws.
Finally, I combine these concepts to define attentional stability. Roughly speaking, the
theory pi is attentionally stable if we can find a (Λ, σ) pair that pays “fine” enough attention
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to be an SSS under pi, but “coarse” enough attention so that the resulting statistics can be
explained by some model in the support of pi.
Definition OA.9. Theory pi is attentionally stable, conditional on the objective model Ψ•
and censoring thresholds c1, ..., cL, if there exists an SSS (Λ, σ) such that Λ(H•(c1, ..., cL)) =
Λ(H(Ψ; c1, ..., cL)) for some Ψ in the support of pi.
OA 7.2 The Gambler’s Fallacy is Inexplicable under Full Atten-
tion
Fix γ > 0. Let pi be any full-support belief over {Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) : (µ1, µ2) ∈M}, whereM⊆ R2
is any specification of feasible fundamentals. Let λ be any belief with Ψ• = Ψ(µ•1, µ•2; 0) in
its support. I first show that without channeled attention, agents will come to realize that
their misspecified theory pi is wrong after seeing a large dataset.
Proposition OA.8. pi is inexplicable relative to λ, conditional on Ψ• and any censoring
thresholds c1, ..., cL ∈ R.
Proof. This is because Ψ• ∈ supp(λ) but every Ψ ∈ supp(pi) has KL divergence bounded
away from 0 relative to Ψ• in terms of the histories they generate under censoring by c1, ..., cL,
that is to say
inf
Ψ∈supp(pi)
DKL(H•(c1, ..., cL) ‖ H(Ψ; c1, ..., cL))
= inf
(µ1,µ2)∈M
DKL(H•(c1, ..., cL) ‖ H(Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ2, σ2; γ); c1, ..., cL)) > 0.
This inequality holds because the derivation of µ∗1, µ∗2 in Example 2 implies the above KL-
divergence minimization problem has a minimum strictly above 0 even over the unrestricted
domain (µ1, µ2) ∈ R2. The restriction to someM⊆ R2 can only make the minimum larger.
OA 7.3 The Gambler’s Fallacy is Attentionally Stable
Now I exhibit a family of SSS for finite datasets of size N and another SSS for large gener-
ations that naturally corresponds to taking N → ∞. These SSS have the additional prop-
erty that they lead agents to the same beliefs about the fundamentals as the full-attention
Bayesianism assumed in the rest of the paper. So, not only do these SSS justify agents not
discarding their misspecified theory after seeing large datasets, they also provide a limited-
attention foundation for the learning dynamics that I investigate in the main text of the
paper for the Gaussian case.
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In a dataset of size N, consider the statistics map with K = 2,
Λ(N)((hn)Nn=1) =
 1
N
N∑
n=1
h1,n,
1
#(n : h2,n 6= ∅)
∑
n:h2,n 6=∅
(h2,n + γh1,n)
 .
The first statistic is the sample mean of the first-period draws. The second statistic can
be thought of as a “re-centered” observation vn := h2,n + γh1,n for each history hn where
h2,n 6= ∅. The agent only pays attention to the sample averages of x1,n = h1,n and vn. Under
the feasible model Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ), we may write the distributions of X1, X2 as
X1 = µ1 + 1
X2 = µ2 + γ1 + z2
where 1, z2 ∼ N (0, σ2), are independent. Defining V := X2 + γX1, we see that under
Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ), V = µ2 + γµ1 + z2. So, observations of first-period draws are signals about µ1,
while observations of re-centered second-period V are signals about µ2 + γµ1.
Proposition OA.9. Λ(N) is part of an SSS in datasets of size N . The cutoff choice in this
SSS is the same as for the full-attention agent.
Proof. Write φ(x; a, b2) for the Gaussian density with mean a, variance b2, evaluated at x.
Without loss, suppose h2,n 6= ∅ for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N1, and h2,n = ∅ for all n > N1. I show that
the posterior density over (µ1, µ2) after the dataset (hn)Nn=1 only depends on N1, 1N
∑N
n=1 h1,n,
and 1
N1
∑N1
n=1(h2,n + γh1,n). Indeed,
m0(µ1, µ2|(hn)Nn=1) ∝m0(µ1, µ2)
 N1∏
n=1
φ(h1,n;µ1, σ2) · φ(h2,n;µ2 − γ(h1,n − µ1), σ2)
 ·
 N∏
n=N1+1
φ(h1,n;µ1, σ2)

=m0(µ1, µ2)
[
N∏
n=1
φ(h1,n;µ1, σ2)
]
·
 N1∏
n=1
φ(h2,n;µ2 − γ(h1,n − µ1), σ2)

=
[
N∏
n=1
φ(h1,n;µ1, σ2)
]
·
 N1∏
n=1
φ(h2,n + γh1,n;µ2 + γµ1, σ2)
 .
It is well-known that under the Gaussian likelihood, (h1,n)Nn=1 7→
∏N
n=1 φ(h1,n;µ1, σ2) is a
function of 1
N
∑N
n=1 h1,n, and for the same reason (h2,n+γh1,n)N1n=1 7→
∏N1
n=1 φ(h2,n+γh1,n;µ2 +
γµ1, σ
2) is a function of 1
N1
∑N1
n=1(h2,n + γh1,n).
Since the posterior beliefm0(·|(hn)Nn=1) only depends onN1 and the two statistics Λ(N)1 ((hn)Nn=1),
Λ(N)2 ((hn)Nn=1) ∈ R, the optimal cutoff rule may be expressed as a function of these two statis-
tics, N1, and c of the predecessors.
In the environment where full-attention Bayesian agents move one at a time, their be-
havior is indistinguishable from agents using this SSS. Roughly speaking, this is because
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the subjective joint distribution between (X1, V ) is Gaussian and the mean of a sequence of
Gaussian random variables is a sufficient statistic for the likelihood of the entire sequence.
Even when agents are full-attention Bayesians, their posterior distribution only depends on
the histories data through these statistics. Therefore, the statistics are sufficient for any
decision problem.
Consider now the large-sample analog of the finite-sample SSS just defined. Again with
K = 2, consider the statistic map Λ sends each distribution H to Eh∼H[hi,1] and Eh∼H[hi,2 +
γhi,1 | hi,2 6= ∅]. I show that Λ makes pi attentionally explicable whenever pi has full-support
over the feasible models indexed by feasible fundamentalsM = R2.
Proposition OA.10. For any list of censoring thresholds c1, ..., cL ∈ R and fundamentals
µ1, µ2 ∈ R,
Λ1(H(Ψ(µ1, µ2, γ); c1, ..., cL)) = µ1,
Λ2(H(Ψ(µ1, µ2, γ); c1, ..., cL)) = µ2 + γµ1.
Also,
Λ(H•(c1, ..., cL)) = Λ(H( Ψ(µ•1, µ∗2(c1, ..., cL); γ) ; c1, ..., cL))
The first two equations in this claim show that for any c1, ..., cL, Ψ 7→ Λ(H(Ψ; c1, ..., cL))
is a one-to-one function on the support of pi, and furthermore any values of the statistics
s1, s2 can be rationalized through appropriate choices of µ1, µ2. We may put σ(s1, s2) =
C(s1, s2 − γs1; γ) to make (Λ, σ) an SSS, thus showing the gambler’s fallacy is attentionally
stable in large datasets. Another implication of this claim is that the limited-attention agent
comes to believe the large-generations pseudo-true fundamentals (µ•1, µ∗2(c1, ..., cL)) after see-
ing the history distributionH•(c1, ..., cL). Therefore, the large-generations SSS gives the same
behavior as the full-attention Bayesianism in the baseline large-generations environment.
Proof. To see the first two equations, let c ∈ R, µ1, µ2 ∈ R, and write Ψ = Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ). We
have
Eh∼H(Ψ;c)[h2 + γh1 | h2 6= ∅]
=Eh∼H(Ψ;c)[h2 | h2 6= ∅] + γEh∼H(Ψ;c)[h1 | h2 6= ∅]
=EΨ[X2 | X1 ≤ c] + γEΨ[X1 | X1 ≤ c]
=EΨ[µ2 − γ(X1 − µ1) | X1 ≤ c] + γEΨ[X1 | X1 ≤ c]
=EΨ[µ2 + γµ1 | X1 ≤ c]
=µ2 + γµ1.
Since this holds for any c, so we must get that on the mixed history distribution,
Λ2(H(Ψ(µ1, µ2, γ); c1, ..., cL)) = µ2 + γµ1
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as well. It is easy to see that we must have Λ1(H(Ψ(µ1, µ2, γ); c1, ..., cL)) = µ1.
To obtain the final equation, first note that we can re-write the second statistic under
the true distribution of histories H•(c1, ...cL) as a weighted average,
Eh∼H•(c1,...cL)[h2 + γh1 | h2 6= ∅] =
L∑
`=1
w` · Eh∼H•(c`)[h2 + γh1 | h2 6= ∅]
This is because the event of h2 6= ∅ happens only when h1 falls below the censoring threshold,
so the posterior probability of h being generated from the sub-distribution H•(c`) given that
h2 6= ∅ depends on the relative likelihoods of X1 falling under the L different censoring
thresholds.
For each `,
Eh∼H•(c`)[h2 + γh1 | h1 ≤ c] = µ•2 + γE[X1 | X1 ≤ c`]
where the conditional expectation of h2|h1 ≤ c` is simply µ•2 by independence of X2 and X1
under Ψ•. Putting this into the weighted average expression,
Eh∼H•(c1,...cL)[h2 + γh1 | h2 6= ∅] =µ•2 + γ
L∑
`=1
w` · E[X1 | X1 ≤ c`].
In order to match the statistics, s1 = µ•1 and s2 = µ•2 + γ
∑L
`=1w` ·E[X1 | X1 ≤ c`] produced
by Λ(H•(c1, ..., cL)), we must therefore have µ1 = µ•1, and
µ•2 + γ
L∑
`=1
w` · E[X1 | X1 ≤ c`] = µ2 + γµ•1,
which rearranges to
µ2 = µ•2 − γ
L∑
`=1
w` · (µ•1 − E[X1 | X1 ≤ c`]) = µ∗2(c1, ..., cL).
OA 8 Additional Extensions of the Baseline Model
I consider further extensions of the baseline model for the Gaussian case.
OA 8.1 Draws as Costs
In the baseline model, I have studied optimal-stopping problems satisfying Assumption 1.
One implication of Assumption 1 is that higher draws are more beneficial to the agent, as
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u1 and u2 are strictly increasing functions of the draws in their respective periods. In this
section, I verify the robustness of my positive-feedback loop result when draws are interpreted
as costs. Here is the canonical example to keep in mind:
Example OA.6 (Do It Now or Later). The agent has two periods to complete a task. In
period 1, she draws her cost of completing the task today, X1 = x1. The agent chooses
between paying x1 and finishing the task, or waiting until period 2. If she decides to wait,
she will draw another cost X2 = x2 in period 2, which she must then pay. So, u1(x1) = −x1
and u2(x1, x2) = −x2.
In optimal-stopping problems like Example OA.6, the subjectively optimal stopping rule
given any beliefs about the fundamentals in the two periods features stopping for low values
ofX1. This means agents observed censored datasets from their predecessors whereX2 is only
observed following high values of X1, the “opposite” kind of endogenous censoring compared
to what happens in problems satisfying Assumption 1. Now, a more heavily censored dataset
induces a higher belief about the second-period mean in the next generation, which causes
the next generation to accept higher costs in the first period. This exacerbates the censoring
and the positive feedback cycle again obtains.
More generally, I will consider payoff functions u1(x1), u2(x1, x2) satisfy the following
assumptions.
Assumption OA.3. The payoff functions satisfy:
(a) For x′1 > x
′′
1 and x
′
2 > x
′′
2 , u1(x
′
1) < u1(x
′′
1) and u2(x
′
1, x
′
2) < u2(x
′
1, x
′′
2).
(b) For x′1 > x
′′
1 and any x¯2, u1(x
′
1)− u1(x′′1) < −|u2(x′1, x¯2)− u2(x′′1 , x¯2)|.
(c) There exist xh1 , xl2, xl1, xh2 ∈ R so that u1(xh1)−u2(xh1 , xl2) < 0, while u1(xl1)−u2(xl1, xh2) >
0
(d) u1, u2 are continuous. Also, for any x¯1 ∈ R, x2 7→ u2(x¯1, x2) is absolutely integrable
with respect to any Gaussian distribution on R.
I show that the subjectively optimal stopping strategy under dogmatic belief in funda-
mentals µ1, µ2 takes a cutoff form, but the agent stops in period 1 for low realizations of
period 1 costs, X1 ≤ c. Furthermore, the optimal cutoff increases in µ2.
Proposition OA.11. Under Assumption OA.3 and for γ > 0,
• Under each feasible model Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ), there exists a cutoff threshold Ccost(µ1, µ2; γ) ∈
R such that it is strictly optimal to continue whenever x1 > Ccost(µ1, µ2; γ) and strictly
optimal to stop whenever x1 < Ccost(µ1, µ2; γ).
• For every µ1 ∈ R, µ2 7→ Ccost(µ1, µ2; γ) is strictly increasing.
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Proof. Consider the pair of payoff functions u˜1 : R → R and u˜2 : R2 → R defined by
u˜1(x˜1) := u1(−x˜1) and u˜2(x˜1, x˜2) := u2(−x˜1,−x˜2). It is easy to verify that since u1, u2
satisfy Assumption OA.3, u˜1, u˜2 must satisfy Assumption 1.
When (X1, X2) ∼ Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ), we also have (X˜1, X˜2) ∼ Ψ(−µ1,−µ2; γ), where (X˜1, X˜2) =
(−X1,−X2). The best stopping strategy under the payoff functions u˜1, u˜2 when draws
are generated from Ψ(−µ1,−µ2; γ) involves the cutoff threshold C(−µ1,−µ2; γ), stopping
whenever X˜1 exceeds the threshold and continuing whenever X˜1 falls below it. Here,
C(−µ1,−µ2; γ) is the usual acceptance threshold from Proposition 1.
By the relationship between u1, u2 and u˜1, u˜2, we deduce that the optimal stopping strat-
egy under the payoff functions u1, u2 when draws are generated from Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ) involves
the cutoff threshold Ccost(µ1, µ2; γ) := −C(−µ1,−µ2; γ). The agent should stop when the
first (cost-based) draw falls below Ccost(µ1, µ2; γ), and continue when the first draw exceeds
the cutoff.
For µ′2 > µ2, we have C(−µ1,−µ′2; γ) < C(−µ1,−µ2; γ) by Proposition 1. So,
Ccost(µ1, µ
′
2; γ) = −1 · C(−µ1,−µ
′
2; γ) > −1 · C(−µ1,−µ2; γ) = Ccost(µ1, µ2; γ)
as desired.
As Proposition OA.11 shows, the subjectively optimal stopping rules in problems sat-
isfying Assumption OA.3 imply a different kind of censoring than in the baseline model.
Specifically, the history contains the second-period draw only when X1 is high. For c ∈ R,
let S¯c denote the stopping strategy S(x1) = Continue if x1 > c, S(x1) = Stop if x1 ≤ c. The
bar notation distinguishes it from Sc, the stopping strategy with the stopping region [c,∞).
For c, µ1, µ2 ∈ R, the KL divergence between H(Ψ•; S¯c) and H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); S¯c) is given by
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · ln
(
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2)
φ(x1;µ1, σ2)
)
dx1
+
∫ ∞
c
{∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · φ(x2;µ•2, σ2) · ln
[
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · φ(x2;µ•2, σ2)
φ(x1;µ1, σ2) · φ(x2;µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1), σ2)
]
dx2
}
dx1.
Proposition OA.12. The pseudo-true fundamentals minimizing DKL(H(Ψ•; S¯c) ‖ H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); S¯c))
are µ∗1(c) = µ•1 and
µ∗2(c) = µ•2 − γ (µ•1 − E [X1 | X1 ≥ c]) .
So µ∗2(c) is strictly increasing in c.
Since E [X1 | X1 ≥ c] > µ•1 for every c ∈ R and γ > 0, this shows the pseudo-true
second-period fundamental is always too high for every stopping strategy S¯c. The direction
of misinference about µ2 is the opposite as in the main text, due to the opposite asymmetry
data censoring. Still, the key mechanism behind the misinference remains the same: the
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interaction between the (opposite kind of) censoring effect and the gambler’s fallacy, as an
unbiased agent with γ = 0 and a biased agent facing uncensored data both infer µ2 correctly.
Since high values of draws are bad news in the environment where draws are interpreted
as costs, this shows agents end up over-pessimistic beliefs about the distributions, as over-
estimating µ2 corresponds to making an overly unfavorable assessment about the second
period.
Proof. Rewrite DKL(H(Ψ•; S¯c) ‖ H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); S¯c)) as
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · ln
(
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2)
φ(x1;µ1, σ2)
)
dx1
+
∫ ∞
c
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ·
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x2;µ•2, σ2) ln
[
φ(x2;µ•2, σ2)
φ(x2;µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1), σ2)
]
dx2dx1.
The KL divergence betweenN (µtrue, σ2true) andN (µmodel, σ2model) is ln σmodelσtrue +
σ2true+(µtrue−µmodel)2
2σ2model
−
1
2 , so we may simplify the first term and the inner integral of the second term.
(µ1 − µ•1)2
2σ2 +
∫ ∞
c
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ·
[
σ2 + (µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)2
2σ2 −
1
2
]
dx1.
Dropping constant terms not depending on µ1 and µ2 and multiplying by σ2, we get a
simplified expression of the objective,
ξ(µ1, µ2) :=
(µ1 − µ•1)2
2 +
∫ c
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ·
[
(µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)2
2
]
dx1.
We have the partial derivatives by differentiating under the integral sign,
∂ξ
∂µ2
=
∫ ∞
c
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · (µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)dx1
∂ξ
∂µ1
= (µ1 − µ•1) + γ
∫ ∞
c
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) · (µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)dx1
= (µ1 − µ•1) + γ
∂ξ
∂µ2
By the first order conditions, at the minimum (µ∗1, µ∗2), we must have:
∂ξ
∂µ2
(µ∗1, µ∗2) =
∂ξ
∂µ1
(µ∗1, µ∗2) = 0⇒ µ∗1 = µ•1.
So µ∗2 satisfies ∂ξ∂µ2 (µ
•
1, µ
∗
2) = 0, which by straightforward algebra shows µ∗2(c) = µ•2 −
γ (µ•1 − E [X1 | X1 ≥ c]) .
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Combining Propositions OA.11 and OA.12, we see that the positive-feedback loop be-
tween distorted actions and distorted beliefs is preserved when draws are interpreted as
costs. Indeed, a higher belief about the second-period fundamental increases the threshold
c, which leads to more severe censoring of the dataset as X2 is only observed when X1 ≥ c.
This more severely censored dataset, in turn, leads to even higher belief in the second-period
fundamental by Proposition OA.12. So as in Theorem 2, cutoff thresholds and beliefs about
the fundamentals form monotonic sequences across generations t ≥ 1.
OA 8.2 Population with Heterogeneity in Selection Neglect
In Section 3’s learning environment, select neglect is unlikely to appear. Bayesian inference
simply takes the form of updating beliefs using what the agent sees during the stage game:
either X1 or the pair (X1, X2).
I believe even the large-generations learning environment from Section 4 is unlikely to
evoke selection neglect, a psychology most likely to be present when the observed dataset
contains does not contain reminders about selection. Censoring is highly explicit and salient
in my setting, which is not the type of framing that typically evokes selection neglect.
In Enke (2019)’s experiment on selection neglect, players (one human subject and five
computer players following a mechanical rule) are asked to guess a “state of the world”
based on the average of 6 private signals. Players are sorted into one of two groups based on
whether their own private signal is high or low, then observe the signals of others in their
group. In the baseline treatment, there is no reminder of the excluded data on the decision
screen where subjects are shown the signals of others in the same group and asked to enter
a guess. This treatment finds selection neglect. Another “nudge” treatment where subjects
are given a simple hint stating: “Also pay attention to those randomly drawn balls that are
not shown to you by the information source” reduces the number of selection neglecters by
50%. So I believe the much clearer reminders of selection in my environment should reduce
the frequency of selection neglect even further.
Jehiel (2018) studies misperceived investment returns under selection neglect. In his
model, each predecessor has a potential project and observes a private signal about the
project’s quality. Predecessors with high signals implement their projects. Agents in the
current generation observe the pool of implemented projects, then generate their own signals
about the qualities of these observed projects. These signals are independent of the actual
private signals that the predecessors used for implementation decisions. Current agents
infer the conditional quality given each signal using the empirical mean quality among past
implemented projects generating the same signal. This is another environment where the
dataset contains no hints about the existence of excluded data (the unimplemented projects)
or the selection criterion (the private signals of predecessors). In fact, if datasets in Jehiel
(2018)’s setting record the complete experience of the predecessors in their decision problems,
70
as is the case in my history datasets, then the misinference result no longer holds.
Nevertheless, in this section, I study an extension of the baseline model where a fraction
0 ≤ α < 1 of agents in each generation has full selection neglect, while the remainder are
baseline agents with the gambler’s fallacy. This mixture specification is inspired by Enke
(2019)’s experimental results, who finds heterogeneity in subjects’ degree of selection neglect
with the full-selection-neglect subjects and no-selection-neglect subjects together accounting
for a majority of the population. On the other hand, Enke (2019) does not find a significant
mass of subjects at any “intermediate” level of selection neglect.
To model agents with full selection neglect, I assume that when faced with a dataset of
histories (h1,n, h2,n)n∈[0,1], they treat (h1,n)n∈[0,1] as a sample from the unconditional distribu-
tion of X1, and (h2,n)n:h2,n 6=∅ as an independent sample from the unconditional distribution
of X2. Relative to the base line agents, they mistake the selection process by which h2,n’s
appear in the dataset: they are not censored at random, but only censored when h1,n exceeds
the acceptance threshold used by the predecessors. In this environment, the gambler’s fal-
lacy and selection neglect exactly cancel each other out, since in large datasets the mean of
h1,n is µ•1 and the mean of uncensored h2,n is µ•2. This shows that from the dataset H•(c) for
any c ∈ R, the selection neglecters correctly infer the fundamentals and choose the stopping
strategy with cutoff23 C(µ•1, µ•2; γ).
Now consider a baseline agent with the gambler’s fallacy, facing a dataset of histories
generated by a heterogeneous population of predecessors. A fraction α of the histories are
generated by selection neglecters using the stopping strategy SC(µ•1,µ•2;γ). The remaining 1−α
fraction are generated by baseline predecessors using the stopping strategy Sc. The next
Proposition characterizes the pseudo-true fundamentals maximizing the weighted-average
KL-divergence objective,
αDKL(H•(C(µ•1, µ•2; γ)) ‖ H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ);C(µ•1, µ•2; γ)))+(1−α)DKL(H•(c)||H(Ψ(µ1, µ2; γ); c)).
(4)
Proposition OA.13. The pseudo-true fundamentals minimizing Equation (4) when baseline
predecessors use the stopping threshold c is µSN1 = µ•1,
µSN2 (c) =
αP[X1 ≤ C(µ•1, µ•2; γ)]
αP[X1 ≤ C(µ•1, µ•2; γ)] + (1− α)P[X1 ≤ c]
· µ∗2(C(µ•1, µ•2; γ))
+ (1− α)P[X1 ≤ c]
αP[X1 ≤ C(µ•1, µ•2; γ)] + (1− α)P[X1 ≤ c]
· µ∗2(c).
Proof. Let w1 = α,w2 = 1− α, c1 = C(µ•1, µ•2; γ), c2 = c. By simple algebra, we may rewrite
23This cutoff may nevertheless differ from the objectively optimal one, since the selection neglecters also
suffer from the gambler’s fallacy, so they believe in the joint distribution Ψ(µ•1, µ•2; γ).
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the weighted KL divergence as
(µ1 − µ•1)2
2σ2 +
2∑
k=1
wk
{∫ ck
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ·
[
σ2 + (µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)2
2σ2 −
1
2
]
dx1
}
.
Dropping terms not dependent on µ1, µ2 and multiplying through by σ2, we get the simplified
objective
ξSN(µ1, µ2) :=
(µ1 − µ•1)2
2 +
2∑
k=1
wk
{∫ ck
−∞
φ(x1;µ•1, σ2) ·
[
(µ2 − γ(x1 − µ1)− µ•2)2
2σ2
]
dx1
}
.
The first-order condition is only satisfied at µSN1 = µ•1,
µSN2 =
1
w1P[X1 ≤ c1] + w2P[X1 ≤ c2]
2∑
k=1
wkP[X1 ≤ ck] {µ•2 − γ (µ•1 − E [X1|X1 ≤ ck])} .
This shows, in terms of expressions for pseudo-true fundamentals in the baseline model µ∗2,
µSN2 (c) =
αP[X1 ≤ C(µ•1, µ•2; γ)]
αP[X1 ≤ C(µ•1, µ•2; γ)] + (1− α)P[X1 ≤ c]
· µ∗2(C(µ•1, µ•2; γ))
+ (1− α)P[X1 ≤ c]
αP[X1 ≤ C(µ•1, µ•2; γ)] + (1− α)P[X1 ≤ c]
· µ∗2(c).
That is, with a mixture of selection-neglecter and baseline predecessors, baseline agents’
inference about the second-period fundamental is a convex combination between what they
would infer from the histories of the selection neglecters alone and what they would infer
from the histories of the baseline predecessors alone. The relative weights given to these two
pseudo-true second-period fundamentals depend on the relative sizes of the two subpopu-
lations, as well as on how frequently second-period draws are observed in each of the two
sub-datasets.
Since both µ∗2(C(µ•1, µ•2; γ)) and µ∗2(c) are strictly below µ•2, we immediately conclude the
same holds for µSN2 (c) for any c ∈ R. This shows the robustness of the over-pessimism result
from the main text to the presence of a fraction of selection neglecters.
Next, I compare a baseline society with no selection neglecters with a second society
containing a positive fraction of selection neglecters. I show that when two societies start
with the same generation 0 behavior, society with selection neglecters hold more optimistic
beliefs about the second-period fundamental and use a higher stopping threshold in every
generation t ≥ 1. This is not simply due to the mechanical reason that the selection neglecters
always make the correct inferences about the fundamentals, thereby making the “average”
belief in the society more optimistic. The presence of the selection neglecters also moderates
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the over-pessimism of the baseline gambler’s fallacy agents (without completing eliminating
it), by making the censoring effect less severe.
Corollary OA.3. Let 0 < α < 1. Consider two societies, A and B, where society A has no
selection neglecters and society B has an α fraction of selection neglecters in each generation.
Suppose both societies start at the same initial condition c[0] ∈ R. For t ≥ 1, consider the
auxiliary learning environment and denote the baseline agents’ beliefs and cutoff thresholds
in society k ∈ {A,B} as µk1,[t], µk2,[t], ck[t]. Then for every t ≥ 2, µ22,[t] > µ12,[t] and c2[t] > c1[t].
Proof. From Proposition OA.13 (and Example 2 for the case of t = 1), µA1,[t] = µB1,[t] = µ•1
for every t ≥ 1. Also, in the first generation, µA2,[1] = µB2,[1] and cA[1] = cB[1] since both societies
face the same dataset H•(c[0]). Since µA2,[1] < µ•2, we must have cA[1] = C(µ•1, µA2,[1]; γ) <
C(µ•1, µ•2; γ) by Lemma 1. In the second generation, µA2,[2] = µ∗2(cA[1]) and µB2,[2] is a convex
combination between µ∗2(cB[1]) and µ∗2(C(µ•1, µ•2; γ)). As µ∗2(cA[1]) = µ∗2(cB[1]) < µ∗2(C(µ•1, µ•2; γ))
due to Proposition 2, we conclude µB2,[2] > µA2,[2] and hence cB[2] > cA[2]. But when cB[t] > cA[t] and
C(µ•1, µ•2; γ) > cA[t] we have µ∗2(cA[t]) < µ∗2(cB[t]), which shows in the next generation, µB2,[t+1] is
the convex combination of two terms both exceeding µ∗2(cA[t]). This implies µB2,[t+1] > µA2,[t+1]
and cB[t+1] > cA[t+1]. By induction, the corollary holds for all t ≥ 2.
OA 8.3 Only Observing the Final Draw
In the baseline model, the history hn of predecessor n ∈ [0, 1] records just the first-period
draw hn = (x1,n,∅) if n stopped in period 1, and it records both draws hn = (x1,n, x2,n) if
n continued into period 2. An outcome history differs from a history of the baseline model
in that it always records only one draw – the one from the period where the agent stops.
So, predecessor n’s outcome history hon is either hon = (x1,n,∅) or hon = (∅, x2,n). This kind
of observation may be natural when the optimal-stopping problem is search without recall
(i.e. Example 1 with q = 0) and managers in the current generation only know about the
candidates who were eventually hired in the previous generation across various firms, but
not the early-phase candidates who were discovered but let go.
Write Ho(Ψ•; c) for the distribution of predecessors’ outcome histories when (X1, X2) ∼
Ψ• and predecessors use the cutoff threshold c. I show that for agents using a method-
of-moments (MOM) inference procedure analogous to the one in Online Appendix OA 5,
they will still infer the pseudo-true fundamentals associated with usual history distribu-
tion H(Ψ•; c) in the baseline model. To be precise, MOM agents find µMO1 , µMO2 so that
Ho(Ψ(µMO1 , µMO2 ; γ); c) matches Ho(Ψ•; c) in terms of the sample means of the uncensored
first-period draws and uncensored second-period draws. As µ1 7→ EX˜∼N (µ1,σ)[X˜|X˜ ≥ c] is a
strictly increasing function, the MOM inference µMO1 must correctly estimate the first-period
fundamental, µMO1 = µ•1. Also, note that for any µˆ1, µˆ2 ∈ R and any γˆ ≥ 0, the second mo-
ments is the same in the outcome histories distribution Ho(Ψ(µˆ1, µˆ2; γˆ); c) as in the baseline
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histories distribution H(Ψ(µˆ1, µˆ2; γˆ); c). By the method-of-moments interpretation of µ∗2(c),
we conclude that µMO2 (c) = µ∗2(c) for all c ∈ R.
The KL-divergence minimizing pseudo-fundamentals for agents observing outcomes proves
difficult to calculate analytically. This is because the likelihood of the outcome history
hon = (∅, x2,n) is given by an integral over its likelihoods for different censored realizations of
X1. Using numerical simulations, I show in Section OA 9.3 that when Bayesian agents with
a correct dogmatic belief about µ•1 face a large, finite dataset of outcome histories, their in-
ference about the second-period fundamental seems to closely match µ∗2(c). It remains as an
open conjecture whether the minimizers in these two different KL-divergence minimization
problems in fact coincide exactly.
OA 9 Numerical Simulations
OA 9.1 Pessimism and Fictitious Variation in Finite Datasets
Lemma OA.3 proves that when an agent with a full-support prior m0 : R2 → R observes N
histories drawn from the distribution H•(c) in the Gaussian case, then as N goes to infinity
her posterior belief almost surely concentrates on the KL-divergence minimizing pseudo-true
parameters. In this section, I use simulations to check how well the predictions of Proposition
2 and Proposition 7 hold up in finite datasets. In particular, I am interested in the pessimistic
inference in Proposition 2 and the fictitious variation in Proposition 7.
I consider the objective distribution (X1, X2) ∼ Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ2, σ2; 0) with µ1 = µ2 = 0,
σ2 = 1, and a stopping rule that censors X2 whenever X1 ≥ 1. I suppose agents have
dogmatic belief in γ = 0.5 and start with the (improper) flat prior on R2. In Figures
OA.1 and OA.2, I plot distributions of the Bayesian posterior mode after a dataset of size
N = 100, 1000, 10000. I find that when N = 100, there is 91.9% chance that agents under-
estimate the second-period and and 78.9% chance they believe in fictitious variation for the
second-period conditional variance. These probabilities grow to virtually 100% for N = 1000
and N = 10000.
OA 9.2 Welfare Implications of Endogenous Learning
In this paper, I have emphasized the dynamics of mislearning and the interaction between
distorted stopping strategy and distorted beliefs under the gambler’s fallacy. The positive
feedback cycle between censoring and gambler’s fallacy leads to additional welfare implica-
tions beyond what would happen with gambler’s fallacy alone in a static, exogenous-data
setting. Figure OA.3 returns to the illustrative example used for Figure 1 and compares the
expected loss (relative to using the objectively optimal stopping rule) in the learning steady
state versus the expected loss for the first-generation agents. Recall that Figure 1 considers
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Figure OA.1: Histograms of inferences about fundamentals in finite datasets. The red lines
in the histograms for µ1 denote the pseudo-true fundamental (and also the true fundamental)
µ∗1(c = 1) = 0. The blue lines in the histograms for µ2 denote the true fundamental µ•2 = 0,
while the red lines show the pseudo-true fundamental µ∗2(c = 1) = −0.1438.
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Figure OA.2: Histograms of inferences about variances in finite datasets. The red lines in
the histograms for σ21 denote the pseudo-true variance (and also the true variance) (σ∗1)2(c =
1) = 1. The blue lines in the histograms for σ22 denote the true fundamental (σ•2)2 = 1, while
the red lines show the pseudo-true fundamental (σ∗2)2(c = 1) = 1.157.
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Figure OA.3: Welfare loss in the first generation as a fraction of the total long-run welfare
loss, as a function of the believed correlation betweenX1 andX2. A more negative correlation
corresponds to a larger γ and a more severe gambler’s fallacy bias.
search without recall, so u1(x1) = x1, u2(x1, x2) = x2 with true fundamentals µ•1 = µ•2 = 0.
As I initialize the 0th generation with the objectively optimal stopping threshold c[0] = 0,
misinference from the gambler’s fallacy is solely responsible the first-generation loss. The
long-run loss, on the other hand, is exacerbated by successive generations of predecessors
lowering their stopping threshold and thus censoring the dataset with increasing severity.
As Figure OA.3 shows, the fraction of long-run losses attributable to passive inference un-
der gambler’s fallacy falls with the degree of the bias, highlighting the need of the dynamic
analysis especially in environment where we expect the bias to be more serious.
OA 9.3 Inference of Misspecified Bayesian Agents when Observ-
ing Only the Final Draw
Consider a Bayesian agent with the (improper) flat prior over the class of models
{Ψ(µ1, µ2, σ2, σ2, γ) : µ1 = 0, σ2 = 1, γ = 0.5, µ2 ∈ R}.
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Figure OA.4: Black circles show the expected posterior modes for Bayesian agents with
a flat prior over µ2 after seeing 10,000 outcome histories generated according to different
stopping thresholds. Blue X’s show the pseudo-true second-period fundamentals µ∗2(c) in
the baseline model for different values of c.
Suppose she sees a dataset of 10,000 predecessor outcome histories – that is, histories that
only show the draw for the period where the predecessor stopped, as in Section OA 8.3 –
when predecessors use the stopping strategy Sc. Figure OA.4 presents the expected posterior
mode24 for different cutoff thresholds, c ∈ {−2,−1.5,−1,−0.5, 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}.
These numerical calculations give suggestive evidence that when agents hold correct
beliefs about the first-period fundamental, they make more pessimistic inferences about the
second-period fundamentals in outcome histories datasets with a lower stopping threshold.
That is, the direction of the baseline censoring effect continues to obtain in this alternative
observation structure. In fact, they also suggest the pseudo-true second-period fundamentals
with outcome histories are very similar to the pseudo-true second-period fundamentals in
the baseline model.
24These expected posterior modes were calculated by performing 1000 simulation at each cutoff threshold,
computing the posterior mode in each simulation, then taking the average. The standard error for each of
these empirical averages is smaller than 0.002.
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